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Abstract
This dissertation develops a form of relativism in which propositions are treated as sets of
world-time-individual triples, in contrast to standard views that treat them as sets of
worlds or world-time pairs. This builds on existing proposals for predicates of personal
taste such as fun and tasty, and has ties to approaches to de se attitudes involving centered
worlds. I develop an accompanying pragmatic view in which the context set is similarly
construed as a set of world-time-individual triples. The semantic and pragmatic systems
together are used to account for the behavior of predicates of personal taste, epistemic
modals, indicative conditionals, and a variety of attitude reports, including control
constructions. I also explore ways that this account can help solve puzzles related to
Moore's paradox.
To give one concrete example, I propose that the proposition expressed by the
sentence it might be raining is the set of world-time-individual triples <w,t,x> such that
it's compatible with x's knowledge in w at t that it's raining. On the pragmatic side, a
speaker is justified in asserting this sentence in a conversation if it is compatible with the
speaker's own knowledge that it's raining; by asserting it, though, the speaker is making
the stronger proposal to make it common ground that it is compatible with the knowledge
of the entire group of conversational participants that it's raining. If this proposal is
accepted by the other participants, then the group will have established that their
knowledge states are aligned in a particular way.
I introduce the core semantic and pragmatic proposals in Chapter 2, focusing on
epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, and belief reports. In Chapter 3, I extend
the analysis to indicative conditionals, showing that this solves longstanding puzzles
involving the relationship between conditionals and disjunction. In Chapter 4, I extend
the approach to certain control constructions, with a special emphasis on capturing their
de se interpretation. In Chapter 5, I look at two puzzles related to Moore's paradox, with
special attention to the meaning of imagine.
Thesis Supervisors: Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim
Title: Professors of Linguistics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1. Preview
In this dissertation, I argue for a semantic and pragmatic system in which the truth of
propositions is relativized to an individual "judge." In other words, propositions are sets
of world-time-individual triples, as is the context set of a conversation. This builds on a
proposal by Lasersohn (2005) for "predicates of personal taste" such as fun and tasty, and
has obvious ties to approaches to de se attitudes (due to Lewis, 1979 and others), where
the content of a propositional attitude is seen as a set of world-time-individual triples or
"centered" worlds. I propose refinements to Lasersohn's semantic system, develop a view
of the pragmatics of conversation to work alongside it and help to explain how these
items are used in conversation, and extend the system to a broader domain including
epistemic modals, conditionals, and certain attitude reports (including control
constructions), in addition to Lasersohn's predicates of personal taste.
To give a brief concrete example of my view, I propose that the proposition expressed
by the sentence it might be raining is the set of world-time-individual triples <w,t,x>
such that it's compatible with x's knowledge in w at t that it's raining. On the pragmatic
side, a speaker is justified in asserting this sentence in a conversation if it is compatible
with the speaker's own knowledge that it's raining; however, by asserting it, they are
making the stronger proposal to make it common ground (roughly speaking) that it is
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compatible with the knowledge of the entire group of conversational participants that it's
raining. This proposal need not be accepted, but if it is, then the participants will have
established that their knowledge states are aligned in a particular way.
The core proposal is presented in Chapter 2, through the two case studies of epistemic
modals and predicates of personal taste. In Chapter 3, I extend the view to indicative
conditionals, taking the view that they involve covert epistemic modals. A particular
focus of Chapters 2 and 3 is to show that the mechanism of judge dependency, together
with an appropriate view of the pragmatics, can provide solutions to longstanding puzzles
about epistemic modals and conditionals. I also spend some time discussing the behavior
of these "judge-dependent" items (epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, and
conditionals) in attitude reports, focusing on belief. Attitude reports then become the
focus of Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, I look at the phenomenon of obligatory de se
attitudes. I show that my proposed system is exactly what is needed to account for a well-
defined subclass of de se constructions including control constructions as well as attitude
reports that embed judge-dependent items. (I suggest that other de se expressions such as
shifting indexicals, logophors, and optionally de se pronouns have different properties
and should not be given the same account.) This has implications for a theory of control,
which I touch on at the end of Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I look at two puzzles related to
Moore's paradox, with special attention to the meaning of imagine.
Finally, a brief note about the organization of Chapters 2-5: Chapter 2, which
contains the core ideas of this work, is intended to be self-contained. Chapters 3-5 build
on these ideas and thus crucially depend on material from Chapter 2; however, the
sequence of Chapters 4-5 is essentially independent of Chapter 3 (although Chapter 5
does make some reference to material from Chapter 4).1
2. Setting the Stage
To give an idea of what I will be doing, let me start by highlighting a few key aspects of
an approach to natural language semantics and pragmatics that I take to be standard.
1 More precisely, the self-contained portions of this dissertation include Ch.2, Ch.2@Ch.3, Ch.26Ch.4, and
Ch.2•eCh.4Ch.5.
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These are not necessarily universally accepted by semanticists and philosophers of
language, but they do form my starting point. I will be proposing changes to some of
these, but my underlying approach to semantics and pragmatics will be in line with the
approach I describe. Then I will introduce two challenges to standard views that I will be
dealing with here.
2.1. What We Learned in Semantics 1
The meaning (i.e., intension) of a sentence is standardly treated as a set of possible
worlds, or similarly as a set of situations or world-time pairs. (Technically, this is usually
defined as a function that characterizes such a set, and I will use the two descriptions
interchangeably.) The denotation, or extension, of a sentence is a truth value: true if the
actual world (situation, world-current-time pair) is in the relevant set. A proposition is
normally taken by definition to be the kind of thing that can be the intension of a sentence
- that is, a set of worlds, situations, or world-time pairs. Related to the view of
propositions as sets of possible worlds is the notion of truth conditions. The truth
conditions of a sentence are the conditions under which that sentence is true - that is,
what a world (or situation, or world-time pair) has to be like for that proposition to be
true in it.
To illustrate this view in a very mundane case, consider sentences (1)-(2).
(1) Washington, D.C. is the capital of the United States.
(2) San Francisco is the capital of the United States.
The intension of (1) is the set of worlds where the capital of the United States is
Washington, D.C., and the extension of (1) at the actual world is, of course, the truth
value 1 (true), since the actual world is a member of this set. On the other hand, the
intension of the sentence in (2) is a different set - the set of worlds where San Francisco
is the capital of the United States, and the extension of (2) is the truth value 0 (false) at
the actual world.
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2.2. What We Learned in Pragmatics 1
On the theory of conversation in the tradition of Stalnaker (1978, 2002), the exchange of
information in conversation is modeled with the two related notions of a common ground
and a context set. Formally, the context set is a set of worlds (and thus technically a
proposition). Intuitively, it is the set of worlds that are compatible with every proposition
p such that all the participants in the conversation believe that p, all the participants
believe that all the participants believe that p, and so on ad infinitum. (For some
purposes, this needs to be made more general by replacing "believe" with "accept for the
purposes of conversation," but I will largely be unconcerned with this distinction.) The
common ground is the set of these propositions, and when a proposition p is added to the
common ground, we can say that p becomes common ground.
Just as propositions can alternatively be construed as sets of situations or sets of
world-time pairs rather than sets of worlds, the context set can be construed in a parallel
way as a set of situations or a set of world-time pairs. Typically the same formulation is
used for both notions.
An important notion on this view is that of an assertion. According to the
Stalnakerian view, a speaker asserts a proposition p by making a declarative utterance of
a sentence expressing p. By asserting that p, they are making a proposal to restrict the
context set by intersecting it with p; this has the effect of removing any worlds from the
context set in which p is not true. Since there is a systematic correspondence between the
set of worlds in the context set and the set of propositions in the common ground, an
assertion can equivalently be described as a proposal to add p to the common ground.
A speaker who makes an assertion is proposing that the context set be restricted in a
certain way, but that does not mean that the context set will automatically be restricted in
that way. This depends on whether the other participants in the conversation accept the
assertion or reject it. In English, hearers may indicate that they are accepting an assertion
by saying things like I agree, You're right, That's true, Oh, Uh-huh, or by saying
nothing; they may indicate that they reject an assertion by saying things like Nuh-uh, Uh-
uh, No!, You're wrong, That's not true, etc. If the hearers all accept an assertion that p,
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then the context set is intersected with p, giving a new context set; if any hearers reject
the assertion, then the context set is not intersected with p. In any case, the common
ground is always updated with the fact that the speaker made the assertion they made, and
the fact that various hearers accepted or rejected the assertion by saying different things,
but I will not be concerned with updates of those kind.
2.3. First Challenge: Matters of Opinion
There is one very obvious limitation to the standard view that most semanticists have
probably thought about at some point, and which will be a major theme of Chapters 2 and
3. This limitation is tackled most recently by Lasersohn (2005, 2006) who introduces the
problem like this:
To many of us who teach introductory semantics courses, the following
may be a familiar experience: Early in the course, when one introduces the
idea of truth conditions, and of trying to formulate rules assigning truth con-
ditions to sentences in a systematic way, students will frequently ask, "But
what about sentences that aren't about matters of fact, but are really just
matters of opinion?"
(Lasersohn, 2005: p. 643)
The worry is about sentences like (3) and (4).
(3) This soup is tasty.
(4) This party is fun.
These look and act like normal sentences, just like (1) or (2). Speakers can utter them
declaratively, and hearers can agree or disagree with them. At the same time, there is an
obvious sense in which it is a matter of opinion whether some particular soup is tasty or a
particular party is fun, whereas it is not a matter of opinion whether Washington, D.C. is
the capital of the United States. (It may be a matter of opinion whether it ought to be, and
some people may falsely believe that it isn't, but this is not the same thing.) This may
seem benign at first glance, but it wreaks havoc on our basic semantic and pragmatic
assumptions. On the semantic side, if (3), for example, expresses a proposition, and a
proposition is a set of worlds, then it becomes a matter of opinion which proposition it
expresses - or worse, which worlds are members of a particular set. Accordingly, on the
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pragmatic side, if an assertion of (3) constitutes a proposal to restrict the context set in a
certain way, it becomes a matter of opinion what restriction is being proposed.
2.4. Second Challenge: De Se Attitudes
A second challenge to the standard approach to semantics, which is less obvious but
perhaps better known, involves de se interpretations of attitude reports. (I will take on this
challenge mainly in Chapter 4.) A de se attitude is one that crucially involves the self,
rather than simply truth conditions about the world (Lewis, 1979; Perry, 1979; Chierchia,
1989). A classic example due to Perry (1977) involves an amnesiac named Lingens who
is lost in the Stanford library and doesn't know who he is or where he is. Even if he reads
a biography of himself, and learns from it that there is an amnesiac named Rudolf
Lingens lost in the Stanford library, he may still not realize that he himself is Rudolf
Lingens and is in the Stanford library. On the other hand, if he reads the biography and
then suddenly regains his memory, he may well make this connection. In the first case, he
would only be inclined to say, "Lingens is lost in the Stanford library" whereas in the
second, he would be inclined to say, "I am lost in the Stanford library." The latter is a
report of a de se belief. If propositions are seen as something like sets of worlds, there is
no way to distinguish between the content of these two beliefs; both, for example, would
be the set of worlds {w: Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in w}.
De se attitudes are an issue for natural language semantics because certain
constructions are obligatorily interpreted de se, in particular attitude reports involving
embedded infinitives and subject control (Morgan, 1970; Chierchia, 1989). For example,
the Italian example in (5) is only true in a situation where Pavarotti would be inclined to
say, "I am a genius." If he unknowingly listened to a recording of himself and thought,
"That singer is a genius," (5) would not be true. Similarly, (6) would only be true if the
amnesiac Lingens were inclined to say, "I want to get out of the Stanford library"; if he
unknowingly read a biography of himself and thought, "I want this guy Lingens to get out
of the Stanford library" (6) would not be true.
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(5) [Italian]
Pavarotti crede di essere un genio.
Pavarotti believes COMP be a genius.
'Pavarotti believes that he's a genius.'
[Lit.: "Pavarotti believes to be a genius"]
(Anand, 2006, no. la; based on Chierchia, 1989)
(6) Lingens wants to get out of the Stanford library.

Chapter 2
Epistemic Modals,
Predicates of Personal Taste,
and Attitude Reports
1. Introduction*
In this chapter, I present my core semantic and pragmatic proposals, using the case study
of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. In particular, I look at the modals
might and must and at predicates such as tasty andfun, which were discussed by
Lasersohn (2005, 2006). These two classes of expressions share a similar analytical
difficulty in determining whose taste or knowledge is being expressed. Accordingly, they
have parallel behavior in attitude reports and in a certain kind of disagreement. On the
other hand, they differ in how freely they can be linked to a contextually salient
individual, with epistemic modals being much more restricted in this respect.
* Some of the material in this chapter is under review for Linguistics and Philosophy, and an older version
appeared in a working papers volume (Stephenson, 2005). I would like to thank L&P editor Polly Jacobson
and two anonymous L&P reviewers for their very helpful comments and discussion. Thanks also to Pranav
Anand, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox, Valentine Hacquard, Irene Heim, Sarah Hulsey, Sabine Iatridou, Ezra
Keshet, Angelika Kratzer, John MacFarlane, Eric McCready, Jillian Mills, Friederike Moltmann, Craige
Roberts, Robert Stalnaker, Seth Yalcin, the editors and reviewers of MITWPL 51, and audiences at MIT,
Sinn und Bedeutung 11, the 2006 SNEWS workshop, the 2007 LSA Annual Meeting, Yale, and the
University of Maryland.
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I propose a unified account of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste that
captures the similarities and differences between the two classes, as well as their
interactions with certain attitude predicates. My semantic analysis builds on Lasersohn's
(2005) analysis of predicates of personal taste using a "judge" parameter. I argue for
certain modifications to Lasersohn's view, and extend the system to cover epistemic
modals and a number of attitude predicates. I also sketch a pragmatic theory of
conversation that goes with the semantic account and gives further explanatory power to
the system.
Now let me start by introducing the basic puzzle shared by epistemic modals and
predicates of personal taste. I will start with epistemic modals. It is widely assumed that
(la) has a reading (its epistemic reading) which can be expressed as something like (lb)
(Kratzer, 1977).
(1) (a) It might be raining.
(b) In some world compatible with what is known in the actual world, it's
raining.
A troublesome question lurks in (lb). There is reference to the set of worlds "compatible
with what is known," but the question is, known by who? If "what is known" is taken to
mean "what is known by the speaker," the resulting meaning is too weak (see, e.g.,
MacFarlane, 2006). On the other hand, if "what is known" is taken to mean "what is
known by anyone at all" or "what is known by people in general" the meaning becomes
impossibly strong. The question of exactly whose knowledge is relevant for the
interpretation of epistemic modals turns out to be difficult to answer, and a great deal of
effort has gone into trying to either answer it or evade it (for example, by using
descriptions like "what is known"), in both the linguistics and the philosophy literature.1
Lasersohn (2005) discusses a similar puzzle that arises with "predicates of personal
taste" such as tasty andfun. He uses examples like (2).
(2) This roller coaster is fun.
1 In addition to Kratzer and MacFarlane's work, see, for example, Moore (1962), Hacking (1967), Stalnaker
(1984), DeRose (1991), Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005), and von Fintel & Gillies (2005, 2007a).
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Lasersohn shows that iffun in sentences like (2) is taken to mean "fun for the speaker" or
"fun for someone," the meaning is too weak; on the other hand, if it's taken to mean "fun
for everyone" or "fun for people in general" it becomes too strong. The question of
whose taste or subjective experience is relevant to the interpretation of a predicate of
personal taste thus turns out to also be difficult to answer, and the difficulty in this regard
is very similar to the difficulty of specifying whose knowledge is expressed by an
epistemic modal. I would like to suggest, then, that these two questions are difficult for
the same reason; there is just one puzzle that applies to both epistemic modals and
predicates of personal taste.2
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I give examples of the parallel
behavior of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, and review the reasons
why standard mechanisms of context dependence are not sufficient to account for the
puzzling behavior of these items. In Section 3, I present Lasersohn's analysis of
predicates of personal taste, and show how it can help to explain some of the puzzling
behavior of predicates of personal taste discussed in Section 2. In Section 4, I extend this
analysis to epistemic modals, first extending Lasersohn's system directly and then
arguing for a modification to it. The revised version explains the puzzling behavior of
both epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, and also accounts for a difference
between them. In Section 5, I bring up some contrasts between the predicates think,find
(as in find the cake tasty), and believe, and offer an explanation based on requirements
similar to those of evidentials. In Section 6, I show how the semantic system of judge
dependency can be placed within a Stalnakerian theory of conversation and the common
ground. In Sections 7-8, I compare my analysis to recent proposals by Egan, Hawthorne
& Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2006) for epistemic modals, and Lasersohn
(2005) for predicates of personal taste, arguing that my proposal fares better in both
domains, and I sum up the chapter in Section 9.
2 Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) also connect their relativist view of epistemic modals with
examples like Rotting flesh tastes great (uttered by a vulture), but they do not explore taste predicates in
depth.
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2. Parallels between Epistemic Modals and Predicates of Personal Taste
In this section, I will show that epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste have
parallel behavior in attitude reports and in certain phenomena of contradiction and
disagreement.3
2.1. Epistemic Modals in Attitude Reports
Much discussion about the semantics of epistemic modals has been devoted to the
question of whose knowledge state is being expressed, or as it is sometimes put, what the
relevant "community of knowers" is. For example, DeRose (1991) proposes that the
community of knowers is fairly free, but that it's required to include the speaker. Egan,
Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) give counterexamples to this constraint. The main thing
that seems to be generally agreed on is that it is not obvious how to figure out who the
relevant "knowers" will be for any particular example. I would like to begin, though, by
looking at a class of examples where this uncertainty disappears, namely those such as
(3)-(4) where an epistemic modal is embedded under think. (I will be restricting my
attention to modal verbs and auxiliaries, and leave it to future work to determine whether
modal expressions of other syntactic categories, such as probably and likely, have parallel
behavior.)
(3) Sam thinks it might be raining.
(4) Sam thinks it must be raining.
In (3)-(4), the embedded modal seems to express Sam's mental state.4 For example, (3) is
true iff Sam's beliefs do not exclude the possibility that it's raining, and (4) is true iff
Sam's beliefs exclude the possibility that it isn't raining. This fact extends to cases where
the grammatical subject of think is a quantifier, as in (5). (Indices are used just as a
shorthand to indicate the intended reading and are not meant to have theoretical status.)
(5) (a) [Every boy]i thinks hei must be stupid.
3 Moltmann (2005) independently makes similar observations about the parallels between predicates of
personal taste and epistemic modals, and gives brief suggestions towards a parallel analysis.
This observation about embedded epistemic modals is anticipated by Antinucci & Parisi (1971).
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(b) [Every contestant]i thinks theyi might be the winner.5
The sentences in (5) have a reading where the "knowers" range along with the subject.
On the relevant reading, (5a) says that for each boy x, x's beliefs entail that x is stupid,
and (5b) says that for each contestant y, y's beliefs do not exclude the possibility that y is
the winner. Of course, the bound pronoun need not be the subject of the embedded
clause, as illustrated in (6). (Underlining indicates the "knower" for a particular modal.)
(6) (a) [Every boy]i thinks that hisi father must be the smartest person in the
world.
(b) [Every contestant]i thinks that the judges might have liked themi the best.
In cases where one propositional attitude report is embedded under another, there is still
no ambiguity as to whose mental state is being reported with an epistemic modal: the
modal always reports the mental state of the immediate subject. This is illustrated in (7)-
(8).
(7) (a) Mary thinks that Sam thinks it might be raining.
(b) Mary thinks that Sam thinks it must be raining.
(8) (a) Mary thinks that Sam might think it's raining.
(b) Mary thinks that Sam must think it's raining.
In (7a), for example, the content of Mary's belief is that Sam's beliefs don't exclude the
possibility that it's raining. On the other hand, (8a) says that Mary's beliefs don't exclude
the possibility that Sam thinks it's raining.
The adverbial clause as far as x knows has the same effect as an attitude predicate, as
illustrated in (9)-(10).
(9) As far as Sam knows, it might be raining.
(10) Mary thinks that as far as Sam knows, it might be raining.
5 The examples in (5) are from Speas (2004), who argues that the modal base is linked to the bound
variable but does not link the effect to attitude predicates. Similar examples are also used in von Fintel &
Iatridou (2003) to show that quantifiers can bind pronouns across an epistemic modal.
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Again, the modal in (9)-(10) is clearly reporting Sam's beliefs, not the beliefs of the
speaker or anyone else.
2.2. Predicates of Personal Taste in Attitude Reports
Lasersohn (2005) looks at a different kind of item that turns out to have largely parallel
behavior, namely what he calls "predicates of personal taste." Lasersohn gives tasty and
fun as paradigm cases. As Lasersohn observes, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction
between predicates of personal taste and predicates expressing moral or aesthetic values,
such as beautiful or moral. (Some borderline examples are funny, annoying, and tasteful.)
Ultimately it would be desirable to give all of these classes a unified treatment, but (like
Lasersohn) I will focus on the predicates tasty and fun (plus related expressions such as
taste good), taking the relevant class of items to be those which pattern in roughly the
same way.
Because predicates of personal taste such as tasty and fun relate to an internal state or
experience, the question arises as to whose internal state or experience is being reported
in any particular case, or in Lasersohn's terminology, who is the "judge." And as with the
issue of who the "knower" is with epistemic modals, this turns out to be hard to answer.
But also like epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste behave differently when
embedded under a verb like think. For example, consider (11)-(12).
(11) Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
(12) Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.
These examples have a very salient reading where the predicate of personal taste is linked
to the subject of think, that is, where the judge is clearly Sam. We will see that this is not
the only possible reading, and that predicates of personal taste differ from epistemic
modals in this respect. I'll return to this in Section 4.2.
Bearing this caveat in mind, we can see that the link remains when the subject of
think is a quantifier that binds a pronoun in the embedded clause. For example, (13) has a
reading where the judge co-varies with the boys. (Underlining indicates a link between a
predicate and the judge.)
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(13) [Every boy]i thinks hisi dinner is tasy.
As with epistemic modals, when one think-clause is embedded under another as in (14),
the predicate is linked to the subject of the think-clause that most immediately embeds it,
as illustrated in (14).
(14) (a) Mary thinks that Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
(b) Mary thinks that Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.
Also as with epistemic modals, the same effect can be achieved in some cases with
certain adverbial phrases, as Lasersohn points out. Some of these are illustrated in (15).
(15) (a) The roller coaster is fun for Sam.
(b) As far as Sam is concerned, the roller coaster is no fun.
(c) The cake tastes good to me.6
Thus one parallel between epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste is in their
behavior when embedded under propositional attitude predicates such as think.
2.3. Contradictions and Disagreements
Another parallel between epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste is in the fact
that both give rise to a peculiar kind of disagreement between speakers. I take the
presence of expressions like no or nuh-uh to mark disagreement in English, as used, for
example, in the dialogue in (16), which involves three people, Mary, Sam, and Sue.
(16) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: He's in his office.
Sue: Nuh-uh, he's at home! He doesn't work on Fridays.
[OR] No, he isn't, he's at home! He doesn't work on Fridays.
6 1 assume that tastes good has the same meaning as is tasty, ignoring the fact that it's presumably built up
from taste and good. The two expressions don't have exactly the same distribution, as seen for example in
the fact that ?tasty to me is less acceptable than tastes good to me. But when convenient, I will substitute
one for the other.
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The disagreement in (16) is about a completely objective, factual matter. But
disagreement is also possible if epistemic modals are used as in the dialogue in (17),
which contains an epistemic modal.
(17) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. He might be in his office.
Sue: Nuh-uh, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
[OR] No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
The puzzling thing about discourses like (17) is this: Sam seems to be expressing his
mental state, and Sue seems to seems to be disagreeing with him. But if this is the case,
then Sue ought to be understood as saying that Sam is wrong about his own mental state.
However, Sue does not seem to be doing that, but rather expressing her own mental state.
In other words, two speakers can disagree about a statement containing an epistemic
modal simply because they have different knowledge states. Compare this to (18), where
Sam's statement explicitly refers to his own knowledge; here it seems odd for Sue to
respond as if she is disagreeing.
(18) Mary: Is Bill in his office?
Sam: Well, I'm not sure, but I don't know that he isn't.
Sue: # Nuh-uh, he's at home! He doesn't work on Fridays.
[OR] # No, he isn't, he's at home! He doesn't work on Fridays.
Thus there are two facts to be explained: the fact that disagreement is possible in (17),
and the contrast between (17) and (18) in this respect.
Once again, the behavior of predicates of personal taste is very similar. For example,
in (19)-(20), Sam seems to be expressing his own taste or experience, and Sue seems to
be expressing hers, and yet they are disagreeing.
(19) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It's tasty.
Sue: Nuh-uh, it isn't tasty at all!
[OR] No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
(20) Mary: How was the party?
Sam: It was fun.
Sue: Nuh-uh, it wasn't fun at all!
[OR] No it wasn't, it was no fun at all!
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On the other hand, if Sam makes explicit that he is expressing his own taste, Sue's
responses then become odd, as illustrated in (21)-(22).
(21) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It tastes good to me.
Sue: # Nuh-uh, it doesn't taste good at all!
[OR] # No it doesn't, it tastes terrible!
(22) Mary: How was the party?
Sam: It was fun for me.
Sue: # Nuh-uh, it wasn't fun at all!
[OR] # No it wasn't, it was no fun at all!
Another way to look at this contrast is in terms of possible interpretations of elided VPs.
For example, compare (23) to (24).
(23) Sam: The party was fun.
Sue: No, it wasn't!
(24) Sam: The party was fun for me.
Sue: No, it wasn't!
In (23), Sue could be responding based on the fact that the party wasn't fun for her;
however, in (24), Sue's response seems to mean "it wasn't fun for you (Sam)," and has to
be based on a belief of Sue's that the party was not fun for Sam.
Thus, as with epistemic modals, there are two facts about predicates of personal taste
to be explained: why disagreement is possible in (19)-(20), and why these contrast with
(21)-(22).7
I should clarify that when I say that disagreement is possible in a certain dialogue, I
mean very narrowly that expressions like no (it isn 't) and nuh-uh are allowed. I don't
mean that we merely have an intuition that the speakers disagree about something, which
7 A MITWPL reviewer pointed out that the same kind of disagreement is possible with vague scalar
predicates as in dialogues like (i), in a situation where George's jacket is of a color intermediate between
clearly red and clearly burgundy.
(i) Mary: What color is George's jacket?
Sam: It's red.
Sue: No it isn't, it's burgundy!
This suggests to me that it might be possible to extend the account I give to predicates of personal taste and
epistemic modals to capture certain properties of vague scalar predicates, but I will not pursue that here.
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may be a broader phenomenon.8 I also don't mean that the disagreement is necessarily a
rational or sensible one to engage in. The dialogues in (19) and (20) are just the kind of
arguments that are often pointed out to be futile, given that people's tastes simply differ.
That is not my concern. The only fact that matters for my purposes is that such dialogues
can and do occur - often enough, in fact, to give us ample opportunity to perceive their
futility.
2.4. Note about First-Person Belief Reports
I observed in Sections 2.1-2.2 that when an epistemic modal or predicate of personal
taste is embedded in an attitude report, the attitude holder becomes the person whose
knowledge or taste is relevant. Then in Section 2.3 I observed that when an epistemic
modal or predicate of personal taste is explicitly linked to the speaker, it is not possible
for a hearer to disagree using expressions such as no it isn 't or nuh-uh. Putting these two
observations together, we might expect that when an epistemic modal or predicate of
personal taste is embedded in a first-person attitude report, disagreement would again
become impossible. For example, we might expect (25)-(26) to be odd, and yet they are
perfectly acceptable.
(25) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. I think he might be in his office.
Sue: No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
(26) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: I think it's tasty.
Sue: No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
Notice, though, that the form of Sue's response in these dialogues shows that her
disagreement is targeting the embedded clause rather than the matrix clause. That is, in
(25) Sue says no, he can 't be (i.e., Bill can't be in his office); and similarly in (26) she
says no it isn 't (i.e., the cake isn't tasty). If Sue were disagreeing with the matrix clause,
she would have to say, No you don 't, meaning you don 't think that. It is an interesting
8 For example, if Sam says, "I like this cake," and Mary says, "I don't like this cake," we may have a
general intuition that there is something that Sam and Mary disagree about; however, this does not count as
the type of disagreement that I am talking about because disagreement markers such as no or nuh-uh would
not be licensed. (This was brought to my attention by Philippe Schlenker, p.c..)
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question why speakers may disagree with propositions that are embedded within attitude
reports, but one that is independent of the issues at hand. I will return to this issue in
Section 6.5.
2.5. Why Not Context Dependence?
One might think that epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste are simply
context-dependent items, so that, for example, tasty means "tastes good to x" and might
means "compatible with x's knowledge," where x is some salient, contextually
determined individual or group. In fact this approach is often taken with respect to
epistemic modals (see, e.g., DeRose, 1991; von Fintel & Gillies, 2007a). However,
standard mechanisms of context dependence are not enough to account for the behavior
of these items. Lasersohn (2005) argues this in great detail for predicates of personal
taste, and proponents of context relativism such as Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson
(2005) and MacFarlane (2006) do so for epistemic modals. Below I consider some
obvious options for a context-dependent analysis, and review the reason why they fail.
First, note that in the dialogues (17) and (19)-(20) above, where Sam says that the
cake is tasty or that Bill might be in his office, he seems, intuitively, to be expressing
something about his own experience of taste or his own mental state. This suggests that a
context-dependent account of these items ought to involve the speaker in some way. The
most obvious possibility, then, is that predicates of personal taste and/or epistemic
modals involve first-person indexicals, so that tasty means "tastes good to me (the
speaker)" and might means "compatible with my (the speaker's) knowledge." But we
have already seen that this cannot be right because of disagreements of the kind that
occur in dialogues such as (17) and (19), repeated in (27)-(28).
(27) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. He might be in his office.
Sue: Nuh-uh, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
[OR] No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
(28) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It's tasty.
Sue: Nuh-uh, it isn't tasty at all!
[OR] No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
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If might and tasty contained first-person indexicals, then these dialogues would be akin to
that in (29), which is incoherent.
(29) Mary: I'm a doctor.
Sam: # No, I'm not!
Even if a simple account using first-person indexicals is not right, we might think that the
hidden argument should contain something like an inclusive us, that is, the speaker and
the addressee. On this view, tasty would mean something like "tastes good to us" and
might would mean something like "compatible with our knowledge." In this case, I will
use different arguments for predicates of personal taste and for epistemic modals, so I
will consider the two cases separately. In both cases, the arguments I will give below will
apply equally to a view where the hidden argument consists of the speaker and addressee
plus possibly other individuals.
The view that tasty means "tastes good to us" is initially plausible in light of
dialogues like (28); there it is possible that Sue is denying that the cake tastes good to
both her and Sam, on the grounds that it does not taste good to her. Assuming that the
property of tasting good is distributive, this would be sufficient to make it false that the
cake tastes good to both of them. However, now consider (30).
(30) Mary: This cake is tasty.
Sam: No, it isn't, it tastes terrible!
In this case, Sam can say that the cake tastes terrible, even though he knows that the cake
doesn't taste terrible to Mary, and therefore doesn't taste good to both of them.
Lasersohn makes a similar point with examples like (31).
(31) Sam: This cake isn't tasty at all.
Mary: Yes it is! It tastes great!
(based on Lasersohn, 2005, no. 17)
Here since Mary already knows that the cake does not taste good to Sam, she should not
be able to assert that the cake tastes good to both of them.
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Now let me turn to the case of epistemic modals. Here the proposal would be that
might means something like "compatible with our (the speaker and addressee's)
knowledge." It is not important for the argument whether this is understood as the
speaker and addressee's combined knowledge or their shared knowledge. To see that this
cannot be right, recall the behavior of epistemic modals in attitude reports such as (3),
repeated in (32).
(32) Sam thinks it might be raining.
If, for example, Bill utters (32) to Sue, the sentence means that it's compatible with
Sam's knowledge or beliefs that it's raining. It clearly does not mean that it's compatible
with Bill and Sue's knowledge that it's raining, which is what the proposal would predict.
Thus, in general might cannot mean "compatible with our knowledge."
One solution that may come to mind here is to suggest that the component meaning
us is not a normal indexical but a shifting indexical (see, e.g., Schlenker, 2003). The
problem with this idea is that epistemic modals do not have the same behavior as shifting
indexicals in this respect. The shifted interpretation of shifting indexicals is generally
optional, whereas the shifting in (32) would be obligatory. Relatedly, in a case where one
speech or attitude report is embedded under another, shifting indexicals can typically be
linked to either the lower or higher attitude report. (I'll say more about this difference in
Chapter 4, Section 2.4.)
A similar argument applies to a view where the relevant knowledge is just that of any
particular, contextually relevant group (as argued by DeRose, 1991; von Fintel & Gillies,
2007a, and others). Again supposing that Bill uttered (32) to Sue, the sentence would
clearly not mean that Sam thinks it's compatible with the knowledge of the group
relevant for Bill and Sue that it's raining. Similarly, if Bill uttered (33) to Sue, it would
not generally mean that Sam thinks the cake tastes good to the group of people who Sue
takes to be relevant.
(33) Sam thinks that the cake is tasty.
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One final possibility that comes to mind is that tasty, for example, means something like
"tastes good to people in general." I'll address that possibility in Section 4.6.
3. Lasersohn's Analysis of Predicates of Personal Taste
In this section I will summarize Lasersohn's (2005) analysis of predicates of personal
taste, which uses an additional individual parameter called the "judge." On this view, the
Kaplanian content of a sentence is a function from tuples <w,tj> to truth values, where w
is a world, t is a time, and j is an individual (the judge). The judge is the person whose
taste or experience is relevant for a predicate of personal taste. This is in contrast to the
standard view which takes the content of a sentence to be a function from just worlds or
world-time pairs to truth values. I will go through the analysis in more detail below. In
Section 4, I will extend the same kind of view to epistemic modals.
3.1. Basic Assumptions
Lasersohn's starting point is the dual view of sentence meaning from Kaplan (1989). On
this view, there are two senses of the "meaning" of an expression: the "character," which
is constant for a single expression across utterances, and the "content," in which the
reference of indexicals such as I and now has been fixed. For example, suppose that one
speaker, A, utters the sentence I am in Boston now at time ti, and another speaker, B,
utters the same sentence at time t2. The two utterances have the same character, but the
content of A's utterance is the proposition that A is in Boston at time ti, and the content
of B's utterance is the proposition that B is in Boston at time t2. In general, then, the
content of an expression is a function from world-time pairs <w,t> to extensions (i.e., its
intension). The character of an expression is thus a function from contexts of utterance to
contents. In particular, the content of a sentence (a proposition) is a function from world-
time pairs to truth values, and the character of a sentence is a function from contexts of
utterance to propositions. The elements of the context of utterance that determine content
from character are called the "context" and the parameters of evaluation that determine
truth value from content are called the "index."
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Given that both the context of utterance and the world and time contribute to the
extension of an expression, we can write the extension of an expression a as l[a]c '; w,t
where c is the context of utterance (the context), w is the world of evaluation, and t is the
time of evaluation (so <w,t> is the index). Assuming a system of semantic interpretation
along the lines of Heim & Kratzer (1998), we can use the two rules of semantic
interpretation in (34).9,1o (Note that worlds are type s and times are of type i.)
(34) Rules of semantic interpretation:
Functional Application (FA): If a is a complex expression formed by
combining two expressions 0 and y, and Ify]Ic; w,t is in the domain of
S01 C; w,t, then I[af J; w,t= -01] _ C; w,t (l-lC]; w,t)
Intensional Functional Application (IFA): If a is a complex expression
formed by combining two expressions P and y, and
[Xw's . [Xt'i . Ifyc; w',t'] ] is in the domain of [ 1311c; w,t then I[alc; w,t=
fPi0C; w't( [RW's. [,t'i. [y]]I; wOt]] ).
3.2. A New Parameter
To analyze predicates of personal taste, Lasersohn adds a "judge" to the index. In
particular, the content of a sentence under this view is a function from world-time-
individual triples <w,tj> to truth values. Thus the extension of an expression a should
now be written as I[ac ; w,tj, where c is the context of utterance (the context), w is a
world, t is a time, and j is the judge (so <w,t,j> is the index). It should be noted that since
the judge is an individual, formally speaking Lasersohn's indices are in fact centered
worlds, although he does not present the idea in those terms. I will not discuss other uses
of centered worlds, but will make the connection implicitly by using the notion of
doxastic alternatives.
Lasersohn's "judge" is the individual whose taste or experience is relevant for a
predicate of personal taste. Thus fun, tasty (or taste good), and taste terrible have the
meanings in (35).
9 Lasersohn presents his analysis in a somewhat different form, as a self-contained fragment, but the two
versions are essentially notational equivalents.
10 Additional rules of semantic interpretation would be needed if Kaplanian "monsters" are to be allowed
(Kaplan, 1989; Schlenker, 2003); I will not address this question here, except for touching on it briefly in
Chapter 4.
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(35) [fun]if ; w,tj = [x,x . x is fun for j in w at t]
[tasty]lj; w,tj = I[taste good]'c; w,tj = [xe .x tastes good to j in w at t]
[taste terrible]C; w,tj = [Xx, .x tastes terrible to j in w at t]
On the other hand, the extension of a normal, non-judge-dependent predicate such as [be
a] doctor does not depend on the judge (which is to say that it is a constant function from
the judge) as shown in (36).
(36) i[be-a-doctor]H; w,tj = [Xe . x is a doctor in w at t]
All the meanings given so far are for expressions that don't depend on the context of
utterance (and thus have the same content regardless of the context of utterance). Some
expressions that do depend on the context of utterance are given in (37). (From now on I
will include the context parameter only when it is relevant.)
(37) [I]•; w,tj = the speaker of c
I[youl]c; w,tj = the addressee of c
Adding a new parameter of evaluation requires us to revise the rules of interpretation
from (34), replacing them with those in (38). Note that the judge parameter is an
individual (type e).
(38) Rules of semantic interpretation [revised]:
Functional Application (FA): If a is a complex expression formed by
combining two expressions 0 and y, and 1[y]cf; w,tj is in the domain of
Ip 1c; w,tj, then I[alp c; w,tj = f wp,trc ; w,tqj).
Intensional Functional Application (IFA): If a is a complex expression
formed by combining two expressions 0 and y, and
[Xw's. [st'i. [Rj'e. [[]Yc; w',t'j'] ] ] is in the domain of [111Pc; w,tj
then I[aIlc; wtj = [3 c; wtj ( [Xw's . [t'i . [Xj'e . [[Y1 c; wt'j'] ] ).
In the case of modified predicates of personal taste such as fun for Sam, Lasersohn treats
the preposition as an intensional operator that shifts the judge parameter to the object of
the preposition. This is equivalent to using the syncategorematic rule in (39).
(39) [P for y]W,tj = -•plw,ty
[where P is a predicate and y is a DP]
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The to that is used in tastes good to Sam should work the same way. These are
presumably different fromfor and to in their normal prepositional use, as in a present for
Sam or a letter to Sue.
Of course, something more would need to be said to account for the fact that we say
fun for Sam and tastes good to Sam in English, and not *fun to Sam or *tastes goodfor
Sam. I will leave this aside for now, but return to it briefly in Section 8, when I compare
Lasersohn's view with the revised view I will propose here.
On Lasersohn's view, attitude predicates such as think or believe take propositions as
arguments, but in effect only operate on the world and time, not the judge. Roughly
speaking, think would have a lexical entry along the lines of (40). 11
(40) [think]]w tJ = [XP<s,<i,et> [RZe . V<w',t'> compatible with z's beliefs in w
at t, p(w')(t')(j) = 1]]
This says that "z thinks that p" is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff in all the
world-time pairs <w',t'> compatible with z's beliefs in w at t, p is true in w' at t' as
judged by j.
Lasersohn's final assumption is that speakers typically make assertions, and assess
the assertions of others, from an "autocentric" perspective - taking themselves to be the
judge. This is not always the case, though: in contexts where the perspective of another
person is particularly salient, they may make and assess assertions from an "exocentric"
perspective. One such context is that of an attitude report, since if a speaker is reporting
the thoughts or experience of someone else, then it is natural to take them as the judge. I
will have some criticisms of this view of perspective-taking, but will again save them
until Section 8.
3.3. Consequences
Lasersohn's account can explain the "linked" reading of examples like (11), repeated in
(41), where the judge of tasty is naturally understood to be Sam. Lasersohn's explanation
" This is simplifying Lasersohn's view of propositional attitudes somewhat (see Lasersohn, 2005, Sec.
6.2).
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is that in attitude reports, it is especially natural for the speaker to take an exocentric
perspective using the subject as the judge. This view predicts that the link is not
obligatory. As I mentioned in Section 2.2, this turns out to be correct for predicates of
personal taste; I will return to this in Section 4.2.
(41) Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
Lasersohn's account can also give at least the beginnings of an explanation for why
predicates of personal taste give rise to disagreements in dialogues like (19), repeated in
(42).
(42) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It's tasty.
Sue: Nuh-uh, it isn't tasty at all!
[OR] No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
If we assume that what is crucial for the occurrence of expressions such as nuh-uh and no
it isn 't is the content of sentences (i.e., propositions), we can make some sense of (42).
The content of the sentence uttered by Sam is a function from world-time-judge triples
<w,tj> to truth values that yields the truth value 1 just in case the cake tastes good to j in
w at t. The content of the sentence uttered by Sue is the negation of this, the function
from triples <w,tj> that yields true just in case the cake does not taste good to j in w at t.
Thus Sue utters a sentence that negates the content of Sam's sentence, and they disagree.
On the other hand, if the judge is made explicit as in (21), repeated in (43), the sentence
uttered by Sam has a different content: the function from triples <w,tj> that yields the
truth value 1 just in case the cake tastes good to Sam in w at t. This is becausefor me
operates on the judge parameter; the value of me is set to Sam by the context of utterance
before the calculation of the content. The content of Sue's response is not the negation of
this, so it sounds odd for her to signal that she is disagreeing.
(43) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It tastes good to me.
Sue: # Nuh-uh, it doesn't taste good at all!
[OR] # No it doesn't, it tastes terrible!
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This explanation for the contrast between (42) and (43) depends crucially on the
assumption that speakers may take an autocentric perspective, thus in effect evaluating
assertions using a different judge. In Lasersohn's system, this is technically no different
from the situation that arises when two speakers believe they are in different worlds and
thus disagree about whether a proposition is true in the actual world. Conceptually,
though, there is a difference between the two situations, because there is always an
objective fact of the matter as to what is the actual world and time, whereas there is no
analogous "actual judge." I will develop a slightly different view of this in Section 6,
where I discuss how this analysis can be put into a theory of conversation and common
ground along the lines of Stalnaker (1978, 2002) and others. There I will try to make
more sense of why disagreements would be expected to work in the particular puzzling
way that they do for both predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals.
I call this only the beginnings of an explanation because it does not provide us with
any insight into why disagreement would still involve the content in this way once the
judge parameter is added into the system. Since the phenomenon of disagreement is
specific to multi-speaker dialogues, we can only answer this question by looking at the
pragmatics and rules of conversation, which is what I will do in Section 6.
4. Extending the Analysis to Epistemic Modals
In this section I show how Lasersohn's apparatus can be used to give a parallel analysis
of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. In Section 4.1, I will give a
preliminary proposal that extends Lasersohn's analysis very directly. In Section 4.2, I
will bring up a contrast between epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste that
poses a problem for that approach. In Sections 4.3-4.4, I will revise the analysis in a way
that captures both the parallels and the differences between epistemic modals and
predicates of personal taste. In Section 4.5, I address one apparent problem for the
revised proposal.
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4.1. First Attempt
The most direct way to extend Lasersohn's account to epistemic modals is to simply
identify the person whose knowledge is relevant for an epistemic modal with the judge.
On this view, the lexical entries for might and must would be those given in (44).12 (I will
modify these slightly in Section 4.3.)
(44) [might] w't = [Rp<s,<i,et>> . there is some world w' compatible with j's
knowledge in w at t such that p(w')(t)(j) = 1]
[Imust] w'tj = [h<s,<i,et>> . every world w' compatible with j's knowledge in
w at t is such that p(w')(t)(j) = 1]
This view will straightforwardly explain the parallel behavior of epistemic modals and
predicates of personal taste discussed in Section 2. For example, the subject of think in
examples like (3), Sam thinks it might be raining, can be linked to Sam because Sam's
perspective is salient in a context where his mental state is being reported. Speakers can
disagree in dialogues like (17) based on the fact that they have different knowledge
because each of them may take an autocentric perspective, with themselves as the judge.
As we will see, however, there is a problem with directly importing Lasersohn's analysis
to epistemic modals.
4.2. A Contrast
A direct extension of Lasersohn's system neatly accounts for the similarities between
epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, but it turns out that there is also an
important way that the two classes differ which this view cannot capture. Essentially the
difference is that predicates of personal taste can generally be interpreted with respect to
any salient enough referent, whereas epistemic modals cannot. The easiest way to see this
is by looking at the case where they are embedded under think. Recall that in attitude
reports involving either epistemic modals or predicates of personal taste, the judge of the
embedded clause may be linked to the subject of the matrix attitude predicate. It turns
12 This is what I proposed in an earlier version of this work (Stephenson, 2005). Egan (2007) independently
proposes a very similar view of epistemic modals. My view and Egan's differ from the accounts of
MacFarlane (2006) and Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) in not relativizing the time of knowledge
along with the "knower" (although as time is not Egan's focus, it is not clear whether he intends this to be
significant).
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out, though, that while this link is optional with predicates of personal taste, it is
obligatory with epistemic modals. To see that the link is optional with predicates of
personal taste, compare example (45) with (46).
(45) Mary: Has anyone tried the cake?
Sam: Sue has. She thinks it's tasty.
(46) Mary: How's that new brand of cat food you bought?
Sam: I think it's tasty, because the cat has eaten a lot of it.
(Kai von Fintel, p.c.)
In (45), the judge of tasty is naturally understood to be Sue, whereas in (46) it's naturally
understood to be the cat. The difference seems to come purely from the fact that in a
context like (46), the cat's perspective towards the taste of the cat food is especially
salient. Lasersohn notices examples like (46) and uses them as evidence for his view that
speakers can freely choose between an autocentric or exocentric perspective.
On the other hand, now compare (47) with (48).
(47) Mary: I heard it isn't very nice out.
Sam: Yeah, Sue thinks it might be raining.
(48) Mary: Wow, the dog really likes the dog food you're feeding him.
Sam: (#) Yeah, I think it might be table scraps.
In (47), the judge of might is naturally understood to be Sue, as expected. However, in
(48), the judge of might cannot be understood to be the dog, even though the dog's
perspective with regards to the taste of the dog food is salient (from Mary's statement),
and even though the dog's attitude towards the dog food could be caused by his mental
state (e.g., if he always likes food meant for people better than food meant for dogs). In
other words, Sam's statement is only felicitous if Sam does not know what the dog food
consists of, regardless of whether the dog knows. In a context where it's assumed that
Sam knows what he is feeding to his dog, his response sounds odd.
A related point can be made if a predicate of personal taste is embedded under an
epistemic modal as in (49).
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(49) The cat food might be tasty.
(Danny Fox, p.c.)
In (49), tasty can mean "tastes good to the cat" (for example) or it can mean "tasty" in the
judge-dependent way, but might can only have the judge-dependent interpretation. For
example, imagine that Sam reads the ingredients on a can of cat food and reflects that
there is nothing in it that he actually dislikes; then he might utter (49) to convey that we
shouldn't assume that the cat food would taste terrible to us just because it's intended for
cats. Now imagine that Sam is watching his cat eat the cat food, and he can't tell from her
reaction whether she likes it; in this case he might utter (49) to convey that he isn't sure
whether the cat food was a good choice. Finally, imagine that Sam is watching his cat
sniff the cat food inquisitively, evidently trying to decide whether it's going to taste good.
In this case, Sam cannot utter (49) to convey something about the cat's mental state. (And
clearly the problem is not that a cat cannot have a mental state, since we have already
attributed to her the process of deciding whether the cat food will taste good.)
On the simple extension of Lasersohn's view, we might expect that the choice
between an autocentric or exocentric perspective would extend over the entire utterance.
Thus it is surprising not only that the interpretation of tasty can vary in a way that the
interpretation of might cannot, but that tasty can vary independently of might within a
single sentence. This suggests that, if I am on the right track in treating epistemic modals
as judge-dependent items in the first place, the ability of predicates of personal taste to
vary should be captured in some way other than a generally available option of using an
exocentric perspective.
4.3. Revised Analysis
The first change I will make to Lasersohn's system has to do with the source of judge
dependency for predicates of personal taste. Instead of making them directly dependent
on the judge, I take them to be simple two-place predicates, whose first argument is the
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person whose taste or experience is relevant. 13 New lexical entries for tasty (or taste
good), taste terrible, andfun are given in (50).
(50) [tastylw' tJ = I[taste good]] w tJ = [xe. [hYe . y tastes good to x in w at t] ]
[taste terrible]w'tJ = [Xxe. [,ye .y tastes terrible to x in w at t] ]
I[funl w'tJ = [xe . [Aye .y is fun for x in w at t] ]
Note that the judge parameter is still present, but these items are no longer inherently
judge-dependent. To bring judge dependency back into the system, I propose that there is
a silent nominal item PROj that refers to the judge. The lexical entry for PROj is given in
(51).
(51) [iPROj]] w' tJ =
Note that PROj is not an indexical since it takes its reference from the index rather than
the context of utterance, and also differs from pronouns like he and she in not being able
to be bound.14 When a predicate of personal taste with the new kind of meaning as in (50)
takes PROj as its first argument, the result will be the same as the original judge-
dependent meanings given earlier in (35) (as the reader can verify).
I assume that in expressions such as fun for X, the PP (for X) has the same extension
as the DP (X). In other words,for denotes the identity function over individuals, as in
(52). (This has the same effect as making prepositions semantically vacuous.)
(52) I[for]w 'td = [Xye . y]
13 Treating predicates like tasty and fun as two-place predicates is by no means new. For example, Epstein
(1984) assumes that they have a syntactic argument place that can be filled by a null item. (I will discuss
some observations of Epstein in Chapter 4.) My view of predicates of personal taste might also be
considered to be broadly in the spirit of Mitchell's (1986) semantics for "perspectival" expressions,
although his domain of inquiry and ultimate analysis are both different from mine.
14 Though despite the differences between PROJ and typical pronouns, I will suggest in Chapter 4 that
PROj is subject to Principle B.
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Then a predicate of personal taste can take a PP directly as an argument, instead of taking
PROj. Crucially, I also assume that a predicate of personal taste can take a null referential
pronoun referring to a contextually salient individual."5
Epistemic modals, on the other hand, keep their lexical entries from the preliminary
analysis in (44) (to be revised slightly below). The difference between epistemic modals
and predicates of personal taste, then, is that epistemic modals are inherently judge-
dependent, whereas predicates of personal taste become judge-dependent only if they
take PROj as an argument.
Another way to formulate the account, which is empirically equivalent as far as I can
tell, would be to also give epistemic modals meanings that take an individual "knower"
argument, but require that it always be PROj. 16 (This could be treated as a syntactic
selection requirement or as a semantic presupposition.) This would have the advantage of
making the basic meanings of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste more
parallel, but at the cost of stipulating that epistemic modals must combine with PRO1 . If
there turns out to be a good reason to adopt this kind of formulation over the one I have
given, it should be possible to make the switch while keeping the rest of my proposal
intact. Yet another option would be to treat predicates of personal taste as systematically
ambiguous between a two-place-predicate meaning and a judge-dependent meaning,
eliminating the need for PROj at the cost of positing the appropriate kind of rule. (On this
view, predicates of personal taste would still need to be able to take silent referential
arguments.) On any of these variations, the crucial point would be that predicates of
personal taste have the option of taking referential arguments while epistemic modals do
not.
Returning to the analysis, I further assume that attitude predicates such as think
obligatorily shift the judge parameter of the embedded clause to the matrix subject. (This
option was proposed in an earlier version of Lasersohn's paper and later rejected.) I will
15is Once null referential pronouns are posited, the question arises as to whether these pronouns can be bound
in the same way that overt pronouns can. I leave an exploration of their behavior in this respect to future
work.
16 This was the version I presented in Stephenson (2006).
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implement this using the notion of doxastic alternatives (Lewis, 1979; Chierchia, 1989),
defined in (53).17
(53) Doxastic alternatives:
Doxw,t,x = {<w',t',y>: it is compatible with what x believes in w at t that
he/she/it is y in w' at t'}
The doxastic alternatives of an individual x in world w at time t are the set of world-time-
individual triples <w',t',y> such that it is compatible with x's beliefs in w at t that x
(him/herself) is y in w' at t'. Intuitively, these represent properties that x self-ascribes. For
example, if John self-ascribes the property of being an individual named John, then all of
John's doxastic alternatives are triples <w',t',y> such that y is named John in w' at t'. The
lexical entry for think using doxastic alternatives is given in (54).
(54) [ithink] wtJ = [-P<s,<i,et . [•ze . V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x)= 1] ]
Unlike the lexical entry in (40) (in Section 3.2 above), this meaning for think operates on
the world, time, and judge parameters. It has the effect that a sentence of the form "x
thinks that S" is equivalent to "x thinks that S is true as judged by x." In many cases this
will be equivalent to "S is true as judged by x" because of what Lasersohn refers to as
epistemic privilege. For example, if S is the cake is tasty, then given that people have
privileged access to their own experiences of taste, a person will generally think that S
tastes good to them just in case it does taste good to them. (The principle of epistemic
privilege does not generally hold with respect to epistemic modals, since it would require
individuals to have no false or unjustified beliefs that they take to be knowledge.)
Because people can forget what their own internal states have been in the past,
epistemic privilege breaks down in examples like (55). This happens because the
•7 I use doxastic alternatives in order to capture the fact that the shifted judge is always interpreted de se
(Pranav Anand, p.c.). For example, (i) cannot be used in a context where Sam sees himself on T.V. and, not
knowing that the man on T.V. is Sam himself, comes to believe that it's compatible with what is known by
the man on T.V. that it's raining. This point will not be crucial here, but I will return to it in Chapter 4.
(i) Sam thinks it might be raining. (Pranav Anand, p.c.)
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proposition believed is understood generically, so that the time of thinking is different
from the time(s) of the taste experience.' 8
(55) Sue thinks sea urchin tastes good to her, but whenever she eats it, she
realizes that she can't stand the stuff.
(Robert Stalnaker, p.c.)
In the interest of consistency, I will recast the meanings of epistemic modals using a
notion of"epistemic alternatives" (in analogy to doxastic alternatives), which I define in
(56).
(56) Epistemic Alternatives:
Epistw,t,x = {<w',t',y>: it is compatible with what x knows in w at t that
he/she/it is y in w' at t'}
The key difference between doxastic alternatives and epistemic alternatives is that a
person's knowledge cannot rule out the actual individual that they are in the actual world
and time at which they are located, and so Epistw,t,x must always include <w,t,x> itself.
Presumably knowledge also carries extra requirements for justification, so that if x rules
out a triple <w',t',y> without sufficient justification, then <w',t',y> will still be among x's
epistemic alternatives. New lexical entries for might and must using this notion are given
in (57).
(57) [might] w' tj = [XP<s,<i,et>>. 3<w',t',x>EEpistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x)= 1]
[must]w t = [XP<s,<i,et>> . V<w',t',x>: Epistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x) = 1]
Note that my lexical entries for epistemic modals can be thought of as a simplification of
a fuller theory of modality where modals take restrictor arguments, which come in
various types (deontic, epistemic and so on) and determine the modal base and/or
ordering source. On a more complete view of this kind, my claim would be that the only
kind of epistemic restrictor is one that makes reference to the knowledge of the judge.
18 (55) becomes much less natural without the overt PP to her in the embedded clause, which is to say that
the argument of tastes good in this case cannot (easily) be a silent referential pronoun referring to Sue. This
may be related to the puzzle I will discuss in Section 4.7.
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I have one final change to make to Lasersohn's analysis. I assume that what
Lasersohn calls an autocentric perspective is obligatory: speakers always make
assertions, and accept or reject the assertions of others, using themselves as the judge.
Cases involving predicates of personal taste where it appears that speakers are taking an
exocentric view will be treated as instead containing a null referential pronoun referring
to the individual whose perspective is apparently being taken. In Section 8.2, I will show
that this view makes better predictions than Lasersohn's, under which speakers freely
choose between an auto- and exocentric perspective.
4.4. Examples
To see how the revised proposal works, let's first look at a case of a matrix epistemic
modal as in (58a). I assume that the structure of (58a) is (58b). The meaning is computed
in (58c).
(58) (a) It might be raining.
(b) [might] [ it be raining ]
(c) I[(b)]wt j = I[mightl]w itJ ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xj" . [it be rainingw,' t"J] ] )
= 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: it's raining in w' at t'
Thus (58a) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff at least one ofj's epistemic
alternatives is such that it's raining.
Now let's see what happens when (58a) is embedded under think, with its new
meaning from (54), which operates on the judge parameter. An example is given in (59a),
with the structure in (59b) and meaning in (59c).
(59) (a) Sue thinks it might be raining.
(b) [ Sue [VP thinks [s [might] [ it be raining ] ] ] ]
(c) f[(b)]w,' t = [Ithinks]]w tJ
( [Xw". [Xt" . [Xj" . [[it might be raining] w t' 't"J" ] ] ] ) ( [SueJ]w td )
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: [it might be raining]w',t'~x = 1
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1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: 3<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: it's raining in w"
at t"
This says that (59a) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff every one of Sue's
doxastic alternatives has an epistemic alternative where it's raining. This can be
simplified if we make certain assumptions about the relationship between belief and
knowledge. Specifically, I assume that to believe something is to believe that one knows
it, which means that the epistemic alternatives of a person's doxastic alternatives are the
same as the person's doxastic alternatives. Under this assumption, (59c) becomes
equivalent to (60).19
(60) = 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: it's raining in w' at t'
This is the same as the matrix case (58c) except that "j" is replaced by "Sue" and the
epistemic alternatives are replaced with doxastic alternatives.
When we turn to predicates of personal taste, there are now two possibilities for the
matrix case. Consider (61).
(61) This cake is tasty.
One option is for the argument of tasty to be PROj. In this case, the structure of (61) is
(62a), giving the meaning in (62b). (I'm ignoring tense and the contribution of the
copula.)
(62) (a) [ This cake ] [ is tasty PROj ]
(b) f[(a)]]w tJ = [tasty]]w td ( [IPROJ]w,' t ) ( [this cake]]w't J)
= [,xe . [,ye . y tastes good to x in w at t] ] (j ) (the cake)
= 1 iff the cake tastes good to j in w at t
This sentence says that the cake tastes good to the judge, and is the same as the meaning
given for the sentence under the preliminary analysis from Section 4.1. However, on the
revised analysis, it is also possible for tasty to take a null referential argument, for
19 At the end of Chapter 3 I go through the assumptions that are needed to allow this simplification, and
provide a proof.
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example one referring to Sam. In that case the structure of (61) is the one given in (63a),
with the meaning in (63b). (I will use "prox" to indicate a null referential pronoun
referring to an individual x.)
(63) (a) [ This cake ] [ is tasty prosm ]
(b) [(a)l]w'tJ = [tasty]w't ( I[prosamwl" 'tJ ) ( this cake]wt J)
= [,xe . [Lye . y tastes good to x in w at t] ] ( Sam) ( the cake)
= 1 iff the cake tastes good to Sam in w at t
On this reading, the sentence says that the cake tastes good to Sam, making it non-judge-
dependent. Again, what allows tasty to simply be linked to a salient referent (in this case,
Sam) is that it can take a silent referential argument. Note that since silent referential
arguments are not allowed for epistemic modals, my view predicts that an epistemic
modal in a matrix context cannot simply be linked to a salient referent. I will discuss this
prediction in Section 4.5.
For predicates of personal taste that can take overt PP arguments, the situation is
exactly the same. For example, the sentence in (64a) is completely parallel to (63), with
the structure in (64b) and the meaning in (64c).
(64) (a) The roller coaster is fun for Sam.
(b) [The roller coaster] [is fun [for Sam] ].
(c) [(b)]]w 't = I[fun]w'tj ( Ifor Sam]w'tj ) ( I[the roller coasteri] w tJ )
= [Xxe . [ey, . y is fun for x in w at t] ] (Sam) (the roller coaster)
= 1 iff the roller coaster is fun for Sam in w at t
I will ignore the possibility of overt PPs in the discussion of attitude predicates below,
since these have the same effect as null referential arguments.
There are still the same two possibilities when (61) is embedded under think, giving
(65).
(65) Sue thinks this cake is tasty.
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If PROJ is used as the argument of tasty in (65), then the structure of (65) is (66a), with
the meaning in (66b).
(66) (a) [ Sue [ thinks [ [ this cake ] [ is tasty PROj ] ] ] ]
(b) f[(a)]]w'tj = f[thinks]]wtj
( [xw" .[Xt" .[Xj" .[this cake is tasty PROj]w" t'' J"] ] ] ) ( j[Sue] w'tj )
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: j[this cake is tasty PROJ] w t'' x = 1
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>EDoxw,t,sue: the cake tastes good to x in w' at t'
This says that (66a) is true iff (roughly speaking) the cake tastes good to all of Sue's
doxastic alternatives. Assuming that Sue has privileged access to her own experiences of
taste, this becomes equivalent to (67).
(67) = 1 iff the cake tastes good to Sue in w at t
On the other hand, if a null referential pronoun - say, one referring to Sam, as in (63) - is
used as the argument of tasty in (65), then the structure of (65) is (68a), with the meaning
in (68b).
(68) (a) [ Sue [ thinks [ [ this cake ] [ is tasty prosam ] ] ] ]
(b) f[(a)]w'tJ = I[thinksIlw ' tJ
( [Xw". [Xt". [j" . I[this cake is tasty prosam ]w'",t"j" ] ] ]) ( [SueWl", )
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: j[this cake is tasty prosaml w' t' ,x = 1
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: the cake tastes good to Sam in w' at t'
This sentence simply describes a factual belief of Sue's, namely that the cake tastes good
to Sam. It's important to note that think still operates on the judge parameter, but since in
this case tasty has taken a referential argument rather than PROj, the embedded clause is
non-judge-dependent, so shifting the judge parameter has no effect on the meaning of the
sentence.
Similarly, there are two possibilities when a predicate of personal taste is embedded
under an epistemic modal as in (49), repeated in (69).
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(69) The cat food might be tasty.
If PROj is the argument of tasty in (69), then the structure of (69) is (70a), with the
meaning in (70b).
(70) (a) [ might [ the cat food be tasty PROJ ] ]
(b) I[(a)]w ',t = Igmight]"wtj ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xj" . I[the cat food is tasty
PROijw" ,t"j"]]
= 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: [the cat food is tasty PROj]w',t ',x = 1
= 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: the cat food tastes good to x in w' at t'
In this case, (69) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iffj has at least one epistemic
alternative where the cat food is tasty - roughly speaking, if it's compatible with j's
knowledge that the cat food tastes good to j themselves. This is the meaning needed for
the situation where the speaker checks the ingredients of the cat food and realizes that
there is nothing in it that he knows he dislikes.
On the other hand, if tasty takes a null referential pronoun referring to the cat (for
example), then (69) has the structure in (71a) and the meaning in (71b).
(71) (a) [ might [ this cat food be tasty prothe-cat I ]
(b) [(a)]lw tJ = f[mightl] w tJ ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xj". I[the cat food is tasty
prothe-cat]w't'"j" ]] )
= 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: [the cat food is tasty prothe-catlw ,t,x = 1
= 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: the cat food tastes good to the cat in w' at t'
In this case, (69) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iffj has at least one epistemic
alternative where the cat food tastes good to the cat. This is the meaning needed for the
situation where the speaker isn't sure whether the cat likes the cat food.
4.5. Apparent Counterexamples
On my proposal, epistemic modals are directly judge-dependent, so that the relevant
knowledge can never simply be that of a salient individual or group. I used examples
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such as (48) and (49) as evidence that this is correct; however, there are also examples in
the literature that seem to suggest the opposite. First consider (72a-b), based closely on
examples by DeRose (1991).
(72) [Context: John has some symptoms of cancer, and his doctor has run a test. If the results
are positive, John may (or may not) have cancer; if they are negative, then John definitely
does not have cancer. John's doctor has received the test results. John's wife, Jane, knows
that the doctor has received the results, but does not know yet what they are. Jane says:]
(a) John might have cancer.
(based on DeRose, 1991: pp. 582, "Cancer Test Case 581A")
(b) I don't know whether John might have cancer.
(based on DeRose, 1991: pp. 584-585, "Cancer Test Case 581B")
In (72b), but not (72a), the group whose knowledge is relevant for the interpretation of
might seems to include the doctor, which I predict to be impossible. DeRose concludes
from this that the interpretation of epistemic modals is somewhat flexible and context-
dependent in this respect.
I suggest that the difference between (72a) and (72b) is not in who the relevant
"knowers" are but rather in what sort of modality is being used. Specifically, I suggest
that might in (72b) does not actually express epistemic modality, but rather something
like "metaphysical" modality of the kind that appears in examples involving the future
such as (73)-(74) (see, e.g., Thomason, 1970; Abusch, 1985; Copley, 1996).
(73) It might rain tomorrow.
(74) It won't rain tomorrow.
I assume that might in (73) and won 't in (74) express, respectively, compatibility and
incompatibility with facts about the current state of the clouds, winds, and so forth; which
is to say that they involve a circumstantial modal base (Kratzer, 1991 a). Hence a person
could utter (75) if they were unaware of what these facts were.
(75) I don't know if it might rain tomorrow.
Similarly, in (72b) what Jane doesn't know is whether it's compatible with certain facts
about John's physical state that he has cancer, where the relevant facts are whatever the
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test is screening for. For example, suppose that the test screened for a certain protein in
the blood, which would definitely be present in the case of cancer but might also be
present for other reasons. What Jane doesn't know (but the doctor does know) is whether
this protein is present in John's blood, and therefore whether it is compatible with the
state of John's blood that he has cancer.
Another kind of apparent counterexample comes from Egan, Hawthorne &
Weatherson (2005), who discuss (76).
(76) [Context: Ann is planning a surprise party for Bill. Unfortunately, Chris has discovered
the surprise and told Bill all about it. Now Bill and Chris are having fun watching Ann try
to set up the party without being discovered. Currently Ann is walking past Chris's
apartment carrying a large supply of party hats. She sees a bus on which Bill frequently
rides home, so she jumps into some nearby bushes to avoid being spotted. Bill, watching
from Chris's window, is quite amused, but Chris is puzzled and asks Bill why Ann is
hiding in the bushes. Bill says:]
I might be on that bus.
(Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson, 2005, no. 16)
Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson report that (76) is acceptable on a reading where might
expresses Ann's mental state, which I predict to be impossible.
I suggest that on the relevant reading, there is more to (76) than meets the eye -
specifically, that there is ellipsis as shown in (77).20
(77) [Context: Same as (76).]
Ann is hiding in the bushes because I might be on that bus.
I believe it's plausible that ellipsis is involved given that Bill's statement in (76) is
supposed to be the answer to a question. That is, according to Egan, Hawthorne &
Weatherson's original context, (76) is really part of a dialogue along the lines of (78).
(78) [Context: Same as (76).]
Chris: Why is Ann hiding in the bushes?
Bill: I might be on that bus.
20 1 assume that elided material is present in the syntactic structure and interpreted at LF; however, a
different view of ellipsis would be compatible with my view provided it gave (76) the same meaning.
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Intuitively, Bill's response, on the relevant reading, is understood as an answer to Chris's
question. I assume that the meaning of a question is the set of propositions that are
possible answers to the question (see, e.g., Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977; and related
ideas of Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984). In the case of Chris's question in (78), this is,
roughly speaking, the set of propositions of the form "Ann is hiding in the bushes
because p" where p is any proposition. Thus for Bill's response to be an answer, it must
be understood as expressing a proposition of this form, and the only obvious way to do
this is to let "I might be on that bus" stand in for p.
If we assume that (76) has the structure in (77), then the occurrence of might is no
longer in a matrix clause, but embedded inside the because-clause. I suggest that in
because-clauses that express a person's conscious reasoning or rationale, the judge
parameter is shifted to the person whose reasoning is involved - in the case of (76),
Ann.21'22 One way to achieve this is to give because the lexical entry in (79).
(79) I[because]j]w' t = [kZe . [Xq<s,<i,et>> . [p<s,<i,et>> . the reason that p(w)(t)(j) = 1
is that V<w',t',x>eEpistw,t,,: q(w')(t')(x)= 1] ] ]
According to (79), because takes two propositional arguments, p and q, and an individual
argument z, and "p because q" is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff the reason
that p is true at <w,tj> is that all of z's epistemic alternatives in w at t are such that q is
true. This has the effect of evaluating the matrix clause with respect to the matrix judge,
while evaluating the embedded clause with the person whose reasoning is involved as
judge. Roughly speaking, "p because q" is equivalent to "p is true because z knows that q
is true as judged by z," where z is the person whose reasoning is involved. Note that since
21 The person whose reasoning or rationale is involved is not always the grammatical subject of the higher
clause (as I previously suggested in Stephenson, 2006). For example, in (i) (due to an anonymous L&P
reviewer), it seems that might can be linked to John's epistemic state at least as easily as it can be linked to
Ann's in (76). Thanks to this reviewer and L&P editor Polly Jacobson for very helpful discussion of the
meaning of because.
(i) Airplanes frighten John because they might crash.
22 It's difficult to give independent evidence for this analysis of because since the kinds of examples that
seem to support it may also be explained by binding of a null referential pronoun. (See note 15.) For
example, (i) has a reading equivalent to "each boy x is smiling because the food tastes good to x," which
could be explained if the argument of tasty is PROj and because shifts the judge parameter, but could also
be explained if the argument is a null referential pronoun bound by each boy.
(i) Each boy is smiling because his food is tasty.
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z's knowledge is involved, rather than simply z's beliefs, q must actually be true as
judged by z (but need not be true as judged by j). I assume that the individual argument is
always silent.
I will leave open the question of what happens when a because-clause does not
involve anyone's conscious reasoning or rationale. One possibility is that because has a
different meaning that does not take an individual argument and does not involve
epistemic alternatives; another possibility is that it still has the meaning in (79) but takes
either PROj or a contextually salient argument such as the speaker.
Now, in the pre-ellipsis sentence in (77), for example, because takes Ann as its silent
individual argument, and the two sentences I might be on that bus and Ann is hiding in
the bushes as its propositional arguments, giving it the meaning in (80b-c). The syntactic
structure is shown in (80a), where prOAnn is used to represent the silent argument referring
to Ann, and c* indicates the context of (77), where Bill is the speaker.
(80) (a) [Ann is hiding in the bushes] [because prOAnn [I might be on that bus] ]
(b) 1[(77)] c*; w,tj = D[becauselc*; w,tj ( [iproAnnl]C*; wt )
( [/w' . [Xt' . [Xj' . [DI might be on that bus]c *; w',t'j' )
( [w" . [Xt" . [Xj" . f[Ann is hiding in the busheslc*; w","j" )
= 1 iff the reason that I[Ann is hiding in the bushes]c *; w,tj = 1 is that
V<w',t',x> E Epistw,t,Ann: [II might be on that bus]c *; w',t',x = 1
= 1 iff the reason that Ann is hiding in the bushes in w at t is that
V<w',t',x>eEpistw,t,Ann: 3<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: Bill is on the bus in w" at
(c) = 1 iff the reason that Ann is hiding in the bushes in w at t is that
3<w',t',x>eEpistw,t,Ann: Bill is on the bus in w' at t'
Thus the sentence in (77) says that the reason Ann is hiding in the bushes is because it's
compatible with Ann's knowledge that Bill is on the bus. (Note that the two layers of
knowledge shown in the last line of (80b) can be collapsed into one as in (80c).) Provided
I'm justified in positing ellipsis here, this is possible without letting might take a
referential argument, and the example in (76) no longer poses a problem for my revised
analysis.
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Notice that in (81a), where the might-statement is embedded under I think, it is not
possible to understand might as linked to Ann's knowledge. This is completely expected
under my view, provided that the ellipsis in (81b) is not possible (corresponding to the
ellipsis I posited for (76)).
(81) [Context: Same as (76).]
(a) # I think I might be on that bus.
(b) I think Ann i; hidi,; g in the bushes be.a..e I might be on that bus.
Without going into the theory of ellipsis in any detail, we can see that this kind of ellipsis
is not generally allowed. For example, consider (82).
(82) Ann just jumped into the bushes, and Bill and Chris can't agree on why
she did that. Bill thinks she's hiding because Chris is there, and Chris
thinks she's hiding because Bill is there.
If the second occurrence of she's hiding because were elided, the result would be (83a),
with the ellipsis shown in (83b).
(83) (a) Ann just jumped into the bushes, and Bill and Chris can't agree on why
she did that. # Bill thinks she's hiding because Chris is there, and Chris
thinks Bill is there.
(b) Ann just jumped into the bushes, and Bill and Chris can't agree on why
she did that. Bill thinks she's hiding because Chris is there, and Chris
thinks she'sc hiding beeaue Bill is there.
But (83a) does not have a meaning equivalent to (82), where Bill's presence is the reason
Chris attributes to Ann hiding - rather, it can only mean that Chris himself thinks Bill is
there, which is an odd thing to say in the context given that Bill and Chris are having a
conversation and thus are obviously aware of each other's presence. Compare this to the
gapping case in (84), which is acceptable and means the same thing as (82).
(84) Ann just jumped into the bushes, and Bill and Chris can't agree on why
she did that. Bill thinks she's hiding because Chris is there, and Chris,
because Bill is there.
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Given that the ellipsis in (83b) is impossible, then, it seems reasonable to assume that the
same kind of ellipsis in (8 lb) is also impossible.
Note that not all speakers I have consulted accept (76). This variation could be taken
to either be variation in whether the ellipsis in (77) is allowed, or perhaps variation in
whether because can shift the judge parameter. I'll leave this question open.
4.6. Note about Generic Readings
One question that comes up is whether judge-dependent items allow interpretations that
involve generic quantification over potential judges - for example, whether it is possible
for tasty to mean something like "tasty to people in general." Lasersohn (2005) gives
conclusive evidence that a generic reading is not the only reading possible for predicates
of personal taste, but this leaves open the possibility of it being an additional reading.
First let me briefly review Lasersohn's evidence that predicates of personal taste are
not always interpreted generically.23 (The following argument is based on Lasersohn,
2005: pp. 653-654.) First, there is the simple fact that a speaker always seems to be
justified in asserting a sentence with a predicate of personal taste provided that it is true
as judged by them, even if they know that most people would disagree. Lasersohn gives
the example of an office supplies aficionado enthusiastically cataloguing his collection of
the latest models of paperclips. This guy may have odd taste in pastimes, but he still has a
firm grasp on reality and is aware that most people would not enjoy cataloguing
paperclips. Nevertheless, as long as he is having a good time doing it, he can permissibly
utter (85).
(85) This is fun!
(Lasersohn, 2005, no. 22a)
Second, Lasersohn points out that if predicates of personal taste were always interpreted
generically, then sentences like (86) should be contradictory.
23 Lasersohn (2005) cites Bhatt & Izvorski (1995) for suggesting a generic view of predicates of personal
taste.
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(86) This is fun, but most people would hate it.
(Lasersohn, 2005, no. 23)
However (86) is perfectly coherent (and the kind of thing our realistically minded
paperclip collector might say). Note that if most people is replaced with some other
plausible candidate for generic quantification, as in (87a-b), the sentence remains
acceptable.
(87) (a) This is fun, but almost everyone would hate it.
(b) This is fun, but the average person would hate it.
It is clear, then, that a generic interpretation is not the only possible interpretation for
predicates of personal taste.24 But is a generic reading possible at all? Lasersohn does not
explicitly address this question, but some of his data seems to suggest that generic
readings are not possible. For example, he claims that it would be odd for our paperclip
collector to utter (88).
(88) # This is not fun at all, although I'm having fun doing it.
(Lasersohn, 2005, no. 22b)
While I share Lasersohn's judgment, some speakers I have consulted do accept sentences
like (88) in the context described. Moreover, there are examples that clearly seem to need
a generic interpretation. Consider the sentences in (89), for example.
(89) (a) If a game isn't fun, don't play it!
(b) If a dish isn't tasty, don't eat it!
A person giving advice along the lines of (89a) clearly isn't suggesting that the listener
conduct an opinion poll before deciding which games to play - rather, the advice seems
to be, "if you don't find a game fun, don't play it." (Presumably the quantificational
indefinite a game helps to bring out the generic reading.) I conclude, then, that generic
24 Larry Horn (p.c.) has suggested that a purely generic view of predicates of personal taste might be
tenable if genericity itself were taken to be a relativist or judge-dependent phenomenon - for example, if
the domain of quantification for a generic operator always included the judge. I will not pursue this
possibility; but in any case such a view (if tenable) would really be a more complex version of my view
rather than an alternative to it.
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readings of predicates of personal taste are generally available, in addition to the normal,
judge-dependent reading, as well as readings involving an implicit, salient referent. Of
course, this means that there must be some other explanation for why some speakers do
not accept (88); I will leave that open.
It is not difficult to allow for the possibility of generic readings for predicates of
personal taste on my view, since I allow them to take silent pronouns as arguments. For
example, we could assume that the silent pronoun can be bound by a generic operator
(see note 15). Alternatively, we could assume that the silent pronouns can also be
"generic pronouns," whatever that might mean. How exactly to capture the generic
readings of predicates of personal taste depends, of course, on having an account of
genericity. Since I don't want to complicate matters by going into the semantics of
generic quantification, I will largely avoid discussing generic readings. The important
point is just that generic readings, on my view, would be seen as a more complicated
version of "exocentric" readings involving a silent referential argument. 25
Note that since epistemic modals do not take an individual argument on my view,
(and therefore cannot take a silent referential pronoun), this predicts that epistemic
modals do not allow generic interpretations. This seems to be right. For example, suppose
that the administrators of a small liberal arts college in New Mexico, let's call it Hidalgo
College, are planning to launch an advertising and recruiting campaign to increase the
visibility of the institution on the national level. They start by hiring a polling agency to
conduct a nationwide survey to try to determine how many people have heard of Hidalgo
College and how much they know about it. They are encouraged to find that a large
percentage of respondents have heard of the school, but very few people know that it is
located in New Mexico. A lot of respondents thought that it was in Arizona, and many
more others only knew that it was in the Southwest. If the polling results are reliable,
then, it is compatible with the knowledge of Americans in general that Hidalgo College is
in Arizona. In this situation it would be very odd for the pollster to report back to the
25 Lasersohn could allow for the possibility of generic interpretations by giving speakers and hearers the
additional option of taking a "generic" perspective, in addition to an autocentric or exocentric one.
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college administration using any of the sentences in (90), whereas they could use those in
(91).
(90) (a) (#) Our survey shows that Hidalgo College might be in Arizona.
(b) (#) We have concluded that Hidalgo College might be in Arizona.
(91) (a) Our survey shows that as far as most Americans know, Hidalgo College
might be in Arizona.
(b) We have concluded that to the best of most Americans' knowledge,
Hidalgo College might be in Arizona.
4.7. A Puzzle about Silent Pronouns
I have assumed that predicates of personal taste can take silent pronouns as arguments,
which act just like overt pronouns. However, it seems that these silent pronouns do not
behave in all ways like their overt counterparts. For example, consider (92)-(93), which
involve ellipsis of a VP that contains tasty or tastes good.
(92) Sam thinks that the tuna is tasty, and Mary does, too.
(93) Sam thinks that the tuna tastes good to him, and Mary does, too.
Sentence (93) allows an interpretation on which both Sam and Mary think that the tuna
tastes good to Sam, but (92) does not allow this reading.
This seems to have some connection with the presence or absence of epistemic
privilege. In (93), the first conjunct seems to require that Sam not be sure of his own taste
(for example because he has forgotten); accordingly, the second conjunct can then either
mean that Mary shares Sam's uncertain belief about his taste, or that she has the same
kind of uncertain belief about her own taste. In other words, if a predicate of personal
taste has an overt argument that refers to the attitude holder, it seems that the situation
described has to be one where epistemic privilege does not hold.26 On the other hand, the
first conjunct of (92) tends to evoke a scenario where Sam is certain about his own taste,
26 Note that the question of whether epistemic privilege holds is distinct from that of whether the argument
of the predicate of personal taste allows a de se interpretation. Sam can believe (de se) that he himself is a
person who the tuna tastes good to, without actually knowing or remembering how the tuna tastes. I will
return to issues of de se interpretation in Chapter 4, but will not have anything more to say about the puzzle
at hand.
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that is, where epistemic privilege holds. However, it seems to me that the sentence is also
compatible with scenarios where epistemic privilege does not hold, as in (94).
(94) Sam thinks that the tuna is tasty, but he doesn't remember for sure.2 7
Even when this kind of scenario is brought out, the ellipsis facts remain the same. For
example, (95) still does not allow an interpretation on which both Sam and Mary think
that the tuna tastes good to Sam (but can't remember).
(95) Sam thinks that the tuna is tasty but doesn't remember for sure, and Mary
does, too.
In sum, then, there seems to be a prohibition against a predicate of personal taste taking a
silent argument that refers to the attitude holder, even though an overt argument referring
to the attitude holder is perfectly acceptable. I leave this as an open puzzle.
5. More Attitude Predicates: Find and Believe
In this section I look at two additional attitude predicates,find and believe. I argue that
their meanings, while generally similar to think, also have important differences from
think and from each other.
5.1. Find vs. Think
Consider (96) and (97).
(96) Sam thinks the cake is tasty.
(97) Sam finds the cake tasty.
Both sentences are naturally interpreted to mean that the cake tastes good to Sam. The
two sentences have somewhat different syntax in that only think takes a finite clause as
complement. Apart from that, they seem at first glance to be very similar. However, there
is an important difference betweenfind and think in English: as Mitchell (1986) observes,
find does not seem to allow the embedded predicate to be interpreted with respect to a
27 Keir Moulton (p.c.) reports, in contrast, that examples very much like (94) are not acceptable (see
Chapter 4, footnote 31).
CHAPTER 2
salient referent (in Lasersohn's terms, an "exocentric" reading).28 We can see this by
comparing (98) with (99).
(98) Sam thinks the cat food is tasty.
(99) Sam finds the cat food tasty.
The sentence in (98) can be used to mean that Sam thinks the cat food tastes good to the
cat, as discussed in Section 4.2. This reading can be brought out by the continuation
...because the cat has eaten a lot of it. In contrast, (99) can only mean that the cat food
tastes good to Sam, odd as it might sound for Sam to have tried cat food.
There is another difference as well, which I will not be addressing but should
mention: it is not clear whether epistemic modals can be embedded underfind. For the
case of might and must, there are independent reasons for this in English, since might and
must lack non-finite forms. This should in principle be testable in other languages where
the equivalent offind takes a regular tensed clause, as with Germanfinden (Irene Heim,
p.c.), but it is not clear if the constructions are truly equivalent given that there is a
contrast in English between thefind construction as in (96) and thefind to be construction
(Mitchell, 1986, Ch. 1). Find can embed probable as in (100), but it not clear to me that
probable is truly interpreted epistemically in this case.
(100) I find it probable that it's raining.
(Kai von Fintel, p.c.)
I will leave this issue aside and focus on the behavior offind in sentences like (96) with
predicates of personal taste.
On the face of it, the contrast between (98) and (99) seems to suggest that predicates
of personal taste cannot in general take silent referential arguments, which would be a
problem for my account. The behavior offind could be captured if predicates of personal
taste were obligatorily judge-dependent, but then the behavior of think could not be
captured. However, I suggest that this contrast does not have anything to do with the
argument structure of predicates of personal taste, but rather with the fine-grained lexical
28 This fact has also been pointed out to me by a number of people, including Rick Nouwen (p.c.).
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semantics offind. In particular, I suggest that to "find" a proposition p (in the sense that
find is used in the examples above) means to believe it due to having a direct experience
of it. Thusfind has a component to its meaning that is essentially an evidential of direct
evidence. 29 A lexical entry forfind along these lines is given in (101). This is different
from the meaning of think only in the extra requirement of direct experience.30 (For
simplicity, this requirement is encoded as an entailment.)
(101) [find] w'tJ = [XP<s,<i,et> . [ze . V<w',t',y>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(y) = 1,
and this is caused by z having a direct experience of p in w] ]
The reason that (99) cannot be understood to mean that Sam thinks the cat food tastes
good to the cat, I suggest, is because the proposition that the cat food tastes good to the
cat is simply not the kind of proposition that Sam can have direct experience of. Of
course this notion of direct experience is a bit vague, but for present purposes the idea is
this: whether something tastes good to someone depends on the internal psychological
state of that individual, and the only way to have direct experience of an individual's
internal psychological state is to be that individual. Thus if Sam tastes a cake and
discovers that it tastes good to him, he has direct experience of the cake tasting good (and
of the cake tasting good to him); on the other hand, if Sam sees his cat devouring cat food
with gusto and licking her chops, he can infer from this, perhaps even with a high degree
of certainty, that the cat is having a similar experience of taste, but he cannot have direct
experience of this, and sofind cannot be used in this case, as in (99). Since think does not
carry this extra requirement, though, think can be used in this case, as in (98).
This predicts that the contrast betweenfind and think has nothing to do with whether
the embedded predicate is judge-dependent, but only with whether the embedded
proposition is something that the subject can have direct experience of. We can see that
29 Kai von Fintel (p.c.) suggested the connection with evidentiality, as well as the related point that the lack
of direct experience does not always entail lack of certainty. The distinction between direct experience and
certainty is discussed at some length by von Fintel & Gillies (2007b) in connection with epistemic must.
30 In the past tense in English,find seems to be telic and have an inchoative interpretation, something like
'come to believe (through direct sensory experience),' as in (i). This kind of predicate is telic, however, and
so should not be possible in the English simple present. Thus I will assume thatfind is stative, but this issue
calls for further investigation.
(i) John found the apple tasty.
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this prediction is correct from considering what happens when predicates of personal
taste take explicit arguments. If the argument of a predicate of personal taste is made
explicit with a prepositional phrase as in (102a-b) (thus rendering it non-judge-dependent
according to my view), the resulting sentences are simply unacceptable. (This can be
tested with tasty only to the extent that tasty allows to-phrases.)
(102) (a) */# Sam finds the hamster wheel fun for the hamster.
(b) */# Sam finds the cat food tasty to the cat.
I conclude, then, that the difference betweenfind and think is merely telling us something
about a difference in the lexical semantics of the two attitude predicates, and not about
predicates of personal taste or judge dependency.
5.2. Believe vs. Think
In most of my examples of attitude reports so far, I have used the attitude predicate think.
The meaning I have given to it is based on meanings proposed by others for believe, and
so one might assume that think and believe have identical behavior. However, there turns
out to be a contrast between them: while think is very natural with both epistemic modals
and predicates of personal taste, believe is less natural with predicates of personal taste in
certain contexts. To see this, first consider (103) and (104), with an epistemic modal.
(103) Sam thinks that it might be raining.
(104) Sam believes that it might be raining.
These two sentences are essentially synonymous, and seem to mean that it's compatible
with Sam's beliefs that it's raining.
Now consider (105) and (106), which contain a predicate of personal taste embedded
under think or believe.
(105) Sam thinks that the cake is tasty.
(106) Sam believes that the cake is tasty.
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Although both sentences are acceptable, (106) seems to suggest that Sam isn't sure of his
opinion of the cake, possibly because he hasn't actually tasted it. For example, (106)
would be odd in a context where Sam has just tasted the cake and expressed his
enjoyment of it, whereas (105) would be fine in such a context, as illustrated in (107).
(107) [Context: Mary and Sue have made a cake for Sam. They are not very good at baking,
whereas Sam is famous as a cook, so they are worried it won't be up to his standards. Of
course, they know that Sam would be too polite to say so, so they decide to spy on him as
he tastes the cake. Sam takes a bite, smiles, and says, "Mmm, yum!" Mary says to Sue:]
(a) Oh good, Sam thinks the cake is tasty.
(b) # Oh good, Sam believes the cake is tasty.
(107a) is much more natural in this context than (107b). 31
I suggest, again, that this difference is due to a fine-grained difference in semantics
between the two attitude predicates. Specifically, I suggest that to "believe" a proposition
p in the sense that the English word believe requires, the belief must not come from a
direct experience of p. (This is the opposite of whatfind required, and is akin to an
evidential of indirect evidence.) Typically, this will suggest some level of uncertainty.
Normally one might assume that any suggestion of uncertainty from using believe comes
from an implicature based on the fact that the speaker did not use know or be certain, but
I'm proposing that this actually comes from the semantics. A lexical entry is given in
(108).
(108) I[believe]w' tJ = [XP<s,<i,et>> [XZe . V<w',t',y>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(y) = 1,
and this is NOT caused by z having a direct experience of p in w] ]
3' Keir Moulton (p.c.) has suggested that the reverse fact holds as well: think is not acceptable with
predicates of personal taste when there is a lack of certainty. He claims, for example, that (i) is odd.
(i) I've never had licorice, the smell turns me off. # But I think that it's tasty.
I'm not sure that I agree that think is unacceptable in (i), although believe might be slightly more natural. In
any case, sentences like (i) become much better if the embedded clause is not in the present tense, as in
(ii)--(iii).
(ii) I don't remember for sure whether the cake was tasty, but I think it was.
(iii) I think the cake will be tasty, but I can't be sure since I've never tried this recipe before.
I leave it to future work to investigate what difference, if any, there is between the acceptability of think
and believe in contexts where a person is not sure of their own opinion.
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Thus the reason believe cannot be used in examples like (107b) is because Sam's belief
comes from direct experience of tasting the cake. Since think is neutral between whether
the belief comes a direct experience or not, think is fine in (107a).
Of course, this notion of direct experience is just as vague here as it was above in the
discussion offind. However, there is at least some evidence that the same notion is
involved for bothfind and believe. In exactly those cases where believe is natural with
predicates of personal taste, meaning that direct experience is not involved, find becomes
unacceptable. For example, (109) is perfectly natural, and (110) is unacceptable.
(109) I've never actually tried licorice, but I believe it's tasty.
(110) */# I've never actually tried licorice, but I find it tasty.32
Also, when we consider readings of predicates of personal taste with referential
arguments (either silent or overt), then believe becomes natural. For example, (111) and
(112) seem equally natural when tasty is interpreted to mean "tastes good to the cat."
(111) I think the cat food is tasty, because the cat has eaten a lot of it.
(112) I believe the cat food is tasty, because the cat has eaten a lot of it.
The situation is the same when the argument of a predicate of personal taste is made
explicit. For example, (113) and (114) are equally acceptable.
(113) I think the cat food tastes good to the cat.
(114) I believe the cat food tastes good to the cat.
Again, since these were exactly the kinds of cases wherefind was impossible, it seems
reasonable that the same notion of direct experience is needed for both.
5.3. Remarks
I have suggested here that there is a three way distinction between think, find (as infind
the cake tasty), and believe. Of these three, think has the simplest, most general meaning,
simply saying something about the attitude holder's doxastic alternatives. Find has an
32 (110) is similar to Keir Moulton's example from note (31) except that (110) usesfind instead of think.
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additional requirement that the belief come from direct experience, whereas believe
requires the exact opposite - that the belief not come from direct experience. (I assume,
then, that the way the world believe is used in many contexts of linguistic and
philosophical analysis, including in this paper, is not true to its meaning in English.)
One might ask why I treated the extra requirements offind and believe as part of the
entailments of these predicates rather than as presuppositions. For example, we might
observe that (115) cannot be used to describe a situation where Sam thinks that the cake
is tasty because of a direct experience, and (116) cannot be used to describe a situation
where Sam believes the cake is tasty but hasn't tried it.
(115) Sam doesn't believe that the cake is tasty.
(116) Sam doesn't find the cake tasty.
However, I think this comes from the fact that both believe andfind are neg-raisers. (This
is standardly observed for believe; I don't know if this has been claimed forfind before,
but it seems to be true.) In other words, (115) normally means that Sam believes the cake
isn't tasty, and (116) normally means that Sam finds the cake un-tasty (so to speak). As
long as we adopt an account of neg-raising that predicts that "x doesn't believe p" is
equivalent to "x believes that not p" (and similarly forfind), this will capture the behavior
of (115) and (116). (Gajewski, 2005 is one possibility.) Of course, if there were some
reason to make the extra requirement separate presuppositions, that could also be done.
6. Pragmatics and Judge Dependency
In this section, I will discuss how a system using a judge parameter can be embedded in a
theory of conversation. In particular, I will propose extended notions of assertion and the
common ground that can help make sense of the behavior of judge-dependent items.
6.1. Common Ground and Assertion
In the theory of conversation and common ground developed in large part by Stalnaker
(see, e.g., Stalnaker, 1978, 2002), it is assumed that the purpose of conversation is to
establish and update a context set, which is the set of worlds consistent with what the
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participants in the conversation all believe, believe that they all believe, and so on ad
infinitum. (Sometimes what is taken to be relevant is not actual beliefs, but rather the
propositions taken to be true for the purposes of the conversation, but this is not
important for my purposes.) The common ground is the set of such propositions. The
context set is thus essentially a proposition, expressed as a set. When a speaker makes an
assertion, they are proposing to remove from this set any worlds in which the asserted
proposition is not true. The hearers can then accept or challenge this proposal with their
own speech acts.
I would like to follow this view of conversation as closely as possible. The simple
view of a context set as a set of worlds is based on the assumption that a proposition is a
set of worlds. On the view I have adopted, a proposition is a set of world-time-individual
triples. To extend the Stalnakerian view of conversation to the semantic system I have
adopted, then, the first step is to treat the context set as a set of world-time-individual
triples instead of worlds or world-time pairs. In particular, I propose that for all the triples
in the context set for a conversation, the judge element represents the plurality of the
group of participants in the conversation.33 As we will see below, this is not going to
mean that might (for example) is equivalent to something like "compatible with our
knowledge." What it does mean is that I have in effect introduced a notion of an actual
judge, which is just the group of participants in a particular conversation. Moreover, in
the typical case there will be no interesting disagreement in a conversation about who the
actual judge is, unlike with worlds and possibly times.
The other important piece of my pragmatic proposal is the norm of assertion. I
suggest that it is what Lasersohn would call autocentric. Specifically, I propose that in
order for a speaker A to assert a sentence S, it must be the case that for all of A's doxastic
alternatives <w',t',x>, S is true at the index <w',t',x>. As I discussed when I introduced
the meaning for think in (54) (Section 4.3), this means that A must believe that S is true
as judged by A. Crucially, then, A does not need to believe that S is true as judged by the
33 Egan (2007) independently develops a different view of a relativist pragmatics, where for indices <w,t,x>
in the context set, x varies among the atomic individuals participating in the conversation. I leave it to
future work to make a thorough comparison of the two pragmatic systems.
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whole group of conversational participants. Thus the norm of assertion is crucially weak
in a certain sense. In order for A to assert that S, A only needs to believe that S is true as
judged by A, but if A's assertion is accepted by the other speakers and added to the
common ground, it has the same effect as adding the proposition that S is true as judged
by the group of conversational participants. 34
On my view, then, there are two differences between the judge parameter and the
other elements of the index (world and time): first, it is generally known in a conversation
who the "actual" judge is, namely, the group of conversational participants; and second,
the judge involved in the norm of assertion varies according to who the speaker is.
6.2. Consequences
With these new assumptions in place, we can now make some sense of the special kind of
disagreement that occurs with epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, as
discussed in Section 2.3. Consider (117), for example.
(117) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It's tasty.
Sue: No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
In this dialogue, Sam's assertion serves as a proposal to add to the common ground the
proposition that the cake is tasty, which, if successful, will have the same effect on the
common ground as adding the proposition that the cake tastes good to the entire group of
conversational participants. To make this assertion, though, he only needs to believe that
the cake tastes good to him. Sue objects to the proposal by asserting that the cake is not
tasty (No it isn 't.), which serves as a counterproposal to restrict the context set to triples
<w,tj> such that the cake does not taste good to j in w at t.35 She then goes on to assert
that the cake tastes terrible; crucially, in order to do that, she only needs to believe that
34 The norm of assertion is also weak in a different way, given that it only involves belief. We could make
it stronger in this sense by replacing doxastic alternatives with epistemic alternatives, without affecting my
main points. I will suggest in Chapter 3 that this stronger requirement is needed for certain other purposes.
35 I assume that in the case of distributive predicates, including predicates of personal taste, the plural judge
carries a homogeneity requirement - that is, "the cake does not taste good to j" means that for each atomic
part ofj, the cake does not taste good to j (see, e.g., Schwarzschild, 1994). (This does not apply to
epistemic modals, which I assume involve a collective interpretation of knowledge). Thanks to Barry
Schein (p.c.) for bringing up this issue.
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the cake tastes terrible to her. This shows that the relevant judge for the purposes of the
norm of assertion is just the speaker, and not the entire group of conversational
participants, because in this case Sue clearly knows that the cake does not taste terrible to
Sam. This same point can also be seen by examples like (118), as Lasersohn (2005)
observes.
(118) Sue: This cake isn't tasty.
Sam: Yes it is!
(based on Lasersohn, 2005, no. 17)
In this case, again, Sam can assert that the cake is tasty even knowing that it does not
taste good to Sue.
The situation is completely parallel if the disagreement involves an epistemic modal
as in (17), repeated below in (119).
(119) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. He might be in his office.
Sue: Nuh-uh, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
[OR] No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
Here Sam's assertion serves as a proposal to add to the common ground the proposition
that Bill might be in his office. If successful, this will have the same effect as adding the
proposition that the combined knowledge of the group of conversational participants is
consistent with Bill being in his office. Sue challenges this assertion because she believes
that her knowledge is inconsistent with Bill being in his office.
Essentially I have proposed that what a group does in a conversation is analogous to
what an individual does in developing and revising a set of beliefs: an individual is trying
to place him or herself in the space of possible individuals (as reflected in the notion of
doxastic alternatives), and similarly a group of people in conversation are on a joint
venture to place themselves, as a group, in the space of possible plural individuals. In
other words, they are trying to align their world views, not only with regard to factual
beliefs such as whether Bill works on Fridays, but also with regard to subjective matters
such as what is tasty and which epistemic possibilities are still open. The rules of
conversation are set up to let this happen particularly efficiently, by letting a speaker just
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propose something like "let's establish that we're in a world where Bill doesn't work on
Fridays" or "let's establish that we're a group of people for whom this cake is tasty" or
"let's establish that our epistemic state leaves it open whether Bill is in his office"
without knowing whether their interlocutors will accept the proposal. The others are free
to object, and if they do, then some argument may ensue, but if they don't, little time
needs to be wasted on the issue.
One might still ask why speakers should be able to make proposals that they know
will be unsuccessful, as Sue does in (117), where she knows that Sam will not accept the
proposition that the cake tastes terrible. I will follow Stalnaker and assume that in making
a conversational move, a speaker does not need to intend or even expect the move to
succeed. This is analogous to the fact that, as Stalnaker puts it, "Congress may make a
law knowing it will be vetoed, a labor negotiator may make a proposal knowing it will be
met by a counterproposal, or a poker player may place a bet knowing it will cause all the
other players to fold" (Stalnaker, 1978: p. 153). Perhaps a more appropriate analogy
would be the following: suppose that a widely used hiking path runs along the edge of a
privately owned ranch. The rancher believes that the path is actually on her property, and
thus that the hikers are trespassing, but the hikers believe that the path runs along the
route of a colonial wagon road, and is therefore a public right-of-way. The rancher puts
"No Trespassing" signs along the path, thereby proposing that the path be treated as part
of her property. In turn, the hikers (in addition to continuing to use the path) put up
improvised road signs along it saying things like "1 mile to Acoakset," thereby proposing
that it be treated as a public way. The hikers know that the rancher will not accept this
proposal, but by doing this they are making it clear to her that her proposal to treat the
path as private property has not been accepted either. Similarly, in the case of a
disagreement as in (117), the main purpose of Sue's assertion that the cake tastes terrible
is to make it clear that she does not accept the proposal to add to the common ground the
proposition that it's tasty. I suggest that the ability of speakers to allowably make doomed
proposals (sometimes resulting in futile arguments) is an inevitable byproduct of an
otherwise useful and efficient system.
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6.3. A Special Case
Note that in my discussion of the purpose of conversation and the norm of assertion I
have been talking about normal, information-sharing conversation. Some types of
conversation are different. For example, an anonymous Linguistics and Philosophy
reviewer brings up an example along the lines of (120). (Similar examples appear in von
Fintel & Gillies, 2007a.)
(120) [Context: Sam is playing a game with his young daughter. He is hiding a prize in one of
his hands and she has to guess which hand it is in. Sam says:]
It might be in my right hand. It might be in my left hand. You have to
guess.
Of course Sam knows which hand the prize is in - let's suppose it's in his left hand. Then
it seems surprising on my view that he can assert that it might be in his right hand, since
it's not compatible with his beliefs that it's in his right hand.
I suggest that the norm of assertion in a guessing game is different than it is in
normal, information-sharing conversation, and that this is related directly to the purpose
of the conversation and the roles of the participants. In normal conversation, a speaker
making an assertion is trying to get the others to share their beliefs. The speaker must
believe the proposition they are asserting because it would be counterproductive to get
the other participants to accept a proposition that they themselves do not believe (unless,
of course, the speaker is lying, but in that case they are presenting themselves falsely as
being engaged in information-sharing conversation). In a guessing game, on the other
hand, the clue-giver is not supposed to eliminate the right answer as a possibility, but is
also not supposed to give it away. The proposition that the prize might be in the clue-
giver's right hand happens to have the special property that even though the clue-giver
doesn't believe it, adding it to the common ground does not go against the purpose of the
guessing game.
Note that allowing the epistemic modal in (120) to refer directly to the daughter's
knowledge does not seem to be the answer here in any case. On such a view, (120) would
be expected to express roughly the same thing as (121).
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(121) [Context: Same as (120). Sam says:]
# You don't know if the prize is in my right hand or my left hand. You have
to guess.
However, (121) sounds odd in this context. In particular, it seems as if Sam is simply
stating the obvious (that his daughter doesn't know where the prize is), whereas in (120)
he seems to be setting the parameters of the guessing game and inviting his daughter to
play. This suggests that (120) does not mean the same thing as (121).
6.4. Questions and Answers
Another area where thinking about the pragmatics can be informative is in questions and
answers. Consider an exchange like that in (122).
(122) Mary: Is the cake tasty?
Sam: Yes, it is.
On the most natural interpretation of Mary's question in (122), she is asking Sam to
report his own experience, that is, whether the cake tastes good to him. Thus at first
glance, the judge of a predicate of personal taste seems to shift to the addressee in
questions. 36 However, this is something of an illusion. In fact tasty in Mary's question in
(122) does not literally mean "tasty to you." If it did, then Sam's response would have to
literally mean either "the cake tastes good to me" (if you were interpreted as singular) or
"the cake tastes good to us" (if you were interpreted as plural). On the singular
interpretation, the prediction would be that in a dialogue like (122), a third person could
not disagree, saying that the cake isn't tasty, based purely on the fact that it doesn't taste
good to them. But a third person can do this as usual, as we can see from the continuation
(123).
(123) Mary: Is the cake tasty?
Sam: Yes, it is.
Sue: No, it isn't!
36 McCready (2006) makes this observation, both for predicates of personal taste and for Japanese
experiential predicates.
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Of course, if you were interpreted as plural, the dialogue in (123) would be expected to be
possible since the cake doesn't taste good to Sue, and therefore doesn't taste good to both
Sam and Sue. However, this would then predict that the dialogue in (124) should be
impossible, contrary to fact.
(124) Mary: Is the cake tasty?
Sam: No, not at all.
Sue: Yes, it is!
We can make sense of the behavior of predicates of personal taste in questions under
simple assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of questions. First, I assume that
the denotation of a question is the set of propositions that constitute answers to that
question (following Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977; see also Groenendijk & Stokhof,
1984). Second, I assume that in asking a question, the asker is inviting the addressee to
assert one of this set of propositions, with the presumption that the asker will accept
whichever assertion the addressee makes. To see how this works with a more mundane
example, consider (125).
(125) Mary: Is it raining?
Sam: Yes, it is.
In this exchange, Mary is inviting Sam to assert either that it's raining or that it isn't
raining, with the presumption that she will accept whichever one he asserts (for example
because she does not know whether it's raining, thinks that he knows, and thinks that he
will truthfully tell her).
Now, in (122), Mary is asking Sam to assert either that the cake is tasty or that it isn't
tasty, again with the presumption that she will accept whichever assertion he makes. Her
reasons for being willing to accept his assertion would be different than in (125) - for
example, she may assume that the two of them have similar taste, wish to defer to his
taste for the purpose of the conversation, or simply consider it irrelevant whether the cake
tastes good to her - but what she is doing in both cases is the same. Sue's disagreement in
(123) is possible because Sam's answer is a normal assertion subject to the normal kinds
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of objections. (Although Mary has indicated by asking the question that she will accept
his answer, Sue is under no such obligation.)
6.5. First-Person Belief Reports
As I noted in Section 2.4, in some cases epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste
that are embedded in attitude reports seem to behave the same way that they do in the
matrix clause, and disagreement is possible. This was illustrated in (25)-(26), repeated in
(126)-(127).
(126) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. I think he might be in his office.
Sue: No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
(127) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: I think it's tasty.
Sue: No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
On the face of it, these cases seem to present a challenge to my view of attitude
predicates shifting the judge parameter, which predicts that might and tasty in (126)-
(127) are interpreted with Sam as the judge, and thus that Sue should not be able to
respond based on her own knowledge or taste. As I noted before, though, we can tell
from the form of No, he can 't be! and No, it isn 't! (rather than No, you don 't!) that Sue's
disagreement targets the embedded clause rather than the main clause.
This is part of a more general phenomenon and is not specific to judge-dependent
items. Simons (2005b) observes (also citing Urmson, 1952; Hooper, 1975 and others)
that assertions of the form "x thinks that p" can be used in such a way that the "main
point" of the utterance is p, and not the entire attitude report. (This is especially easy
with, but not restricted to, first-person reports.) For example, consider the dialogue in
(128).
(128) Mary: How's the weather outside?
Sam: I think it's raining.
Sue: No it isn't, it's sunny!
As in (126)-(127), Sue's response in (128) is acceptable, and we can tell from the form
no it isn 't (not no you don 't) that the disagreement is with the embedded clause.
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I suggest (as hinted at by Simons) that when a belief report is used as evidence for the
proposition being believed - i.e., if the fact that x thinks that p is used as evidence for p -
then the utterance acts as if it is asserting both the main clause and the embedded clause.
(This happens especially with first-person belief reports, since people generally treat their
own beliefs as reliable.) Sam's utterance in (126), for example, serves as a proposal to
(among other things) add to the common ground the proposition that Bill might be in his
office. Since this proposition is judge-dependent, Sue can disagree based on her own
epistemic state.
One might be concerned that since attitude verbs such as think shift the judge
parameter, the embedded clause will have a different meaning than it does in a matrix
position - that is, that the proposition asserted by the embedded clause in Sam's utterance
in (126), he might be in his office, in this context means that Bill might be in his office
according to Sam's knowledge. If this were true, then the assertion associated with the
embedded clause would be essentially equivalent to the one associated with the main
clause, and Sue's response would again be predicted to be deviant. But this would be a
misunderstanding of what it means to shift the judge parameter in the relevant sense.
Recall that the meaning I have given to think is (129).
(129) I[think] w' t = [XP<s,<i,et>> . [Xze. V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x) = 1]]
The first argument of this function is a proposition, i.e., a function from world-time-judge
triples to truth values - let's call it p. The second argument is an individual, z. Then the
meaning of think says something about what happens when the proposition p is applied to
each of a particular set of triples, namely the doxastic alternatives of z in w at t. In no
sense does this change p - p is still the same function from world-time-judge triples to
truth values. Thus if p ends up also being asserted, it will behave in the same way as it
would if it were in a matrix context.
7. Predictions of the Analysis for Epistemic Modals
In this section and the next I will compare my proposal to existing analyses of epistemic
modals and predicates of personal taste, considering the two cases separately. In this
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section I will look at epistemic modals, focusing on the context-relativist approaches of
Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2006). After summarizing their
approach in Section 7.1, I will discuss specific differences in predictions between their
approach and mine in Sections 7.2-7.4, plus one similar feature in Section 7.5, then
summarize in Section 7.6.
7.1. The Context-Relativist View of Epistemic Modals
Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2006) propose that the truth of
an utterance depends not only on the context of utterance (which gives the values for
indexicals such as I and now) and the index (a world and time), but also on a "context of
assessment." 37 Under this view, a particular utterance may be true as assessed in one
context but false as assessed in another. When a speaker makes an assertion that contains
an assessment-sensitive item, they can be challenged and forced to withdraw the assertion
if it is found to be false even with respect to a different context of assessment. For
epistemic modals in particular, MacFarlane and Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson propose
that the person whose knowledge is relevant is the person assessing the sentence. That is,
a sentence of the form "might S" is true at a context of assessment A just in case the
proposition expressed by S (at the time of utterance) is compatible with the knowledge of
the person assessing the sentence, at the time that they are assessing it. This amounts to
giving epistemic might and must the lexical entries in (130), where A is a context of
assessment, and w(A), t(A), and a(A) are the world, time, and assessor of A.
(130) Context-Relativist lexical entries for might and must:
Imightw,; A = [p<,it> . 3<w',t',x>eEpistw(A),t(A),a(A): p(w')(t')= 1]
[Imust]w t; A= [P<s,it> . V<w',t',x>: Epistw(A),t(A),a(A): p(w')(t') = 1]
My judge-dependent lexical entries for might and must are repeated in (131).
(131) Judge-dependent entries for might and must:
[might]w tdj = [XP<s,<i,et>>. 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x)= 1]
I[mustI]w'tJ = [RP<s,<i,et>> . V<w',t',x>: Epistw,ti: p(w')(t')(x) = 1]
37 Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson call it a "context of evaluation."
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I will refer to accounts along the lines of (130) as the context-relativist approach, and
accounts along the lines of (131) as the judge-dependent approach. (Both are forms of
relativism.) Notice that both approaches add some kind of extra parameter of
interpretation beyond what is standardly assumed, and this extra parameter gives the
person whose knowledge is relevant for epistemic modals. (By "parameter of
interpretation" I mean any element used for the semantic interpretation of an utterance, in
the context, index, or elsewhere.)
The crucial difference between the two approaches is in the size, so to speak, of the
extra parameter of interpretation. On the context-relativist approach, the context of
assessment comprises an entire situation where an utterance is assessed. This includes at
least the person assessing the sentence and the world and time of assessment, and
presumably also the place. On the judge-dependent approach, the judge is simply an
individual.
7.2. Scope Ambiguities
On the context-relativist approach, the context of assessment comprises an entire
situation where a person assesses a sentence. In particular, this includes the time when the
sentence is assessed. I will use "time of assessment" to mean the time provided by the
context of assessment, and "time of evaluation" to mean the matrix time, that is, the time
provided by the index. On the judge-dependent approach, the judge is only an individual.
This means that on the judge-dependent view, the relevant knowledge is that of the judge
at the time of evaluation. On the context-relativist view, on the other hand, the relevant
knowledge is that of the assessor (roughly analogous to the judge) at the time of
assessment, meaning that the time of evaluation is only relevant for the interpretation of
the sentence under might. As pointed out by von Fintel & Gillies (2007a), this property of
the context-relativist view leads to a problem with sentences like (132).38
(132) The keys might have been in the drawer.
38 Von Fintel & Gillies actually use (132) to make a more general point, and use a different example to
illustrate scope ambiguity, but in their discussion the connection is obvious.
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The most salient reading of (132) in isolation is a counterfactual one; however might can
also be understood in this example as epistemic, and moreover, it can take scope either
over or under the past tense. The following dialogue from von Fintel & Gillies
exemplifies the reading of (132) where might scopes under the past tense (making the
necessary assumptions about ellipsis).
(133) [Context: Billy is looking for her keys. Alex is trying to help.]
Alex: The keys might be in the drawer.
Billy: [Looks in the drawer, agitated] They're not. Why did you say
that?
Alex: Look, I didn't say they were in the drawer. I said they might
be there - and they might have been. Sheesh.
(von Fintel & Gillies, 2007a, no. 10, emphasis added)
The underlined sentence in Alex's second utterance says that it was compatible with what
he knew before Billy looked in the drawer that the keys were there. In this context it
obviously isn't compatible with what Alex knows after Billy looked in the drawer that the
keys were there before, so it isn't a matter of present knowledge.
On the other hand, (132) also has a reading where might scopes over the past tense.
This can be brought out in a context like (134).
(134) [Context: Billy is looking for her keys. Alex is trying to help her retrace her steps.]
Alex: Where were they when you went to bed last night?
Billy: Hmm, I remember that I checked a bunch of places and I did
see them, but now I forget where. They might have been in
the drawer. On the other hand, they might have been on the
coffee table. I just don't remember.
In (134), the underlined part of Billy's utterance means that it's compatible with what she
knows now that the keys were in the drawer last night. Crucially, since this is a case of
forgetting, she presumably knew last night whether the keys were in the drawer, so it
isn't a matter of past knowledge.
As von Fintel & Gillies observe, the context-relativist view has no way to capture the
ambiguity of sentences like (132) because, by assumption, the relevant knowledge does
not depend on the time of evaluation, but only on the time of assessment. This means that
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whichever way the items actually took scope, the relevant knowledge would be expected
to be that of the assessor at the time of assessment. The judge-dependent view, however,
can easily capture this ambiguity since the relevant knowledge is taken to be that of the
judge at the time of evaluation - or, more precisely, at the time at which the judge takes
themselves to be located at the time of evaluation.39 Let's assume that the two schematic
structures shown in (135) are the ones available for a sentence of the form "might have
S," such as (132).
(135) (a) PAST [ might [ S ] ]
(b) might [PAST [ S ] ]
On one standard view, past tense shifts the evaluation time. Without going into details
about the semantics of tense, it's clear that if the past tense scopes over might as in
(135a), the evaluation time will be shifted for both might and the embedded sentence;
whereas if might scopes over the past tense as in (135b), the evaluation time will only be
shifted for the embedded sentence. (135a) corresponds to the reading of (132) brought out
in (133), and (135b) corresponds to the reading brought out in (134).
7.3. Time Lag
There is a second apparent problem for the context-relativist view related to time that von
Fintel & Gillies (2007a) bring up, the problem of "time lag." The problem is that the
number of facts that are known by any given person or group tends to grow over time, so
that in general, it should get easier and easier as time goes by to contradict a statement
containing epistemic might. However, they observe, it actually seems to get increasingly
difficult to contradict a might-statement as time passes. They illustrate this with (136) and
several other examples like it.40
39 In general, von Fintel & Gillies lump the judge-dependent view together with context relativism, but they
do observe (fn. 9) that it does not run into the same problems related to time as the context-relativist view.
40 Elsewhere they give example (i), the relevant fact being that later on in the investigation, when some of
the preliminary possibilities have been eliminated, no one would try to retract or disagree with the original
statement.
(i) [Context: We are starting to investigate a crime.]
There are many people who might be the culprit. (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007a, no. 30)
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(136) [Context: A randomly chosen card is being put in an envelope. Person A catches a
glimpse of the card and knows that it is a black face card. When the envelope is opened
ten years later, they find that it is actually the Jack of Clubs.]
A: [now] It might be the King of Spades.
B: ?? [ten years later] Wrong! / What you said is false!
(von Fintel & Gillies, 2007a, no. 19)
In this context, it's compatible with both A and B's knowledge at the earlier time that the
card is the King of Spades, and at the later time, after the envelope is opened and the card
shown, it is compatible with neither person's knowledge that the card is the King of
Spades. This means that any difference has to come from the time of the knowledge, not
from the holder of it. On the context-relativist view, it's expected that different times of
assessment can lead to disagreement, and so the oddness of B's utterance in (136) is
surprising. On the other hand, the judge-dependent view does not make room for a time
of assessment, so it does not face the same problem.
I think we need to be cautious here, though. Recall from Section 6.1 my assumption
that in order to assert that p, a speaker only needs to believe that p is true as judged by
them, but that the assertion acts as a proposal to add p to the common ground. And if p is
added to the common ground, it becomes equivalent for all intents and purposes to the
proposition that p is true as judged by the entire group of conversational participants.
This means that hearers have a motivation for contradicting others' assertions of judge-
dependent propositions: even if the asserter did not violate the norm of assertion, the
hearer may be unwilling to add the proposition to the common ground, and therefore feel
obliged to challenge it. But this motivation only lasts as long as the conversation. A
conversation, I assume, is a real event that happens in the world, which has spatial and
temporal boundaries (although these may be vague in some cases). Moreover, speech
communities have conventions about what sorts of conversations may occur. Typically
they are spatially and temporally continuous, for example. There are exceptions to this, of
course, such as telephone calls (which are spatially discontinuous) and correspondences
conducted by slow-moving mail (which are temporally and usually also spatially
They use (i) in their discussion of might in disjunctions (which I will discuss in Section 7.5), but I think it is
also an example of the "time lag" sort, and suffers from the same objection I will make about those.
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discontinuous). These sorts of special cases are themselves conventionalized. Roughly
speaking, I take a conversation to be a communicative interaction that people enter into
knowingly (if not always willingly), where the purpose is to exchange information
between a finite group of people during a finite period of time.41 During this finite period
of time with this finite group of people, among other things a context set is established
and updated. But when the conversation ends, the updating also ends, and if the
participants want to continue exchanging information on another occasion, they have to
start a new conversation.
I suggest, then, that there are limits to how a conversation can proceed. It cannot, for
example, start with some people putting a card into an envelope, and then adjourn and
reconvene ten years later when they open the envelope. Similarly, a conversation cannot
start in a courtroom, and then continue, after many of the original participants are dead,
when a detective starts going over the transcripts (the setup for another of von Fintel &
Gillies's examples). These just aren't conversations. It's not that a conversation cannot
adjourn and reconvene - that is presumably exactly what happens when someone is
talking on the telephone and says, "hold on a second, I need to turn off the stove" - but
something really extraordinary would have to happen for a conversation to reconvene
after ten years. Normally after that long the participants will assume it's over.
If this is true, then examples like (136) are not really conversations - or, more
precisely, the utterances made by A and B in these examples are not part of the same
conversation. And if there are two different conversations, then there are also two
different common grounds. So A's assertion still acts as a proposal to add a proposition to
the common ground (in this case, the proposition that the card might be the King of
Spades), but the common ground to be updated this way is the one connected to the first
conversation, not the second. By the time B's utterance occurs, the first conversation is
over, and A's proposal was either successful or unsuccessful, and now a new
conversation has started with a new common ground. In this new conversation, there is
41 Note that I'm using 'conversation' for these purposes in a much broader way than the English word
conversation would normally be understood. For example, written correspondences, one-sided lectures, and
even arguments are commonly not considered to be real conversations, but would count as conversations in
my sense.
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no assertion for B to challenge. This, I suggest, could be the real reason why B's
utterance in (136) sounds odd: because it has no purpose in the (current) conversation.
It might be possible, then, for the proponents of the context-relativist approach to
escape the time lag problem by adopting assumptions about conversation similar to the
ones I have adopted. However, the fact that relevant knowledge seems to be linked to the
evaluation time, as we can see from the potential scope ambiguity between might and
past tense, remains a problem for the context-relativist approach that does not apply to
the judge-dependent approach.
7.4. Retraction
Recall that it's possible for speakers to disagree about a statement containing an
epistemic modal simply because they have different knowledge states. One example of
this kind was (17), which is repeated in (137).
(137) Mary: Where's Bill?
Sam: I'm not sure. He might be in his office.
Sue: Nuh-uh, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
[OR] No, he can't be. He never works on Fridays.
As we have already seen, this kind of disagreement is expected on the judge-dependent
approach, since the judge is part the of the Kaplanian "index" rather than the "context,"
and thus the sentence asserted by one speaker has the same content as the one negated by
the other. This kind of disagreement is also expected on the context-relativist approach
for a similar reason, given that when two different people assess the same utterance, the
context of assessment will be different since the assessors are different. On this point,
then, the two approaches seem to be equivalent.
Nevertheless, there is another fact that seems to favor the context-relativist approach
- on the face of it at least. This is the fact that, as observed by MacFarlane (2006), when a
speaker makes a statement containing an epistemic modal, and another speaker disagrees
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with it, the original speaker sometimes apparently retracts their previous statement,
saying that they were wrong. An example of this is given in (138), due to MacFarlane. 42
(138) Sally: Joe might be in Chicago.
George: He can't be in Chicago. I saw him in the hall five minutes
ago.
Sally: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
This kind of example can be explained straightforwardly on the context-relativist
approach, since Sally's knowledge state changes between her first and second utterances,
and thus at the time of her second utterance, she may assess her previous utterance as
false. But of course, this is the very same property of the context-relativist approach that
leads to the time-related problems pointed out by von Fintel & Gillies (2007a) and
discussed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 above.
Notice that the same phenomenon does not seem to occur with predicates of personal
taste. For example, it seems odd and pathologically meek for Sam to respond to Sue's
challenge as in (139).
(139) Mary: How's the cake?
Sam: It's tasty.
Sue: No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
Sam: # Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
Given this contrast between epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste, there are
two directions we could go. One would be to say that epistemic modals and predicates of
personal taste are actually completely different and should not be analyzed using the
same mechanism, despite apparent parallels. But even if we put predicates of personal
taste aside, the problem remains of how to allow retractions for epistemic modals as in
(138) without running into the problems that arise from allowing a separate time of
assessment. The other direction we could go is to retain the parallel analysis of epistemic
modals and predicates of personal taste and look for a solution in the more fine-grained
differences between the items rather than in the basic mechanism of judge dependency or
context relativism. I will advocate a solution of that kind.
42 Examples (138) and (146) come from an earlier version of MacFarlane's (2006) paper.
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I suggest that when a speaker says "Oh, I guess I was wrong" in reference to a
previous assertion, they are not necessarily saying that the previous assertion was false or
unjustified, but are simply saying something about their belief state at the time of making
it, namely that they had relevant false beliefs. Look again at dialogue (138), repeated in
(140).
(140) Sally: Joe might be in Chicago.
George: He can't be in Chicago. I saw him in the hall five minutes
ago.
Sally: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
My claim is that what Sally is "wrong" about is some relevant belief that she had when
she said that Joe might be in Chicago. For example, she might have believed that Joe had
plans to fly to Chicago that day, but upon finding out that he was in the hallway five
minutes ago concludes that she was mistaken about his plans. To the extent that her
previous assertion was based on that false belief, her admission of being wrong may
serve as a retraction of her statement.
At this point, one might ask how it would even be possible for a might-statement to
be based on a false belief, if "might p" simply entails the lack of knowledge that p is
false. There are two ways to answer this question. One is to assume that pragmatic factors
typically require there to be some reason for bringing up a particular epistemic
possibility, for example if there is reason to believe that it's fairly likely. Another answer
to this question comes from Kratzer (1981, 1991a), who argues that the semantics of
modals involves not only a modal base but also an ordering source. An ordering source is
a set of propositions that creates a partial ordering among worlds in the modal base with
respect to various properties. Thus (under certain simplifying assumptions that Kratzer
herself does not make) we can talk not only about accessible worlds but about "best"
accessible worlds - and, by extension, "best" epistemic alternatives. In the case of an
epistemic modal like might, then, we are still dealing with the judge's epistemic
alternatives, but these are ordered in terms of which ones more closely match the typical
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course of events (a "stereotypical" ordering source). Thus the lexical entries for epistemic
modals should actually be roughly as in (141).43
[might] w' t = [P<s,<i,et> . there is some stereotypically best triple
<w',t',x> in Epistw,tj such that p(w')(t')(x) = 1]
[must] w' tj = [RP<s,<i,et> . every stereotypically best triple <w',t',x> in
Epistw,tj is such that p(w')(t')(x) = 1]
In pictures, the simplified meanings for might and must I assumed previously are
represented in (142), and the new ones are represented in (143). For example, suppose the
proposition under the modal is the proposition that it's raining. In (142), a relation is
enforced between the set of indices where it's raining and the set of all of the judge's
epistemic alternatives (containment for must and overlap for might). In (143), on the
other hand, the relation is between the set of indices where it's raining and the set of the
judge's best epistemic alternatives.
(142) Modal semantics without ordering sources
(143) Modal semantics with ordering sources
43 These lexical entries are based loosely on Kratzer's definitions 6 and 8 for "necessity" and "possibility"
(Kratzer, 1991a: p. 664), modified to use the notion of epistemic alternatives. This is only a rough
approximation of Kratzer's (1981, 1991 a) proposals.
(141)
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Given this more complicated semantics, we can now make sense of how Sally's assertion
in (140) could be based on a false belief. Let's assume that the stereotypical ordering
source includes the proposition that people with travel plans follow them, and people
without travel plans stay in their general area. So in all the best alternatives (those in the
smallest circles in (143)), everybody follows their travel plans and everybody without
travel plans stays in their general area. This means that when Sally utters the sentence
"Joe might be in Chicago" in (140), she doesn't just mean that she hasn't eliminated all
the alternatives where Joe is in Chicago, but that in fact there is at least one alternative
where people follow their travel plans and Joe is in Chicago. So this probably means that
Sally thinks Joe has travel plans. So if it turns out that Joe doesn't have travel plans, then
her assertion was based on a false belief. That is, if Sally and George made more of their
reasoning explicit, the dialogue might go like this:
(144) Sally: Joe might be in Chicago.
George: He can't be. I saw him in the hall five minutes ago. Why did
you think he might be in Chicago?
Sally: He was going to go there sometime this week.
George: Oh, no, he's going next week.
Sally: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
In (144) it's fairly clear that what Sally is wrong about is her belief about Joe's travel
plans, and my claim is that this is also the case in (140).
There is another possibility, of course, which is that Joe did have travel plans, but he
cancelled them at the last moment, in which case it's much harder to see what Sally
might be wrong about. But in this kind of situation, I think it's a bit odd for Sally to say
that she was wrong. Consider the dialogue in (145), for example.
(145) Sally: Joe might be in Chicago.
George: He can't be. I saw him in the hall five minutes ago.
Sally: I thought he was going there to visit his relatives sometime
this week!
George: Oh yeah, he was, but he changed his plans at the last minute.
Sally: # Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
It seems strange in this case for Sally to say that she was wrong. On the context-relativist
approach this is surprising, since given the new knowledge that Joe changed his travel
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plans, it would no longer be compatible with Sally's knowledge that Joe was in Chicago,
and so she ought to assess her previous assertion, in her new context of assessment, as
false. Under the view I have proposed, Sally's original sentence is always evaluated with
respect to the judge's knowledge at the time of evaluation (in this case the time of
utterance since the sentence is in the present tense), and thus should not "become false"
in the face of additional knowledge. When the possibility of mistaken belief is factored
out, as in (145), this does indeed seem to be the way epistemic modals behave, and so my
analysis makes the right prediction.
Recall that predicates of personal taste do not give rise to the same phenomenon of
retraction. This makes sense given that assertions involving predicates of personal taste
are normally based only on the speaker's own experience, which they are unlikely to be
mistaken about.
A related phenomenon is the case of eavesdropping examples such as (146), due to
MacFarlane. 44
(146) [Context: Jane, a stranger, is hiding in the bushes.]
Sally: Joe might be in Chicago.
George: Oh, really? I didn't know that.
Jane (sotto voce): Sally is wrong. I saw Joe just a few minutes ago.
Again, I think that there is a contrast between epistemic modals and predicates of
personal taste in this respect. For example, Jane's whispered response in (147) seems odd
compared to that in (146). 45
(147) [Context: Jane, a stranger, is hiding in the bushes.]
Sally: Wow, this cake is really tasty!
George: Oh, really? Let me try.
Jane (sotto voce): ?# Sally is wrong. I tried the cake, and it tastes terrible.
44 See note 42.
45 Some speakers (including an anonymous L&P reviewer) accept (147). It's possible that "X is wrong" can
also be used by these speakers to mean "Don't accept X's assertion!" The retraction cases with predicates
of personal taste as in (139) would still be ruled out, since (for example) Sam would presumably stand by
his assertion that the cake is tasty.
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The fact in (146), and the contrast between (146) and (147), can be explained the same
way as the apparent retraction cases. In (146), Sally's assertion may reveal the fact that
Sally believes that Joe has travel plans. If Jane knows that Joe doesn't have travel plans,
then she may conclude that Sally has a false belief and is justified in saying that she is
wrong. On the other hand, Sally's assertion in (147) is only based on her own experience,
which she would not typically have false beliefs about.
The moral of this, I believe, is that researchers have been too quick to assume that "x
is wrong" means "x made a false assertion" or "x made an improper unjustified move"
rather than "x has a false belief." It's important to keep a clear distinction between
situations where two participants in a conversation can have a disagreement, and
situations where one participant can be called "wrong" by themselves or someone else.
For a disagreement, typically one person has made a proposal to add p to the common
ground, and the other objects to that proposal because they don't accept p. For a person to
be called wrong, it isn't necessary for any proposal to have been made about the common
ground, but they must have (or be believed to have) a false belief.
7.5. Might in Disjunctions
I will close by discussing one problem brought up by von Fintel & Gillies that the judge-
dependent approach apparently shares with the context-relativist approach. This has to do
with the puzzling behavior of might in disjunctions. It is well known that assertions of the
form "might p or might q" seem to have the same effect as two separate assertions "might
p" and "might q."46 As von Fintel & Gillies point out, then, the expectation is that a
hearer ought to be able to challenge an assertion of this form if they know that one of p
and q is true and the other, false. For example, then, (148) (based on von Fintel & Gillies,
2007a, no. 27) ought to be an acceptable discourse.
(148) Sally: Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York.
George: # Nuh-uh, he's in New York.
[OR] # No, he's in New York.
46 See, e.g., Kamp (1974), Zimmermann (2001), Simons (2005a), and Geurts (2005).
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But George's response in (148) sounds odd. This is surprising under the context-relativist
view because if George knows that Joe is in New York, then in his context of assessment
it's false that Joe might be in Boston, and therefore he should be able to disagree with
that part of Sally's assertion. It's also surprising under the judge-dependent view for a
similar reason: if George knows that Joe is in New York, then it is not compatible with
his knowledge that Joe is in Boston, so again he should object to this part of Sally's
assertion. On the other hand, if the relevant knowledge is determined contextually, as has
been assumed implicitly or explicitly in most previous work, Sally's utterance in (148)
can always be understood as merely referring to her own knowledge, and on that
interpretation George's response would be odd. Thus von Fintel & Gillies take (148) to
be evidence for a contextual account.
This reasoning relies crucially on the assumption that the puzzling behavior of might-
disjunctions is due to an entailment, as opposed to some other kind of inference such as a
conversational implicature. But the evidence for this is mixed. Another, even better
known fact is that assertions with deontic modals of the form "x can (P or Q)" (where P
and Q are properties expressed as VPs) similarly have the effect of two separate
assertions "x can P" and "x can Q." (Note that there are two differences here: the
modality is deontic instead of epistemic, and there is one modal that scopes over both
VPs instead of two modals.) A number of authors have argued that, at least in this case,
the effect is due to an implicature rather than an entailment.47
Conversational implicatures do not behave the same way as assertions with regards to
disagreement, as we can see from (149).
(149) Sally: Some of the girls came to the party.
George: # Nuh-uh, all of them did.
[OR] # No, all of them did.
Sally's assertion in (149) is standardly assumed to carry a conversational implicature that
not all of the girls came to the party. George's response, which seems to register
47 See, e.g., Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), Alonso-Ovalle (2005, 2006), Schulz (2004, 2005), and Fox
(2006). For opposing views, see, e.g., Zimmermann (2001), Aloni (2003), Geurts (2005), and Simons
(2005a).
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disagreement with the implicated proposition, is not acceptable. It seems, then, that
conversational implicatures cannot generally trigger disagreements in the same way as
assertions. Thus if the inference from "might p and might q" to "might p" and "might q"
is due to a conversational implicature, then disagreements as in (148) are not expected,
and there is no problem for the context-relativist or judge-dependent view of epistemic
modals.
One piece of evidence for treating this inference as an implicature is that both (148)
and (149) can be improved by replacing the disagreement marker (nuh-uh or no) with
actually, as in (150)-(151).48
(150) Sally: Some of the girls came to the party.
George: Actually, all of them did.
(151) Sally: Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York.
George: Actually, I know that he's in New York.
This shows that disagreements are allowed, in a sense, but that it must be signaled (by the
use of actually, for example) that the disagreement turns on an implicature rather than an
entailment of the first speaker's assertion.
On the other hand, one reason for thinking that the inference is an entailment (or at
least not an implicature) is the suspendability test. It has been observed that the
continuation in fact, all of them did in (152) is felicitous, and serves to remove the
implicature that not all of the girls came to the party. However, the parallel continuations
in (153) sound odd (Kai von Fintel, p.c.).
(152) Some of the girls came to the party - in fact, all of them did.
(153) (a) Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York - # in fact, he's in
New York.
(b) Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York - # in fact, he must be
in New York.
48 For some reason, in (151) actually is not sufficient by itself, but needs to be accompanied by I know or
some other material that indicates the speaker's certainty. I have no explanation for this.
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Then again, there is another reason to believe that the inference is not an entailment,
which comes from one of von Fintel & Gillies's own examples. They observe that (154)
is felicitous in a context where Sally knows that Joe is in Boston or New York, and also
knows that George thinks he knows where Joe is (but may not agree with him).
(154) Sally: Look, I know you think you know where Joe is. But we can
agree on this much: Joe might be in Boston or he might be in
New York. So, if he isn't in New York, he must be in Boston.
(von Fintel & Gillies, 2007a, no. 32)
It seems reasonable to assume that entailments are preserved under agreement: that is, if
p entails q, and two people agree that p, then they also agree that q, provided they are
aware of the entailment. For example, if we agree that Fido is a spaniel, and recognize
that being a spaniel entails being a dog, then we agree that Fido is a dog. Now suppose
that Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York entails Joe might be in Boston, as
von Fintel & Gillies claim, and that speakers are generally aware of this entailment. Then
if Sally and George agree that Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York, they
should also agree that Joe might be in Boston. But this is not the case. If George
definitely believes that Joe is in New York, then they do not agree that he might be in
Boston, and (155) is unacceptable in this context.
(155) Sally: # Look, I know you think you know where Joe is. But we can
agree on this much: Joe might be in Boston. So if he isn't in
New York, we should look for him in Boston.
Note that the implicature of some behaves like (154): if Sally thinks that some but not all
of the girls came to the party, and George thinks that all of them did, (156) is also
felicitous.
(156) Sally: Look, I know you think that all of the girls came to the party.
But we can agree on this much: Some of them came.
But things are even worse. Some speakers I have consulted do not accept (154) in the
first place, given that if George has definite beliefs about where Joe is, he cannot agree
that he might be in one place and that he might be in another. For example, if George
believes that Joe is definitely in New York, then he doesn't agree that he might be in
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Boston or he might be in New York. This suggests that the inference is an entailment
after all.
It is not clear, then, whether the inference from "might p or might q" to "might p" and
"might q" is an entailment or an implicature. Either view leaves us with unanswered
questions: if the inference is an entailment, we need to explain why it is not preserved
under agreement, as seen in (154)-(155) (assuming (154) is acceptable to some
speakers); if it's an implicature, we need to explain why it fails the suspendability test, as
seen in (153). Then again, it's also possible that the inference is neither an entailment nor
a conversational implicature, but something else altogether. In any case, I think the
evidence is murky enough that an argument based on one assumption or the other should
not weigh too heavily in choosing between various accounts of epistemic modals at this
stage.
7.6. Summary
In this section I have discussed differences in empirical predictions between the judge-
dependent approach to epistemic modals that I am proposing and the context-relativist
approach proposed by others in previous work. The key point is that the extra parameter
of interpretation includes a time on the context-relativist approach but not on the judge-
dependent approach. Thus the relevant knowledge for interpreting an epistemic modal is
that held at the time of assessment on the context-relativist view, but is that held at the
time of evaluation on the judge-dependent view. This leads to two problems for the
context-relativist approach pointed out by von Fintel & Gillies (2007a). The first is the
existence of scope ambiguities that would be predicted to be impossible on the context-
relativist approach, and the second is the problem of time lag, i.e., the prediction that it
should get easier and easier to contradict a might-statement the more time has elapsed
since it was uttered. I showed that the judge-dependent approach is safe from both of
these problems, although I suggested that some caution is in order with regards to the
time lag problem. The third difference between the approaches has to do with apparent
retractions by speakers of their previous might-statements. On the surface, this
phenomenon seems to favor the context-relativist approach, but I argued that this
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phenomenon has been misanalyzed, and that when it is characterized properly it actually
lends support to the judge-dependent approach. Finally, I discussed one apparent problem
for the context-relativist approach that does seem to carry over to the judge-dependent
approach, but argued that it could be explained in another way.
8. Predictions of the Analysis for Predicates of Personal Taste
In this section I will look again at Lasersohn's account of predicates of personal taste, and
show that the changes I have proposed lead to better predictions specifically in that
domain, apart from the question of extending the analysis to epistemic modals. Recall
that the crucial difference between the two accounts has to do with which items encode a
dependency on the judge. On Lasersohn's view, judge dependency is built directly into
the meanings of predicates of personal taste, so thatfun, for example, means "fun for the
judge." On my view, on the other hand, judge dependency is encoded in the silent
nominal PROj, which refers to the judge; a predicate of personal taste is simply a two-
place predicate whose object may be silent. When a predicate of personal taste takes
PROj as its object, this results in the meaning "fun for the judge." In Sections 8.1-8.2
below, I discuss two specific differences between the accounts.
8.1. PP Arguments
We have seen that predicates of personal taste can sometimes appear with PPs that seem
to explicitly express the person whose taste or experience is relevant. The main example
given so far is fun for X, where X is the person whose experience is relevant. Lasersohn
analyzes this particular kind of example by giving a meaning to for that operates on the
judge parameter; specifically, on his viewfun for X (evaluated with respect to any judge)
is equivalent to fun evaluated with respect to the judge X. This is equivalent to givingfor
the lexical entry in (157).
(157) [for]]w tJ = [ye. [XP<s,<i,<e,et>>> . P(w)(t)(y) ] ]
Thus the role offor on Lasersohn's view is similar to the role I give to attitude predicates
such as think (based on an earlier proposal by Lasersohn), the difference being only that
for X operates on predicates whereas think operates on propositions.
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On my view, in contrast, predicates of personal taste are simply two-place predicates
that may take a silent argument, including PROj. In principle, though, there is nothing to
stop them from taking overt arguments, and I assume that this is what happens in
expressions such as fun for X. Thus I givefor the lexical entry in (52), repeated in (158),
which is just the identity function on individuals.
(158) [for]w"'~t = [Rye. y]
In other words, I assume that in expressions such as fun for X, the preposition makes no
semantic contribution, but is required for some syntactic reason (perhaps to assign case to
the object). This is a common assumption to make for relational nouns; for example, in
the DPfather of Mary, Mary may be taken to be the object of the relational nounfather,
where of has no semantic contribution.49 Other prepositions besides of are possible with
certain relational nouns, such as to in contribution to the charity. If we accept this view
for relational nouns, then it becomes natural on my view to look at predicates of personal
taste as relational adjectives, treating their PP arguments in a way similar to those of
relational nouns.50 The difference between Lasersohn's view and mine, then, is that in fun
for X (for example), Lasersohn treatsfor X as a modifier offun while I treat it as an
argument.51,52 These make different predictions. If the PP is a modifier, then we would
expect the same PP to be able to combine with essentially any predicate of personal taste,
restricted only by general aspects of meaning (in the same way that a modifier likefor
two days may be restricted to imperfective or atelic predicates but not to specific verbs).
If the PP is an argument, on the other hand, we might expect predicates of personal taste
to select more idiosyncratically for a PP headed by a particular preposition. This is in fact
what we find when we consider a wider variety of predicates of personal taste. Some
49 See, e.g., Heim & Kratzer (1998: pp. 61-62).
so The parallel between relational nouns and predicates of personal taste is not complete, however, since
relational nouns cannot have the meaning that would result from combining with PROj. For example, if Sue
is the daughter of A and the mother of C, the dialogue in (i) is absurd.
(i) A: Sue is a daughter. / Sue is the daughter.
C: # No, she isn't, she's a mother! / # No she isn't, she's the mother!
51 Thanks to an anonymous L&P reviewer for discussion of this point.
52 Conceivably it could be the other way around; for example,for could have the lexical entry in (i).
(i) [for2]jw' tJ =- [x. [P<s,<i,<e,<e,et>>>> [P(w)(t)(j)(x)] ] ]
But it is clearly more straightforward on my view to treat these PPs as arguments of the predicates of
personal taste.
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examples are given in (159). (The judgments given in (159) are my own, and the exact
judgments are less important than the variation among predicates.)
(159) fun for Sue * fun to Sue
boring for Sue ?? boring to Sue
tedious for Sue ?? tedious to Sue
pleasurable for Sue ?? pleasurable to Sue
?? pleasing for Sue pleasing to Sue
?? tasty for Sue ?? tasty to Sue
?? delicious for Sue * delicious to Sue
* tastes good for Sue tastes good to Sue
?? tasteless for Sue ? tasteless to Sue
?? funny for Sue funny to Sue
exciting for Sue exciting to Sue
Some predicates in (159) can appear withfor, some can appear with to, and some cannot
appear with either. (I have not yet found any predicates of personal taste that appear with
other prepositions.) There are some semi-regularities, for example, predicates expressing
enjoyment or lack of enjoyment tend to appear withfor. However, the choice of
preposition is largely idiosyncratic, with similar predicates sometimes showing different
behavior. For example, in my judgment exciting to Sue sounds much better than boring to
Sue, whilefun to Sue is completely impossible; similarly, tasty to Sue, while somewhat
odd, is still much better than delicious to Sue. Pleasing and pleasurable seem to be at
least somewhat related in meaning, and yet pleasing takes to and pleasurable takesfor.
This suggests thatfor- and to-phrases are arguments rather than modifiers of predicates of
personal taste, giving my view the advantage over Lasersohn's.
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8.2. Autocentric and Exocentric Perspectives
Recall that Lasersohn assumes that while speakers and hearers typically take an
"autocentric" perspective, making and assessing assertions with themselves as judge, they
may sometimes take an "exocentric" perspective instead, making and assessing assertions
with some other salient individual as the judge. I assumed, in contrast, that speakers and
hearers always take an autocentric perspective in his sense, but that what looks like an
exocentric reading can arise if a predicate of personal taste takes a silent referential
argument instead of PROj.
On the face of it, these two views seem to make similar predictions. On either view,
asserting that the cake is tasty will normally require that the cake taste good to the
speaker, but if some individual X is particularly salient, it might mean that the cake tastes
good to X. Both views also allow for disagreements as in (160), as we have seen.
(160) Sam: This cake is tasty.
Sue: Nuh-uh, it isn't tasty at all!
[OR] No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
However, there is actually an important difference between the two analyses that has
empirical consequences. This difference has to do with what the content of a sentence is,
and thus with when people can disagree. On Lasersohn's view, a sentence with a
predicate of personal taste always has the same content regardless of whether the speaker
is taking an autocentric or exocentric perspective. For example, the content of (161)
(expressed as a set) is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj> such that the cake tastes
good to j in w at t.
(161) This cake is tasty.
On my view, on the other hand, (161) has more than one possible content. One is the
same as Lasersohn's; this is the content if tasty takes PROj as its argument,
corresponding to an autocentric perspective on Lasersohn's view. But if a particular
individual is salient, for example Mary, then tasty can take as its argument a null pronoun
referring to Mary, in which case its content is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj>
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such that the cake tastes good to Mary in w at t. This corresponds to an exocentric
perspective on Lasersohn's view.
Lasersohn and I both assume that two speakers disagree only if the content of the
sentence asserted by one is the negation of the one asserted by the other. On Lasersohn's
view, a sentence has the same content regardless of the perspective taken by the speaker,
which predicts that it should be possible for two speakers to disagree even when one
takes an autocentric perspective and the other takes an exocentric perspective. To test
this, consider the dialogue in (162).
(162) Sam: The tuna is tasty.
Sue: (#) No, it's isn't! It's not tasty at all!
Suppose that Sam and Sue are feeding tuna to their cat. If Sam intends his statement in
(162) to mean that the tuna tastes good to the cat, and Sue understands that he means it
this way, then Sue's response is only felicitous if she also means that the tuna does not
taste good to the cat. In this case she cannot respond as in (162) based on the fact that the
tuna does not taste good to her. On the other hand, now suppose that Sam and Sue are the
ones eating tuna. If Sam's statement is intended in the autocentric way, based on the fact
that the tuna tastes good to him, and Sue understands that he means it this way, then her
response is only felicitous if it is also autocentric, based on the fact that the tuna does not
taste good to her. In other words, for disagreement to be possible in an example like
(162), it must be the case (in Lasersohn's terms) either that both speakers are taking an
autocentric perspective or that both are taking an exocentric perspective linked to the
same third party. My view predicts this, since the difference between an autocentric and
an exocentric perspective comes from whether PROj or a silent referential pronoun is
present, which changes the content of Sam's statement. By assumption, disagreement can
only occur with contradictory contents, and thus Sue's statement can only indicate
disagreement with Sam's if tasty has the same argument in both. Lasersohn does not
predict this, however, at least not without further stipulation. On his view, nothing
prevents this sort of disagreement from occurring, because the content of the tuna is tasty
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is the same in Sam's and Sue's utterances regardless of what perspectives the speakers
take. This supports my view over Lasersohn's.
8.3. Summary
In this section I have discussed differences between Lasersohn's account of predicates of
personal taste and my proposed modification of it. The crucial change I made to
Lasersohn's account in my proposal was to relocate judge dependency from the
predicates themselves to a silent item PROj, which allowed me to enforce a strict
requirement of autocentricity. I have shown that besides being simpler in a certain sense,
my account makes better predictions than Lasersohn's relating to the possibility of
disagreements between speakers - a domain that Lasersohn himself stresses. These
advantages over Lasersohn's account hold whether or not the account is extended to
epistemic modals.
9. Conclusions
In this chapter I have developed an account of both epistemic modals and predicates of
personal taste using Lasersohn's (2005) framework of judge dependency. At this point, I
will summarize the changes to Lasersohn's account that I have proposed, my way of
extending it to cover epistemic modals, and my efforts to address certain theoretical and
conceptual issues that arise from this general framework.
The essential innovation of Lasersohn (2005), which I have adopted, is to add an
individual "judge" parameter to the Kaplanian index, so that the content (or intension) of
any expression is a function from world-time-judge triples to its extension. On
Lasersohn's account, the meaning of a predicate of personal taste such as tasty is directly
dependent on the value of the judge: for example, for any world-time-judge triple <w,tj>,
tasty denotes the set of things x such that x tastes good to j in w at t. My account achieves
a similar effect in a somewhat different way. I treat predicates of personal taste as two-
place predicates, and introduce a silent nominal item PROj that refers to the judge. Thus,
on my view, for any world-time-judge triple <w,tj>, tasty denotes the set of pairs <x,y>
such that x tastes good to y, and tasty PROj has the meaning that Lasersohn gives to
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tasty. I also assume that predicates of personal taste may take null referential arguments,
in which case judge dependency disappears.
Two more differences between Lasersohn's account and mine involve the
perspective(s) that may be taken by speakers and hearers in conversation and, relatedly,
the semantics of attitude predicates such as think. Lasersohn assumes that speakers and
hearers normally take themselves to the be the judge when making and assessing
assertions (an autocentric perspective), but that they can take the perspective of someone
else when that individual is particularly salient (an exocentric perspective). Accordingly,
on his view attitude predicates such as think don't shift the judge parameter, but it would
be expected that attitude reports would generally be contexts where an exocentric
perspective is natural. I propose instead that an autocentric perspective is obligatory, and
that apparent exocentric cases arise only when a predicate of personal taste has taken a
null referential argument rather than PRO1 . This allows me to retain a semantics for
attitude predicates on which they shift the judge parameter to the attitude holder, as
proposed by Lasersohn in an earlier version of his work.
I extend judge dependency to epistemic modals by making the judge the person
whose knowledge is relevant. Unlike with predicates of personal taste, I build the judge
dependency directly into the meaning of the modals so that, for example, given a world-
time-judge triple <w,tj>, might p is true iff p is compatible with what j knows in w at t.
That is, I give epistemic modals roughly the kind of meaning that Lasersohn gives to
predicates of personal taste, but with differences in the surrounding assumptions that
predict the somewhat different behavior of these items.
As it stands, my view must simply stipulate that predicates of personal taste can take
silent individual arguments while epistemic modals cannot, at least in English. We might
expect, then, to find a language where predicates of personal taste cannot take referential
arguments or epistemic modals can.53 I don't know what the relevant cross-linguistic
facts are, and this is an important question for future work. However, it seems likely that
predicates of personal taste or items similar to them might have different argument-taking
5s Thanks to L&P editor Polly Jacobson for bringing up this point.
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behavior across languages. Japanese experiential predicates could be an example of this
(see, e.g., Tenny, 2006; McCready, 2006), but again this would need to be investigated.
Turning to epistemic modals, as I mentioned in Section 4.3, the required judge
dependency of epistemic modals actually ought to reside in the restrictor argument rather
than the modals themselves, but the question remains of why the modal restrictor could
not make reference to the epistemic alternatives of a contextually salient individual. This
issue becomes more pointed when we consider the meaning I gave for because in Section
4.5, which does make reference to the epistemic alternatives of a contextually salient
individual, namely the individual whose reasoning or rationale is involved. If because can
do this, we might ask, why can't might and must? Once again, I cannot answer this
question here, but I suggest that it ought to be investigated as part of a general project
looking at cross-linguistic patterns and restrictions on modality. The Kratzerian tradition
has emphasized the freedom of modals to take a variety of restrictors depending largely
on context. The facts about epistemic modals discussed here and elsewhere suggest that
epistemic modality is more restricted than this view would predict, and it is possible that
other kinds of modality have unexpected restrictions as well.
In proposing an additional parameter of interpretation, it is important to explain how
it is involved in the pragmatic rules governing conversation. I have proposed that a
conversation is always linked to a particular judge, namely the group of participants in
the conversation. This is parallel to the link a conversation has with the particular world
and time in which it occurs. This means that at the level of entire conversations, there is
no conceptual difference between the judge and the other parameters of the index: for any
conversation, there is a completely objective fact of the matter about what world-time-
judge triple it belongs to. The conceptual difference between the judge and the other parts
of the index, I have proposed, only matters within a conversation. Within a conversation,
participants are governed by principles which make a distinction between the world and
time on the one hand and the judge on the other. While all participants are held
responsible, so to speak, to the same world and time (whichever one happens to be the
actual one), each one is held responsible to a different judge - namely themselves. This is
reflected in the norm of assertion that I have proposed, which says in effect that in order
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to assert a sentence S, a speaker only has to believe (justifiably) that S is true with
themselves as the judge, although if their assertion is accepted and added to the common
ground, it becomes linked to the entire group of conversational participants. At the level
of individual conversational moves such as assertions, then, the judge-dependent view
makes a conceptual departure from standard assumptions, but this effect goes away as
soon as any particular conversation is over and its common ground established.
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Conditionals
1. Introduction*
In this chapter I extend the judge-dependent approach to indicative conditionals. First, in
Section 2, I give an analysis of indicative conditionals involving judge dependency.
Essentially, I adopt the view of Kratzer (1991 b) that if-clauses restrict modals, and that
indicative conditionals contain silent epistemic modals, and put this together with a
judge-dependent analysis of epistemic modals. In Section 3, I address some puzzles that
have been used to argue for a non-truth-conditional view of conditionals, and show that
the account I propose solves longstanding puzzles about conditionals. Section 4 is an
appendix with a semantic proof involving the relationship between belief and knowledge.
2. A Judle-Dependent Account of Indicative Conditionals
2.1. Starting Point
I will start by restricting my attention to so-called indicative conditionals where,
additionally, the antecedent contains a stative predicate with no future orientation and the
consequent is in the present tense, as in (1).
(1) If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
* Some of the material in this chapter was presented at CLS 43 (Stephenson, 2007). Thanks to the reviewers
and audience members for useful comments and discussion.
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For the time being, I will not be considering counterfactual (or "subjunctive")
conditionals such as (2), nor conditionals such as (3) where the antecedent has a future
orientation and the consequent contains future morphology. My main reason for
disregarding examples like (3) is that I am going to advocate the Kratzerian view of if-
clauses as restricting modals, and it is conceivable that will itself is a modal.
(2) If the butler hadn't murdered the victim, the cook would have.
(3) If the butler accuses the cook of the murder, the cook will accuse the
butler.
Like epistemic modals, conditionals such as (1) give rise to situations where one person
may justifiably utter "if p then q" while another person justifiably utters "if p then not q,"
apparently with neither person being in error, an observation that goes back at least to
Gibbard (1981). In particular, just as dialogues like (4) with epistemic modals are
possible, so are dialogues like (5) involving conditionals.
(4) [Context: A murder investigation. Sam has narrowed the suspects down to the cook and
the butler, and Mary has narrowed them down to the butler and the maid.]
Sam: The cook might be the murderer.
Mary: (No! / Nuh-uh!) The cook can't be the murderer.
(5) [Same context as (4).]
Sam: If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
Mary: (No! / Nuh-uh!) If the butler isn't the murderer, the maid is.
In (5), it is crucial that the cook and the maid cannot both be the murderer, so that the
consequent of Mary's statement the maid is (the murderer) entails that the cook is not the
murderer (the negation of the consequent of Sam's statement).
This is not the form in which Gibbard made the observation, and the way it tends to
be made especially in philosophy, although it makes the same point. The more standard
form of the observation is that in the context described in (5), Sam could - sincerely and
without error - utter his assertion to a third person, and Mary could separately utter her
assertion to the same person (again sincerely and without error). The third person
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(assuming they are sufficiently rational), would then not be inclined to utter either
conditional themselves, but instead conclude that the butler is the murderer.
From a certain perspective, the parallel between (4) and (5) is expected. Kratzer
(1991b) proposes that if-clauses always act as restrictors to modals, and that when no
overt modal is present as in (5), there is a silent epistemic necessity modal. If the might-
statements in (4) and the conditionals in (5) are both statements involving epistemic
modals (albeit a possibility modal in one case and a necessity modal in the other), it is not
surprising that they might behave the same way. The parallel in fact lends support to an
epistemic view of conditionals - provided, that is, that we have a view of epistemic
modals that accounts for their behavior in (4). As we have seen, a context-dependent
account of epistemic modals (where the "knower" is an individual supplied from the
context) cannot account for this behavior; however, I will show that my proposed judge-
dependent view does. Thus, following suggestions of Weatherson (2005) and Kai von
Fintel (p.c.), I will try to give new life to an epistemic account of conditionals using my
new account of epistemic modals.
Examples like (5) have been used to argue that indicative conditionals have no truth
conditions, but instead act as non-assertive speech acts (see, e.g., Bennett, 2003).
Advocates of this view rightly point out that standard epistemic accounts cannot account
for (5) (unsurprisingly, given that they can't account for (4)). I'll leave this aside for the
moment, until after I have presented a judge-dependent account of conditionals.
2.2. The Account
Recall the meanings for epistemic might and must from Chapter 2 (Section 4.3), repeated
in (6). Only the meaning for must will be involved in conditionals, but since I will
propose minor changes in its meaning, I will make the same changes in parallel for might.
(6) (a) [might-EPISTEMIC]w  = [P<s,<i,et>> . 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x) = 1]
(b) [Imust-EPISTEMIC] w' = [•P<s,<i,et>> . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x)= 1]
With these meanings, a sentence of the form "must ý," for example, is true at a world-
time-judge triple <w,t,j> iff for all of j's doxastic alternatives in w at t, ý is true. At this
103
CHAPTER 3
point I'd like to bring attention to one simplification I have been making in my account of
epistemic modals, and move towards a more adequate account. I have been assuming that
the epistemic "flavor" of epistemic modals is written right into their lexical entries. (I
have added a subscript "-EPIST" to might and must in (6) to reflect this.) There are good
reasons, going back to Kratzer (1977), to believe that this is not right, but rather that the
type of modal interpretation (epistemic, deontic, etc.) comes from a silent, contextually
supplied argument (giving the modal base and/or ordering source). There are still lexical
restrictions on what type of restrictor argument a particular modal can take, but we will
put that aside for now. To place my analysis of epistemic modals in this more general
view, we first need to give more general lexical entries for necessity and possibility
modals as in (7). (These do not take into account any lexical restrictions on the type of
restrictor argument might and must can take, for example the fact that might cannot be
deontic.)
(7) (a) [[mightl] w'tj = [Xr<s,<i,et>>. [1p<s,<i,et>>. 3<w',t',x>: r(w')(t')(x)= 1 &
p(w')(t')(x) = 1 ]]
(b) I[must] w'tJ = [r<s,<i,et>> • [,P<s,<i,et>> • V<w',t',x>: r(w')(t')(x)= 1 D
p(w')(t')(x) = 1]]
These get an epistemic interpretation by combining with a restrictor argument expressing
epistemic accessibility. On my view, this would have the meaning in (8).
(8) I[EPISTEMIC]w' tdj = [w's . [t'i . [•xe . <w',t',x>eEpistw,t ] ]
This is just the function that characterizes the set of epistemic alternatives of the judge of
evaluation at the world and time of evaluation. When the meanings in (7) take (8) as their
first argument, the result is the same as the meanings in (6), as the reader can verify.
Following Kratzer (1991b) and others, I assume that if-clauses act as restrictors of
modals, and that conditionals with no overt modal contain a silent epistemic modal.
Specifically, I assume that a conditional such as (1), repeated in (9a), has the structure in
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(9b).' I use "MUST" in small caps for the silent modal. The gray font and strikethrough on
"the -m ureer" indicates ellipsis.
(9) (a) If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
(b)
The cook is the-merdefef
MUST
EPISTEMIC if the butler isn't the murderer
I assume that if simply denotes the identity function on propositions, as shown in (10).
(10) [Iif] wI' t = [1p<s,<i,et>> . P]
(In the system I am using, this is not technically the same as making if semantically
vacuous, because its presence triggers intensional functional application.)
I also assume that the modal restrictor and the if-clause combine using a version of
predicate modification, given in (11).2
(11) Rule of Propositional Predicate Modification:
If a is a complex expression made up
<s,<i,et>>, then [a]]c; w,tj = [Xw'. [Xt'
= gy]c; w,tj (w')(t')(x) = 1] ] ]
of p and y, which are both of type
. [x . [P3]c; w,tj (w')(t')(x)
Given these assumptions, we now predict that the complex restrictor of the modal in (9)
(consisting of EPISTEMIC and the if-clause) has the meaning in (12a), and the whole
conditional has the meaning in (12b).
(12) (a) [ [EPISTEMIC] [if the butler isn't the murderer] ]wtJ
= [%w" . [Xt" . [y . IEPISTEMICIwtj (w)(t")(y)
lthe butler isn't the murdererl"wtJ (w")(t")(y) = 1] ] ]
' For discussion of how the structure of conditionals is derived, and what relationship there is between the
syntax and the compositional semantics, see, e.g., von Fintel (1994, Ch. 3).
2 One might worry that the rule in (11) would allow any two sentences to combine without a conjunction;
technically, however, I have set things up so that the rule only applies if the two sentential expressions have
basic type <s,<i,et>>, whereas normal sentences have type t. As long as there is no rule of"Intensional
Propositional Predicate Modification," we avoid this overgeneralization.
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= [Xw" . [Xt" . [y . <w",t",y>eEpistw,tj and the butler isn't the murderer
in w" at t"] ] ]
(b) [if the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is the -... ideW .. ,tj
= I[MUST]w t ( [(12a)I]w't )
( [Xw" . [t". [Xy . [the cook is the murderer]]w"' t"' y )
= [,r<s,<i,et>> . [XP<s,<i,et . V<w',t',x>: r(w')(t')(x) = 1 = p(w')(t')(x)= 1 ] ]
( [Xw" . [t". [y . <w",t",y>eEpistw,t, and the butler isn't the murderer in
w" at t"] ] ] ) ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xy . [the cook is the murdererlw",t",' y] ] )
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>:
<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj and the butler isn't the murderer in w' at t' D the cook
is the murderer in w' at t'
This says that (9a) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff for all triples <w',t',x>
that are both epistemic alternatives ofj in w at t and are indices at which the butler isn't
the murderer, the cook is the murderer. Equivalently, (9a) is true at <w,tj> iff for all of
j's epistemic alternatives (in w at t) where the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is the
murderer.
With this analysis in place, we can now account for the behavior of conditionals in
examples such as (5), repeated in (13).
(13) Sam: (a) If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
Mary: (No! / Nuh-uh!) (b) If the butler isn't the murderer, the maid
is.
Sam's assertion in (13a) is a proposal to restrict the context set to triples <w,tj> such that
for all of j's doxastic alternatives in w at t where the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is
the murderer. As with the earlier cases of epistemic modals, Mary objects to this proposal
by making the opposite proposal - to restrict the context set to triples <w,tj> such that
for all of j's doxastic alternatives in w at t where the butler isn't the murderer, the maid is
the murderer.
2.3. Attitude Reports
This account predicts that, like epistemic modals, conditionals should also shift under
attitude predicates such as think. This seems correct. For example, consider (14).
106
CHAPTER 3
(14) Sam thinks that if the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
The meaning I proposed for think is repeated in (15). Combining this with the semantics
for conditionals above, (14) is predicted to have the meaning computed in (16).
(15) [think] wtd = [XP<s,<i,et>>. [?,ze. V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x)= 1] ]
(16) l[(14)] w tJ = [think]]w tJ ( [Aw" . [Xt" . [ Xy . [if the butler isn't the
murderer, the cook is]w",t",y ] ] ] ) ( JSamJ] w tJ)
= [P<s,<i,et>> . [•ze . V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x) = 1] ]
( [w". [t". [ ,y . V<w3,t3,X3>:
<w3,t3,X3>eEpistw,,t,,y and the butler isn't the murderer in w3 at t3
D the cook is the murderer in w3 at t3] ] ]) ( Sam)
(a) = 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sam: V<w 3,t3,x3>:
<w3,t3,X3>eEpistw',ti,x and the butler isn't the murderer in w3 at t3
D the cook is the murderer in w3 at t3
(b) = 1 iff V<w',t',x>: <w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sam and the butler isn't the murderer
in w' at t' D the cook is the murderer in w' at t'
According to (16a), (14) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,t,j> iff all of Sam's
doxastic alternatives <w',t',x> are such that all of x's epistemic alternatives where the
butler isn't the murderer, the cook is the murderer. This simplifies to (16b), according to
which (14) is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,t,j> iff for all of Sam's doxastic
alternatives where the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is the murderer. This is
intuitively correct. (I discussed the simplification from (16a) to (16b) in Chapter 2, and I
have included a proof in Section 4, as an appendix to this chapter).
3. Defense of (Judge-Dependent) Truth Conditions
In this section, I will look at two arguments (discussed mainly in the philosophical
literature) that have been leveled against treating indicative conditionals as having any
truth conditions at all. The two arguments I focus on are discussed by Bennett (2003, at
the end of Chapter 7). I will start by discussing Gibbard's examples in a form closer to
their original one, and show that the judge-dependent account I have proposed captures
the puzzling and apparently paradoxical facts about these examples. Then I will address a
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supposed direct argument for a non-truth-conditional view, and conclude with some
remarks about the implications of adopting a relativist semantics for conditionals.
3.1. Gibbardian Standoffs
In standard Gibbard examples, there are two people, A and B, and sentences 4 and W,
such that A justifiably utters the conditional "if 4 then V" and B justifiably utters the
conditional "if 4 then not xV." In some examples, each of these speakers separately asserts
their respective conditionals to a third person, C, who concludes that 4 is false. The
dialogue in (5) is an example of this, except for being presented as a dialogue. Recast in a
more standard form, (5) would become something like (17).
(17) [Sam and Mary have been separately collecting evidence about a murder. Sam is
reporting to Chris on his findings.]
Sam (to Chris): If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
[Sam leaves, and then Mary comes in.]
Mary (to Chris): If the butler isn't the murderer, the maid is.
[Mary leaves. Chris ponders what he's heard.]
Chris (to himself): Aha! The butler must be the murderer!
There are three crucial observations: first, that the two conditionals uttered by Sam and
Mary seem to contradict each other (as seen more directly from the dialogue in (5));
second, that it is possible that neither Sam nor Mary is mistaken; and third, that Chris
seems to be correct to come to the conclusion that he does (under the assumption that
Sam and Mary are not mistaken). I'll consider these one at a time.
First take the observation that the two conditionals are - or at least seem to be -
contradictory (on the assumption that the cook and the maid can't both be the murderer).
On the account of conditionals proposed above, the proposition expressed by Sam's
conditional is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj> such that in all of j's epistemic
alternatives in w at t where the butler is not the murderer, the cook is. The proposition
expressed by Mary's conditional is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj> such that in
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all ofj's epistemic alternatives in w at t where the butler is not the murderer, the maid is.
These are written in (18).
(18) (a) If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is:
{<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>: <w',t',x>eEpistw,tj & the butler is not the murderer
in w' at t' D the cook is the murderer in w' at t'}
(b) If the butler isn't the murderer, the maid is:
{<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>: <w',t',x>eEpistw,tj & the butler is not the murderer
in w' at t' D the maid is the murderer in w' at t'}
Strictly speaking, these are not disjoint sets: their intersection is the set of world-time-
judge triples <w,tj> such that there are no triples <w',t',x> that are epistemic alternatives
ofj in w at t where the butler is not the murderer in w' at t' - i.e., the set of triples <w,tj>
such that the butler is the murderer in all ofj's epistemic alternatives. In this case, both
universal statements are vacuously satisfied. However, I assume that, like other universal
statements in natural language, epistemic modals (and therefore indicative conditionals)
carry a presupposition that they are not satisfied vacuously - in this case, that j has
epistemic alternatives where the butler is not the murderer. Provided that this
presupposition is satisfied, the two propositions expressed are disjoint sets and the two
conditionals are contradictory. In fact, if we adopt von Fintel's (1999) notion of
Strawson-entailment, we can say that the two propositions are "Strawson-contradictory"
(where p and q are Strawson-contradictory iff p Strawson-entails "not q"). This accounts
for the first observation.
Next consider the observation that it is possible for neither Sam nor Mary to be
mistaken in making their utterances. As a first step, recall the norm of assertion that I
proposed: a speaker A is allowed to assert 4 if ý is true for all of A's doxastic
alternatives, that is, if for all <w',t',x> that are doxastic alternatives ofj at the speech
world and time, [11 ]w',t',x = 1. (Recall that a person's doxastic alternatives are those triples
<w',t',x> such that it's compatible with their beliefs that they are x in w' at t'.) This
means that in (17), Sam is allowed to make his assertion provided that for all of his
doxastic alternatives where the butler is not the murderer, the cook is; and Mary is
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allowed to make her assertion provided that for all of her doxastic alternatives where the
butler is not the murderer, the maid is. This is consistent with the fact that both Sam and
Mary seem to make acceptable assertions. But this doesn't fully capture the intuition
about a speaker not being mistaken in making an utterance. For example, if Sam
misinterpreted some of his available evidence as ruling out the maid being the murderer,
when actually it left that possibility open, he would still satisfy the norm of assertion but
there is an obvious sense in which he would be mistaken. We need to impose a stricter
requirement in this case to rule out this kind of situation. We can get the notion we need
by replacing doxastic alternatives with epistemic alternatives. Recall that a person's
epistemic alternatives are those triples <w,t,x> such that it is compatible with what they
know that are x in w at t. The main difference between doxastic alternatives and
epistemic alternatives is that, since false or unjustified beliefs do not constitute
knowledge, some triples may be eliminated from a person's doxastic alternatives without
being eliminated from their epistemic alternatives. In other words, a person's doxastic
alternatives are generally a subset of their epistemic alternatives. Using epistemic
alternatives, we can formulate a stricter requirement for "non-erroneous assertion" as in
(19).
(19) Requirement for non-erroneous assertion:
For speaker A to assert sentence 4 in w at t (in context c) without error, it
must be the case that V<w',t',x>eEpistw,t,A: [[O w' t'' x = 1
This requirement is stricter because it contains universal quantification over a broader
domain (the speaker's epistemic alternatives rather than doxastic alternatives). Using this
stricter requirement, we can now rule out the kind of case I brought up where a speaker
was mistaken. For example, if Sam mistakenly eliminated all of his doxastic alternatives
where the maid was the murderer, those indices would remain among his epistemic
alternatives (even though he would not be aware of this fact), and his assertion would not
satisfy the requirement in (19).
With the stricter requirement in place, we can account for the observation that it is
possible in Gibbard examples for neither of the two speakers to be mistaken, even though
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they utter apparently contradictory statements. In (17), for example, Sam is not in error in
making his assertion provided that for all of his epistemic alternatives where the butler is
not the murderer, the cook is; and Mary is not in error provided that for all of her
epistemic alternatives where the butler is not the murderer, the maid is. (The requirement
for non-erroneous assertion actually yields two layers of knowledge, but they can be
collapsed into one). Essentially, a speaker is not in error provided that they are right
about their own (relevant) knowledge. In (17), Sam and Mary are both right about their
own knowledge about who the murderer is, but both have incomplete knowledge, and it
is incomplete in different ways. There is nothing contradictory about this. Note that both
Sam and Mary have epistemic alternatives where the butler is not the murderer, so the
presupposition is satisfied in both cases as well.
Finally, consider the observation that Chris, after hearing Sam and Mary's assertions
in (17), can validly conclude that the butler must be the murderer. Chris's reasoning can
be seen as an argument with two premises as in (20). Note that it is immaterial whether
Chris accepts either Sam or Mary's assertion during his conversations with them, that is,
allows them to be added to the common ground; all that is needed is for Chris to assume
that Sam and Mary were not mistaken in making their assertions, that is, that they meet
the requirement in (19).
(20) Reasoning from contradictory conditionals:
Premise 1: Sam was justified and not in error in asserting, "If the butler
isn't the murderer, the cook is."
Premise 2: Mary was justified and not in error in asserting, "If the butler
isn't the murderer, the maid is."
SConclusion: The butler is the murderer.
To see that the argument in (20) is valid, first note that an individual A's epistemic
alternatives at a world w and time t must include the triple <w,t,A>, that is, the triple that
consists of the world, time, and individual that A actually is or is located at. This is the
crucial way that knowledge differs from belief. Now consider the first premise. Given the
requirement from (19), this entails that all of Sam's epistemic alternatives at the actual
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world and time are triples <w',t',x> such that either the butler is the murderer in w' at t' or
the cook is the murderer in w' at t'. Similarly, the second premise entails that all of
Mary's epistemic alternatives at the actual world and time are triples <w',t',y> such that
either the butler is the murderer in w' at t' or the cook is the murderer in w' at t'. Let w*
and t* stand for the actual world and time. Then we also know that the triple
<w*,t*,Sam> must be among Sam's epistemic alternatives and that the triple
<w*,t*,Mary> must be among Mary's epistemic alternatives. This means that w* must be
a world where, on the one hand, either the butler or the cook is the murderer, and on the
other, either the butler or the maid is the murderer. From this it follows that w* is a world
where the butler is the murderer, and so the conclusion follows from the premises.
3.2. The Direct Argument for the Non-Truth-Conditional View
Edgington (1986, 1995) presents what purports to be a direct argument for a non-truth-
conditional view of conditionals. The way the argument works is to start with the
hypothesis that "if 4 then xV" is a proposition and derive a contradiction. This works by
showing that, on the one hand, the sentence "not ý or xV" (i.e., the material implication
ýz) must entail "if 4 then \y," and that, on the other hand, this entailment must not hold.
This is a contradiction, and so the conclusion is that the hypothesis must be false, and "if
then yx" cannot be a proposition.
The direct argument is based on a standard view where propositions are sets of
possible worlds. What I will be doing below is showing that if the standard notion of a
proposition is replaced with the notion I am using (i.e., a proposition is a set of world-
time-individual triples), the argument no longer goes through. In other words, I will show
that it is possible to give truth conditions to conditionals if we change the kind of truth
conditions we are working with.
Before I go on, I should mention that this argument is sometimes presented as being
about a hypothetical conditional connector "->" (where "-+Wy" represents "if ý then i").
The hypothesis is that there is a binary connector -+, and the contradiction derived is that
the material implication connector D must be both stronger than and not stronger than ->,
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leading to the conclusion that no such connector exists. Kratzer (1991 b) points out that on
the view where if-clauses restrict modals, no binary conditional operator is assumed to
exist in the first place, and so this conclusion is not troubling. I think this is dismissing
the issue too quickly, however, since this objection does not apply to the argument in its
more general form. If it is shown that a sentence a must express a proposition that is both
entailed and not entailed by the proposition expressed by another sentence 3, then we
have a problem regardless of the internal composition of a and 3.
Now let's look at the argument. The first premise is this: suppose an individual, let's
call them A, believes (with certainty) "not 4 or Nx." Suppose also that A is not certain that
not ý. (Here I will be a little bit sloppy in using "4" and "V" to stand for both sentences
and the propositions they express.) In this case, if A is rational, A must also believe (with
certainty) "if 4 then N." From this (so the argument goes) it follows that "not 4 or x"
entails "if 4 then Ni." This can be recast equivalently using "4 or x" and "if not 4 then Ni"
(with the conclusion that the first entails the second), which makes it easier to give an
example. Edgington (1995: p. 242) gives an example of the murder-mystery kind:
suppose a detective has narrowed down the suspects to just the gardener and the butler,
meaning that she is certain that either the gardener did it or the butler did it. In that case
she must then be certain that if the gardener didn't do it, the butler did.
The second premise is that it is possible for a rational individual, let's call them B, to
believe that not 4 and also believe that it's not the case that if 4 then N. From this
(according to the argument) it follows that "not 4 or N" does not entail "if 4 then Ni." As
an example, Edgington (1995: p. 243) asks us to imagine that she thinks her husband isn't
home yet; the claim is that it is perfectly rational for her to also think that if he is home,
he will be worried about where she is.
Notice that each premise is used to draw an intermediate conclusion: the intermediate
conclusion from the first premise is that "not 4 or N" entails "if 4 then iV," and the
intermediate conclusion from the second premise is that this is not the case. It is these
intermediate conclusions that create the contradiction. My method of attack, then, will be
to show that, in my system, one of these intermediate conclusions does not follow from
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its premise - specifically, that it does not follow from the first premise that "not 4 or x9"
entails "if 4 then 'x." The problem in a nutshell is that the inference is implicitly based on
the principle that entailments are preserved under belief- so that, for example, if
believing 4 is sufficient for believing xy, then 4 entails xg. This principle is not valid in my
system because of the way that the judge parameter interacts with belief predicates. To
show this, I will start by showing that in my system "not 4 or Ni" does not entail "if 4 then
NW," and then show that nevertheless "A believes that not 4 or yr" does entail "A believes
that if 4 then xV" (for any individual A).
Recall that on my view, propositions are defined as (functions that characterize) sets
of world-time-judge triples. On the standard view, these are sets of worlds or world-time
pairs. I will write ps to mean the set characterized by proposition p, on whichever view is
under consideration. Entailment on the standard view is the subset relation: a proposition
p entails another proposition q iff ps g qs, and p asymmetrically entails q (or is stronger
than 1) iff ps c qs. If we adopt the definition of propositions that I am using, the obvious
way to extend the notion of entailment on my view is also as a subset relation.
On my account, the proposition expressed by "not 4 or xi" characterizes the set in
(21), and the proposition expressed by "if 4 then xi" characterizes the set in (22). (I am
ignoring the role of context.)
(21) not 4 or i:
{<w,tj>: - 1]wtj = 0 or IN[]w'tJ = 1}
(22) if then W:
{<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: [•]]w,'t' x = 1 D [DI]w',t',x = 1}
= {<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: 1[4 ]w',t.x = 0 or I•g] w' t'x = 1}
(21) is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj> such that either 4 is false or xV is true,
and (22) is the set of world-time-judge triples <w,tj> such that in all of j's epistemic
alternatives in w at t, either 4 is false or y, is true. (21) is not a subset of (22). The easiest
way to see this is with an example of a multi-world model. For simplicity, I will collapse
worlds and times into world-time pairs. Consider a model with four world-time pairs si-
s4 and one individual, A, with the facts for each world-time pair stated in (23). Assume
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that 4 and W are non-judge-dependent propositions, so their truth only depends on the
world and time.
(23) sl: 4 is true, xy is true;
A's epistemic alternatives are {<sl,A>, <S4,A>}
s2: ) is true, x is false;
A's epistemic alternatives are {<sl,A>, <S2,A>, <s3,A>, <S4,A>}
s3: 4 is false, Wy is true;
A's epistemic alternatives are {<sl,A>, <S2,A>, <s3,A>, <S4,A>}
s4: 4 is false, W is false;
A's epistemic alternatives are {<sl,A>, <s4,A>}
Intuitively, sl-s4 could be thought of as world-time pairs where A believes that 4 and X
have to either be both true or both false. A is right about this in sI and s4 , and justified
enough that this belief constitutes knowledge, whereas A is wrong about this in S2 and S3,
and thus the belief does not constitute knowledge. In this model, the propositions
expressed by the two statements are given in (24)-(25) (written as sets).
(24) "not 4 or W": {<si, A>, <s3,A>, <s4,A>}
(25) "if 4 then x": {<si,A>, <s4,A>}
The index <s3,A> is a member of (24) but not (25), since N, is true in s3 but A's
knowledge does not rule out the possibility that 4 is true and N, is false. Thus (24) is not a
subset of (25), so "not 4 or N" does not entail "if 4 then W." (Note that the presupposition
is satisfied at all of these indices.)
At this point I have shown that "not 4 or x" does not entail "if 4 then ,."
Nevertheless, "A believes that not 4 or N," does entail "A believes that if 4 then N," as I
will now show. The propositions expressed by the two belief statements are given in
(26)-(27) (expressed as sets).
(26) A believes that not 4 or W:
{<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,A: [4ffJ w ''t',x = 0 or 1 W[N]w ',t' ' x = 1 }
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(27) A believes that if 4 then W:
{<w,tj>: V<w",t",y> e Doxw,t,A: V<w',t',x> eEpistw,,,t,,,y:
[g 1w',t',x = 1 D [V] w'',t', = 1}
(a) = {<w,tj>: V<w",t",y>eDoxw,t,A: V<w',t',x>eEpistw",t,",y:
[•]w',t',x = 0 or •V] w',t',x = 1 }
(b) = {<w,tj>: V<w',t',x>eDOXw,t,A: TO]w',t',x = 0 or j[W]w''t',x = 1}
(26) says that "A believes that not 4 or V" is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff
all of A's doxastic alternatives in w at t are such that either 4 is false or V is true. (27a)
says that "A believes that if 4 then V" is true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iff for
all of A's doxastic alternatives <w",t",y>, all of y's epistemic alternatives are such that 4
is false or V is true. As discussed in Chapter 2, principles about the relationship between
belief and knowledge allow this to be reduced to (27b), which is the same as (26), thus
the two sentences are equivalent. In particular, this means that "A believes that not 4 or
V" entails "A believes that if 4 then V."
At this point I have refuted the direct argument for a non-truth-conditional view of
conditionals, by showing that "not 4) or V" does not entail "if 4 then V" in my system, but
that "A believes that not 4 or V" nevertheless entails "A believes that if 4 then V." To
understand this result more clearly, though, we need to have a fuller picture of what's
going on. A key part of this picture has to do with the entailment relation between "not
or V," and "if 4 then V." I showed that the first does not entail the second by constructing
a multi-world model where the two propositions were those represented as in (24)-(25),
repeated in (28)-(29).
(28) "not 4 or f": {<s1, A>, <S3,A>, <S4,A>}
(29) "if 4 then !": {<sl,A>, <s4,A>}
Since (28) is not a subset of (29), "not 4 or V" does not entail "if 4 then V." But you may
have noticed that (29) is a subset of (28), which raises the question of whether the reverse
entailment holds, that is, whether "if 4 then V" entails "not 4 or N." In fact it does. Recall
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that in the general case, the two propositions characterize the sets in (21)-(22), repeated
in (30)-(3 1).
(30) not 4 or yV:
{<w,t,j>: )] w tj = 0 or -j]]w,tj = 1}
(31) if 4b then V:
{<w,t,j>: V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: T[[w,''t',x = 1 :D [i]Jw],t,x= 1}
= {<w,t,j>: V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: I•]]w''t'x = 0 or [1 Jj]w tx'''X = 1 }
The crucial point, which I observed in Chapter 2 (Section 4.3), is that given an individual
j, world w, and time t, the epistemic alternatives ofj in w at t must include the triple
<w,t,j> (since j's knowledge cannot rule out the world and time that j is actually located
at or the individual that j actually is, so beliefs that rule these out cannot constitute
knowledge). Given this principle, which I will refer to as the factivity principle, there is a
simple direct proof: suppose that a triple <w,t,j> is a member of the set in (31). This
means that all ofj's epistemic alternatives in w at t are such that either 4 is false or W is
true. The factivity principle tells us that <w,t,j> itself must be one of j's epistemic
alternatives in w at t, so this means that it must be the case that either 4 is false or X is
true at <w,t,j>. But this means that <w,t,j> is also a member of the set in (30). Thus every
member of (31) must be a member of (30), so (31) is a subset of (30), therefore "if 4 then
x" entails "not 4 or xg." This entailment relation is really just a more complicated case of
the fact that in epistemic logic "must 4" entails 4. This holds in my system because of
what I called the factivity principle. The companion result, that 4 entails "might 4b" holds
for the same reason. (Proof: suppose that 4 is true at <w,t,j>. Then j's epistemic
alternatives in w at t must include <w,t,j>, and so one of j's epistemic alternatives in w at
t, namely <w,t,j>, is such that 4 is true.)
In sum, then, the situation is that the conditional "if 4 then x" asymmetrically entails
the disjunction "not 4 or ux" (on the obvious notion of entailment to adopt in my system),
but the two become equivalent when they are embedded under a belief predicate. This is
because when judge dependency is involved, belief predicates manipulate the judge
parameter in such a way that information about relative strength may be lost. Thus even
117
CHAPTER 3
though "A believes that not 4 or xV" entails "A believes that if 4 then Ni," it is not the case
that "not 4 or wy" entails "if 4 then V."3 In other words, it is not valid in my system to
conclude that a proposition p entails another proposition q from the fact that believing p
is sufficient for believing q, and so the intermediate conclusion about entailment cannot
be drawn from the first premise of the argument, and the argument does not go through.
3.3. A Note about Entailments
At this point I would like to comment on a property of the judge-dependent system that
has not come out clearly so far. We saw in Section 3.2 that on the account I have
proposed the judge-dependent proposition "if 4 then Ni" entails the non-judge-dependent
proposition "not 4 or Ni." This entailment is related to the factivity of knowledge, brought
in by the silent epistemic modal in indicative conditionals, and is thus fairly special. In
the more general case, a judge-dependent proposition would not be expected to have a
relation of entailment with a non-judge-dependent proposition, even if they are clearly
related. To see this, compare the case of a predicate of personal taste. Consider the
examples with tasty and taste good in (32)-(33). The propositions expressed by these
sentences are given below them (written as sets).
(32) The cake is tasty.
{<w,tj>: the cake tastes good to j in w at t}
(33) The cake tastes good to Sam.
{<w,tj>: the cake tastes good to Sam in w at t}
Neither one of these sentences entails the other in my system. Again, the easiest way to
see this is with an example of a multi-world model. Consider a model with four world-
time pairs Sl-S4 and two individuals Sam and Mary, plus the plurality SamDMary, with
the facts for each world-time pair stated in (34).
(34) st: The cake tastes good to both Sam and Mary (and thus SamEMary).
s2: The cake tastes good to just Sam.
s3: The cake tastes good to just Mary.
s4: The cake does not taste good to either Sam or Mary.
3 Edgington (1986: p. 127) mentions this as a fact about conditionals, stating that "no non-truth-functional
truth conditions can accommodate this fact." My point, then, is that relativist truth conditions can.
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In this model, the set characterized by the proposition that the cake is tasty is given in
(35), and the set characterized by the proposition that the cake tastes good to Sam is
given in (36).
(35) The cake is tasty:
{<sl, Sam>, <sl, Mary>, <sl, SamEMary>, <s2, Sam>, <s3, Mary>}
(36) The cake tastes good to Sam:
{<sl,Sam>, <sl,Mary>, <s1,Sam@Mary>, <s2,Sam>, <s2,Mary>,
<s2,SamEMary>}
These are not in a subset-superset relation. For example, the pair <s3, Mary> is in the first
set because the cake tastes good to Mary in s3 (that is, the cake is tasty in s3 as judged by
Mary) but it isn't in the second set because the cake doesn't taste good to Sam in s3. On
the other hand, <s2, Mary> is in the second set because the cake tastes good to Sam in s2,
but it isn't in the first set because the cake doesn't taste good to Mary in s2. In other
words, since the cake is tasty expresses a relationship between the world, time, and judge,
while the cake tastes good to Sam only expresses information about the world and time,
the two propositions are independent. The parallel argument can be made replacing Sam
with Mary, so similarly there is no entailment relation between The cake is tasty and The
cake tastes good to Mary.
I should distinguish this property of my system from a stronger property that it could
conceivably have but doesn't. Zoltan Szabo (p.c.) objected to my view, claiming that it
predicts that the proposition that the cake is tasty (for example) does not even entail the
proposition that there is some individual x such that the cake tastes good to x. On some
level, this seems absurd. After all, a cake can only be tasty by virtue of causing a
particular experience of taste, and no experience of taste can occur without a sentient
being experiencing it. I'm not so sure that we should give any weight to this common-
sense claim, but I will not evaluate it because in fact on my system this weaker,
existential entailment does hold. To see this, note that the propositions expressed by the
two sentences characterize the sets in (37)-(38).
(37) The cake is tasty:
{<w,tj>: the cake tastes good to j in w at t}
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(38) The cake tastes good to someone:
{<w,t,j>: 3x: the cake tastes good to x in w at t}
Recall that on my view the judge is always an individual. Now, suppose a triple <w,tj> is
a member of (37). This means that there is an individual (namely j) such that the cake
tastes good to that individual, which means that <w,t,j> is also a member of (38).
Therefore, The cake is tasty entails The cake tastes good to someone (if someone is
evaluated with respect to the widest possible domain). The same argument can be made
for any other predicate of personal taste.
What is probably more important here is that any time someone could properly assert
that the cake is tasty, there would in fact have to be someone who the cake tastes good to,
since the norm of assertion requires that the speaker be such an individual.
3.4. Remarks
In this section, I have shown that my view of conditionals allows us to reconcile the
apparent contradictions that arise in Gibbard examples and in inference patterns between
conditionals and disjunction. My goal, of course, has been to argue for a particular view
of conditionals that is based on a particular view of epistemic modals, using a particular
relativist semantics, but I think there are important lessons we can take out of the
discussion here even if this particular view is ultimately not right.
The first lesson is that we need to take seriously the difference between truth and
assertability. In Gibbard examples, we derive a contradiction based on the fact that one
person can acceptably assert one sentence while another can acceptably assert a
seemingly contradictory sentence. On my view, there is no contradiction here because of
the way the norm of assertion works. More generally, Gibbard examples have been taken
to tell us something puzzling about conditionals, but perhaps they ought to be taken to tell
us something puzzling about assertion, namely the fact that we can assert things in some
sense from our own perspective. I have proposed one way of capturing this fact, building
on Lasersohn's assumptions, but there could be entirely different ways of doing so.
The second lesson has to do with the assumption that entailments are preserved under
belief. It is implicitly assumed in the direct argument for a non-truth-conditional view of
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conditionals that if believing p is sufficient for believing q, then p entails q. I have
suggested that this is not a valid inference. On my view, this is because predicates like
believe manipulate semantic parameters in certain ways, but there could be other views of
belief and other reasons why the inference is not valid. Thus the argument could be recast
differently, as testing the hypothesis that entailments are preserved under belief. Applied
to conditionals, this derives a contradiction, and so the hypothesis is false. In other words,
we might see this as teaching us something about belief, and hence about attitudes more
generally, rather than about conditionals.
If we accept the result that entailments are not preserved under belief, this has serious
implications for how we argue for semantic theories. Essentially, we can no longer trust
our intuitions about logical entailments. We can have the intuition that if A can assert ý,
then A can also assert xy, or that if A believes 4 then A must believe Xj, but these don't
automatically translate to logical entailment in the sense of a subset relation between sets
of indices.
In conclusion, I hope that I have not merely given some arguments against a non-
truth-conditional view of conditionals, but also brought up issues that are relevant for
semantics and logic more generally. Of course, in some sense I have not been arguing
against the a non-truth-conditional view at all - one might say that I have actually gone
some way towards vindicating it. On my view, there is an obvious sense in which
indicative conditionals do not have truth conditions: they do not have truth conditions
that depend only on external, objective facts (i.e., the world and time of evaluation). The
same can be said for any other sentence that I treat as judge-dependent, such as those
containing epistemic modals or predicates of personal taste. There could be some
philosophical reason to distinguish the judge-dependent type of truth conditions from the
standard, non-judge-dependent type, in which case we might call the former "truth-and-
judgment conditions" or some such thing. If we looked at things that way, then in fact my
view of conditionals would be a non-truth-conditional view.
We might also cut traditional logicians some slack for insisting that natural language
conditionals are equivalent to the corresponding material conditionals. If my account is
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right, the two do become equivalent under belief- that is, believing one is the same as
believing the other - and it is initially plausible (though ultimately not valid, I claim) to
conclude from this that they are the same.
4. Appendix: Relationship between Belief and Knowledge
In Chapter 2, I assumed that to believe something is to believe that one knows it. I
claimed that from this assumption it follows that the epistemic alternatives of a person's
doxastic alternatives are always the same as their doxastic alternatives. This is not
immediately obvious, and in fact requires an additional assumption (which I have also
introduced). At this point I will show which assumptions are needed, and prove that this
relationship does in fact hold.
For convenience, I will use the italic letters i,j, k etc. as variables over world-time-
individual triples. I will ignore the distinction between a triple <w,t,x> (written in angle
brackets) and a sequence "w,t,x"; thus for example, if i=<w,t,x>, then Doxi = Doxw,t,x.
Note that for any i, the epistemic alternatives of i's doxastic alternatives can be
defined as u {Epistk: keDoxi}, that is, the set consisting of all world-time-individual
triplesj such that there is some k such thatjeEpistk and keDoxi.
What we need to show is that u{Epistk: keDoxi} = Doxi. There are two assumptions I
need to make. The first is the one I started with (that if you believe something, then you
believe that you know it). This is written in (39). Note that only the one-way conditional
is required, from belief to belief of knowledge.
(39) Assumption: If you believe that p, then you believe that you know that p:
For any i
If DoxigS, then U {Epistk: keDoxi} c S.
Intuitively, I'm using "S" for the set characterized by the proposition p. What (39) says is
that if all of a person's doxastic alternatives are such that p is true, then all of the
epistemic alternatives of their doxastic alternatives are also such that p is true.
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Next we need the factivity principle, that is, the fact that a person z's epistemic
alternatives in world w at time t always have to include the triple <w,t,z> itself. This is
repeated in (40).
(40) Factivity Principle: For any i, ieEpisti
Now we need to show that for any i, u{Epistk: keDoxi} = Doxi. The proof is in (41).
(41) Proof that for any i, u{Epistk: keDoxi)} = Doxi:
(a) Part 1: Show that Doxi c {Epistk: keDoxi}
Suppose thatjeDoxi
Note thatjeEpistj [Factivity Principle (40)]
Then there is a k such that keDoxi andjEEpistk, [specifically, k =j]
Soj E V{Epistk: keDox/}
.*. Doxi c {Epistk: keDoxi}
(b) Part 2: Show that that {Epistk: keDoxi} c Doxi
From (39): If Doxi g S, then u{Epistk: keDoxi} c S
Note that Doxi g Doxi
.*. u{Epistk: kEDoxi} c Doxi
(c) Conclusion:
From (a): Doxi c u {Epistk: keDoxi}
From (b): u{Epistk: keDoxi} g Dox,
.*. u{Epistk: keDoxi} = Doxi
QED.
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Chapter 4
De Se Attitudes and Control Structures
1. Introduction
In this chapter I look at applications of the judge-dependent semantic system to the
semantics of certain kinds of embedded clauses, particularly non-finite complements in
control constructions. I show that making use of the judge parameter provides a
straightforward way to capture a number of properties of the relevant constructions,
including the fact that they are obligatorily interpreted de se.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2, I introduce the problem of de se
interpretation and show a parallel between judge-dependent items and controlled PRO. In
Section 3, I develop a judge-dependent account of one particular type of de se
construction. Specifically, I propose that subject PRO in attitude reports is actually PROJ,
the judge-referring nominal I posited in Chapter 2. In Section 4, I explore the
implications of this view for a wider range of control constructions. In Section 5, I bring
up an apparent puzzle involving a restriction on multiple occurrences of PROJ in a clause,
and suggest that it can be explained as an instance of a familiar restriction on binding and
pronominal coreference.
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2. Doxastic Alternatives and De Se Interpretation
2.1. De Se Attitudes
The problem of so-called de se attitudes and essential indexicals goes back at least to
Lewis (1979) and Perry (1979).1 These are attitudes that are crucially about the attitude
holder's self, and which thus cannot be captured using sets of worlds. A classic example
(due to Perry, 1977) is the story of the amnesiac Rudolf Lingens, who is lost in the
Stanford library and does not know who he is or where he is. Even if he reads a
biography of himself, and learns from it that there is an amnesiac named Rudolf Lingens
lost in the Stanford library, he may still not realize that he himself is Rudolf Lingens and
is in the Stanford library.
If propositions are viewed as sets of worlds or world-time pairs, there is no way to
distinguish between the belief Lingens would acquire by reading a biography of himself
and the belief he would acquire if (after reading the biography) he suddenly regained his
memory. In the first case, he would only be in a position to say, "Lingens is lost in the
Stanford library," whereas in the second he would be in a position to say, "I am lost in the
Stanford library." In either case, though, a standard view would have to represent the
proposition believed as the set of worlds in (1 a) or the set of world-time pairs in (1b).
(1) Content of Lingens's belief (sets of worlds / world-time pairs):
(a) {w: Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in w}
(b) {<w,t>: Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in w at t}
If, however, we use a richer notion than the standard proposition, such as a set of world-
individual pairs or world-time-individual triples, we can then distinguish between the two
beliefs. This is essentially the idea proposed by Lewis (1979) and elaborated on by
Chierchia (1989) and others. The content of a belief is expressed using the notion of
doxastic alternatives. 2 A person's set of doxastic alternatives is the set of world-
1 Castafieda (1966, 1968; , and other work) is cited for discussing similar issues in the context of artificial
languages. Geach (1957) gives preliminary thoughts on expressions like he himself from a logical
perspective.
Actually, the term "doxastic alternatives" was originally used in the context of a standard possible-worlds
view of propositional attitudes. Cresswell & von Stechow (1982) attribute the notion of "doxastic
126
CHAPTER 4
individual pairs such that it is compatible with what they believe that they themselves are
that individual in that world, as defined in (2a). On a more complex formulation, a
person's set of doxastic alternatives is the set of world-time-individual triples such that it
is compatible with what they believe that they are that individual in that world at that
time, as defined in (2b).
(2) Doxastic Alternatives:
(a) Doxw,x = {<w',y>: it is compatible with what x believes in w that he/she/it
is y in w'}
(b) Doxw,t,x = {<w',t',y>: it is compatible with what x believes in w at t that
he/she/it is y in w' at t'}
I should note that the motivation for adding times into the definition of a proposition
and/or into the notion of doxastic alternatives also has to do with de se phenomena. One
example of the type discussed in the literature is given in (3) (see, e.g., Cresswell & von
Stechow, 1982, no. 4).
(3) Sam believes that today is June 1, 2007.
Sam's belief in (3) is not a belief about what kind of world he is in, but rather a belief
about what time he is located at. That is, in this case all of Sam's doxastic alternatives are
triples <w,t,x> such that t is during June 1, 2007. (In this case, neither the world nor the
individual parameters are relevant.) In other words, it is a belief that is crucially about the
attitude holder's "now," and thus is often referred to as de nunc. Although I will not be
concerned with temporal de se/de nunc readings, from now on I will use the version of
doxastic alternatives using world-time-individual triples in the interest of consistency.
Once we make the move to using doxastic alternatives in the sense of (2), we can
distinguish between the two cases of Lingens's beliefs. In the case where Lingens only
reads a biography of himself, the content of his belief is represented as the set of world-
time-individual triples in (4a), and in the case where he regains his memory, the content
of his belief is represented as the (distinct) set in (4b).
alternativeness," construed as a modal accessibility relation, to Hintikka (1962). However, I will only talk
about "doxastic alternatives" as the kind encoding self-locating beliefs using an individual or center.
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(4) Content of Lingens's belief (sets of world-time-individual triples):
(a) [Reading biography] {<w,t,x>: Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in w
at t}
(b) [Regained memory] {<w,t,x>: x is lost in the Stanford library in w at t}
The first case is simply a set of world-time pairs repackaged as a set of world-time-
individual triples, since the "x" variable does not appear in the condition for membership
of the set in (4a). In the second case, however, the machinery of doxastic alternatives is
crucial, since the individual is involved in the description of the set.
2.2. Obligatory De Se
The problem of de se attitudes would be mainly a concern for philosophy - and perhaps
an issue for the lexical semantics of certain attitude predicates - if it only arose for
sentences like (5).
(5) Lingens thinks that he's lost in the Stanford library.
Given an appropriate context, (5) allows either a de se construal or a non-de-se construal
of the pronoun he.3 This raises the possibility that the two interpretations are not separate
readings at all, but simply different situations that make the proposition expressed by (5)
true. Thus examples like (5) on their own do not give evidence that de se interpretations
are something for linguistic semantics to reckon with. This point was made by Chierchia
(1989). Chierchia went on to observe, though, that some attitude reports are in fact
sensitive to this distinction. He gives examples like (6), a belief report in Italian using
credere, 'believe' with an infinitive complement.
(6) [Italian]
Pavarotti crede di essere un genio.
Pavarotti believes COMP be a genius.
'Pavarotti believes that he's a genius.'
[Lit.: "Pavarotti believes to be a genius"]
(Anand, 2006, no. la; based on Chierchia, 1989)
3 In many such cases the de se interpretation is strongly preferred. Anand (2006) discusses this issue in
some detail and gives evidence that non-de-se interpretations of pronouns that co-refer with the attitude
holder are generally available given the appropriate context.
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For (6) to be true, Chierchia reports, Pavarotti must know that the person he believes to
be a genius is himself - that is, Pavarotti must be inclined to say, "I'm a genius." If he
were to listen to a recording of a singer and come to believe that the singer was a genius,
unaware that the singer was in fact him, then (6) would not be true. In contrast, (7), where
the embedded clause contains the pronoun gli, 'he,' would be possible in such a case.
(7) [Italian]
Pavarotti crede che gli e un genio.
Pavarotti believes COMP he is a genius.
'Pavarotti believes that he's a genius.'
(Anand, 2006, no. ib; based on Chierchia, 1989)
A similar pattern has been observed for other attitude predicates that allow infinitive VP
complements, which are standardly analyzed as containing the null subject PRO.4 For
example, compare (8), which contains want with an infinitive complement, with (9),
which contains want with the reflexive pronoun himself
(8) Lingens wants to get out of the Stanford library.
(9) Lingens wants himself to get out of the Stanford library.
If, upon reading a biography of himself, Lingens comes to feel sorry for the amnesiac lost
in the Stanford library and wishes that this man would find his way out (but does not
realize that he himself is Lingens), then his benevolent wish might be reported with (9),
but cannot be reported with (8).
This means that there is at least one construction where a de se interpretation is
obligatory, and therefore must be encoded somehow in the semantics. This leaves open
the question of whether examples like (5) are actually ambiguous, having a de se
interpretation and a non-de-se interpretation. I will not address that question here.
2.3. Epistemic Modals in Attitude Reports and De Se Interpretation
Consider a sentence where an epistemic modal is embedded under think, as in (10).
4 The observation about the obligatory de se interpretation in control constructions (also known as Equi-
noun phrase deletion) is originally due to Morgan (1970).
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(10) Sue thinks it might be raining.
As I observed early on, the "knower," that is, the person whose knowledge is relevant for
interpreting the embedded epistemic modal might, has to be the attitude holder - in this
case, Sue. Thus (10) means, roughly, that Sue thinks that it's compatible with her
knowledge that it's raining. I spent some time discussing the fact that, under appropriate
assumptions about the relationship between belief and knowledge, this becomes
equivalent to saying that it's compatible with Sue's beliefs that it's raining. However,
now I want to bring attention to another fact: for (10) to be true, it must not only be the
case that the individual Sue has a particular belief about the individual Sue's knowledge
state, but Sue must also realize that it's her own knowledge state that the belief is about,
meaning that the belief reported in (10) is crucially de se. (This was pointed out to me by
Pranav Anand, p.c.) Put another way, to properly understand the paraphrase "Sue
believes that it's compatible with her knowledge that it's raining," her must be
interpreted de se. To see this more clearly, consider an example like (11), in the context
given.
(11) [Context: Sam is a spokesperson for NASA who is frustrated at what he sees as a lack of
scientific understanding among the general public and, especially, the media. He decides
to vent his frustration by announcing false discoveries to journalists in some of his
frequent television interviews. He starts small by saying that a black hole has been found
100 light years away, then saying that a new satellite is forming around Mars. Then, on a
particularly prominent talk show, he announces that there is evidence of water on the
moon. This creates a media frenzy, his supervisors catch on to what he is doing, and first
thing the next morning he is fired. In despair and determined to forget his stupidity, he
goes home and drowns his sorrows in alcohol. He gets so drunk that when he switches on
the T.V. and happens to see a clip of his own interview announcing the possibility of
water on the moon, he doesn't recognize the man as himself. He thinks to himself,
"Wow, that idiot thinks there might be water on the moon. People sure are stupid about
science."]
# Sam thinks there might be water on the moon.
In the context given, Sam does come to believe that it is compatible with the knowledge
of the man on T.V. that there is water on the moon, and in fact that man happens to be
Sam himself, but (11) cannot be used to report Sam's belief.5
5 If we construct a similar example using a predicate of personal taste, a non-de-se reading at first seems to
be possible. For example, (i) could be used in a context where Sam unknowingly saw himself on T.V.
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Not coincidentally, the semantics I gave for think and might directly capture the
obligatory de se interpretation of sentences like (10) and (11). On my view, (11) has the
meaning in (12a), which can be simplified to (12b).
(12) (a) I[(1 1)]wtJ = 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sam: 3<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: there is
water on the moon in w" at t"
(b) = 1 iff 3<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sam: there is water on the moon in w' at t'
According to (12a), Sam thinks there might be water on the moon is true iff all of Sam's
doxastic alternatives have some epistemic alternative(s) where there is water on the
moon. More precisely, it says that for all triples <w',t',x> such that it's compatible with
Sam's beliefs in the actual world and time that he is x in w' at t', x's knowledge in w' at t'
is compatible with there being water on the moon. The combination of doxastic
alternatives and epistemic alternatives thus captures the obligatory de se interpretation of
embedded epistemic modals.
2.4. The Immediateness Requirement
We have just looked at two cases where attitudes are obligatorily de se; the first involved
embedded infinitives as in (6) and (8), and the second involved embedded epistemic
modals as in (10) and (11). These two types of examples have something else in common
as well: in cases where one attitude report is embedded inside another, the obligatory de
se interpretation always applies to the closest attitude holder. For example, in (13), might
must be linked to Bill's knowledge, not Sue's.
(13) Sue thinks that Bill thinks it might be raining.
That is, (13) can only mean that Sue thinks that Bill has a certain belief about his own
knowledge (namely, that it's compatible with it raining). It cannot mean that Sue thinks
that Bill thinks that her (Sue's) knowledge is compatible with it raining. Note that the
latter could still be a de se belief- Sue could believe that she, herself, is the person whose
knowledge state Bill has a belief about - but this reading is still not allowed for (13). I
eating cat food and expressing enjoyment. However, this is expected on my view because tasty can take a
silent referential argument referring to the man on T.V.
(i) Sam thinks that cat food is tasty.
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will refer to this property of epistemic modals as the "immediateness" requirement. (It is
tempting to call it a locality requirement, but I don't want to suggest that it is syntactic in
nature.)
My analysis accounts for the immediateness requirement for epistemic modals. This
is easy to see if we just start with a singly embedded case such as (14a), which has the
meaning in (14b).
(14) (a) Bill thinks it might be raining.
(b) [i(a)]]wtj = 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,Bill: 3<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: it's raining
in w" at t"
The de se interpretation has already been forced at this point because of the way the
judge-dependent proposition it might be raining interacts with the doxastic alternatives. If
(14a) is embedded inside another attitude report, as in (15a), then it has the meaning in
(15b).
(15) (a) Sue thinks that Bill thinks it might be raining.
[=(13)]
(b) D[(a)]] w'tJ = [Ithinks]] wtJ ( [Bill thinks it might be raining]l]w't ) (Sue)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: G[Bill thinks it might be raining] w ',t' sue
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,sue: 1 iff V<w",t",y>eDox,,,t,,Bill:
3<W3,t3,z>eEpistw,,,t,,y: it's raining in w3 at t3
According to (15b), Sue thinks that Bill thinks it might be raining is true iff for all of
Sue's doxastic alternatives, all of Bill's doxastic alternatives have an epistemic
alternative where it's raining. This correctly links the de se interpretation to Bill instead
of Sue. Indeed, in the context of this analysis, it's difficult to see how it could be
otherwise, since the de se interpretation is already derived before (14a) is further
embedded.
It turns out that the immediateness requirement also applies to cases of obligatory de
se with embedded infinitives. That is, the implied subject of an embedded infinitive must
132
CHAPTER 4
be linked to the closest attitude holder - or, put differently, PRO must be controlled by
the closest subject (at least in the relevant cases). We can see this from examples like (16)
and (17). For example, (16) can only mean that Sue wants it to be the case that Bill wants
it to be the case that he himself goes to the party. It cannot mean that Sue wants it to be
the case that Bill wants her to go to the party. Similarly, (17) can only mean that Sue tried
to make it the case that Bill wants to go to the party, not that she tried to make it the case
that Bill wanted her to go the party. Again, these readings could still be de se, but are not
allowed for (16)-(17).6
(16) Sue wants Bill to want to go to the party.
(17) Sue tried to get Bill to want to go to the party.
I suggest that the immediateness requirement is a key diagnostic for distinguishing
between two different families of de se constructions. As we saw with the case of
embedded epistemic modals in (13)-(15), the type of obligatory de se that comes with the
immediateness requirement falls naturally and unavoidably out of interactions between
the semantics of judge-dependent propositions and attitude predicates. We have seen that
embedded infinitive clauses as in (16)-(17) have an obligatory de se interpretation of the
same kind; this suggests that it should be captured the same way, as I will propose in
Section 3. I will suggest below that there is a second family of de se constructions which
should be given a different kind of account.
2.5. De Se Constructions Not Subject to the Immediateness Requirement
The immediateness requirement does not apply in the case of pronouns that can be
optionally interpreted de se, as in (5) above. Whether or not the de se interpretation is
treated as a separate reading, it is equally available for a lower or higher attitude holder.
For example, consider (18).
(18) Sue thinks that Mary thinks that she is a genius.
In (18), the pronoun she in the embedded clause can refer to either Sue or Mary, and
moreover a de se construal seems to be equally available in either case. That is, it could
61 will say more about the analysis of ECM and object control constructions in Sections 3.3 and 4.1 below.
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be that all of Sue's doxastic alternatives <w',t',x> are such that Mary thinks in w' at t' that
x is a genius; or, alternatively, it could be that Sue thinks that all of Mary's doxastic
alternatives <w",t",y> are such that Mary thinks that y is a genius.
It is tempting to take this as evidence that there is no separate de se reading of
pronouns in sentences like (18); however, the presence or absence of the immediateness
requirement does not correlate with whether the de se interpretation is obligatory. There
is a well-attested class of expressions in natural languages which are obligatorily
interpreted de se but which, it turns out, are not subject to the immediateness
requirement. These include shifting indexicals of the kind found in Amharic and Zazaki7
(Schlenker, 1999, 2003; Anand & Nevins, 2003), and logophors of the kind found in
West African languages such as Ewe, Yoruba, and Abe (Hagege, 1974; Clements, 1975;
Pulleyblank, 1986; Koopman & Sportiche, 1989; Anand & Nevins, 2003). One typical
example of a shifting indexical is given in (19), from Amharic. The first-person indexical
in (19) can either refer to the speaker of the utterance or to the reported speaker, John.
(19) [Amharic]
jon jogna no-ffi yil-all
John hero be.PRES-ls says-3sm
'John says that {I am, he is} a hero.'
[Lit: "John says that I am a hero."]
(Schlenker, 2003, no. 53)
A typical example of a West African-type logophor is given in (20), from Ewe. Here the
pronoun yd can only refer to the reported speaker, Kofi.
(20) [Ewe]
Kofi be ye-dzo
Kofi say LOG-leave
'Kofi said that he (Kofi) left.'
(Clements, 1975, no. 1)
7 Amharic is a Semitic language spoken in Ethiopia; Zazaki is an Indo-Iranian language spoken by ethnic
Kurds in Turkey.
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Crucially, it has been observed that both shifting indexicals (when they have their shifted
interpretations) and logophors generally must be interpreted de se.8 That is, a sentence
like (19) can only report a situation where John said, "I am a hero," not one where, for
example, he unknowingly saw himself on T.V. and said, "he is a hero." However, shifting
indexicals and logophors are not subject to the immediateness requirement. We can see
this from looking at cases where one speech or attitude report is embedded in another, as
in (21) (from Zazaki) and (22) (from Ewe).
(21) [Zazakil
Ali Fatima-ra va ks Rojda Bill-ra va sz to-ra miradiga
Ali Fatima-to said that Rojda Bill-to said I you-to angry.be.PRES
(1 possible reading)
'Ali said to Fatima, "Rojda said to Bill that I am angry at you"'
[Lit: Ali said to Fatima that Rojda said to Bill that I am angry at you]
(Anand & Nevins, 2004)
(22) [Ewe]
Kofi xo-e se be Ama gblo be ye-fu-i
Kofi receive-PRO hear Ama say LOG-beat-PRO
(i) 'Kofii believed that Ama said that hei beat her'
(ii) 'Kofii believed that Amai said that shei beat him'
(Clements, 1975, no. 73)
There is a reading of (21) on which the indexicals 'I' and 'you,' which are located in the
most embedded clause, refer to the speaker and hearer of the higher speech report, that is,
Ali and Fatima (rather than Rojda and Bill or the actual speaker and addressee of the
sentence). Similarly, there is a reading of (22) on which the logophor y refers to the
subject of the higher belief report, that is Kofi (and not Ama). These are both analogous
to the interpretation of (18) on which she refers to Sue instead of Mary, except that the de
se interpretation is obligatory in (21)-(22).
I will not give an analysis of this second family of de se constructions which are not
subject to the immediateness requirement; I bring them up only to show that they are
8 This has not been verified for every relevant language and item, but Schlenker (2003) shows it for
Amharic 'I' and discusses the issue for logophors (citing, e.g., Kusumoto, 1998, for Bafut logophors). Also
see Anand's (2006) discussion.
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distinct from the de se constructions I will be concerned with here. My expectation is that
this family of de se expressions should be analyzed using manipulation of context
variables, along the lines of proposals by Schlenker (2003), von Stechow (2002), and/or
Anand (2006). To give a very informal idea of the approach taken by these kind of
proposals, the Amharic example in (19) would come out to mean something along the
lines of (23). (I refer the reader to references cited for details.)
(23) (19) = true iff in all possible contexts of utterance ci such that what Kofi
said is true in the world of cI, the speaker of cl is a hero.
This captures the de se interpretation of the shifted indexical for the following reason:
suppose that Kofi had unknowingly seen himself on T.V. and said, "He is a hero." There
are possible worlds (including all of those compatible with what Kofi believes) in which
the man on T.V. is not the same person as Kofi, and the man on T.V. is a hero but Kofi is
not. In these worlds, then, there are possible contexts of utterance cl where what Kofi
said is true in the world where it was uttered (since the man on T.V. is a hero) but where
the speaker of cl (i.e., Kofi) is not a hero. Examples with logophors would work
similarly.
I have emphatically left open the question of whether sentences like (18) should be
treated as truly ambiguous between de se readings and non-de-se readings, since the
answer is not important for my purposes. If they are treated as ambiguous, though, the de
se versions would need to belong to the same family of de se constructions as those
containing shifting indexicals or logophors. One possibility (which really goes back to
Castafieda, 1966, 1968) is to treat regular pronouns such as she as ambiguous between
normal pronouns, which are not de se, and logophors, which are de se.
In sum, my claim is not that the judge-dependent system eliminates the need for other
mechanisms that derive de se interpretations. What I am saying is simply this: we have
already seen that judge dependency is independently motivated by the behavior of
epistemic modals, conditionals, and predicates of personal taste; we have also seen that
notions like doxastic alternatives are independently needed to account for the de se
interpretation of embedded infinitives; and we have seen that when we put these together,
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we automatically derive a particular kind of de se interpretation, namely the special kind
that is subject to the immediateness requirement. Given these facts, it makes sense to
account for this special kind of de se interpretation using judge dependency. What I
foresee, then, is that a comprehensive account of de se interpretations will distinguish
between two sharply delineated families of de se constructions, those involving the judge
parameter and those involving context shifting, where the first is subject to the
immediateness requirement and the second is not. This view makes the prediction, then,
that any bona fide de se constructions which are not subject to the immediateness
requirement must be able to be captured through reference to shifting contexts. I leave it
to future work to see how this is borne out.
3. Analysis of Obligatory De Se in Infinitive Complements
3.1. The Property View of De Se Attitudes
A standard way to capture the obligatory de se interpretation of examples like (6) and (8)
is to analyze attitudes as relations between an individual (the attitude holder) and a
property, rather than between an individual and a proposition (see, e.g., Lewis, 1979;
Cresswell, 1985; Chierchia, 1989; Anand, 2006). This amounts to giving the lexical
entries in (24)-(25) to credere, 'believe' from (6) and want from (8). The lexical entry for
want involves a notion of "want-alternatives" that is analogous to doxastic alternatives.
Note that this is in a standard system without the judge parameter, so the index only
consists of a world-time pair, and the variable P stands for an (intensional) one-place
property (type <s,<i,et>>).
(24) [[credere, ('believe')] w' t = [,P<s,<i,et>> . [XZe. V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,z:
P(w')(t')(x)=1] ]
(25) [[want]w 't = [P<s,<i,et>> . [•Ze. V<w',t',x>eWantw,t,z: P(w')(t')(x)=l] ]
[where Wantw,t,z is defined as in (26)]
(26) Want alternatives:
Wantw,t,z: {<w',t',x>: it fits with what z wants in w at t for z to be x in w'
at t'}
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According to (24), "z crede P," 'z believes P' is true iff all of z's doxastic alternatives
<w',t',x> are such that x has the property P in w' at t'. According to (25), along with the
definition in (26), "z wants P" is true iff in all of z's want alternatives <w',t',x>, x has the
property P in w' at t', where z's want alternatives are those world-time-individual triples
<w',t',x> such that being x in w' at t' would satisfy what z wants.
This requires that the relevant infinitive clauses (e.g., to get out of the Stanford
library) be treated as properties of type <e,t> (assuming they combine with the attitude
predicate by Intensional Functional Application). Ignoring the internal structure and
presence of PRO, then, the infinitive clauses from (6) and (8) need to have the meanings
in (27)-(28).
(27) [Idi essere un genio ('to be a genius')]w't = [Xy . y is a genius in w at t]
(28) I[to get out of the Stanford library]] w t = [ky . y gets out of the Stanford
library in w at t]
Putting these together, the resulting meanings for (6) and (8) are given in (29) and (30),
respectively.
(29) J[(6 )] w t = [credere ('believes')]w't ( [w", .[Xt"i . [Idi essere un genio
('to be a genius')]","t" ] ] ) (Pavarotti)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x> Doxw,t,pavarotti: x is a genius in w' at t'
(30) gj(8)]w t = [[want]]w't ( [Xw"s .[Xt"i . I[to get out of the Stanford
library] w 't"] ]) (Lingens)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eWantw,t,Lingens: x gets out of the Stanford library in w' at
t'
Thus the Italian sentence in (6), Pavarotti crede di essere un genio, 'Pavarotti believes
that he's a genius' is true iff all of Pavarotti's doxastic alternatives <w',t',x> are such that
x is a genius in w' at t'. Similarly, the English sentence in (8), Lingens wants to get out of
the Stanford library, is true iff all of Lingens's want alternatives <w',t',x> are such that x
gets out of the Stanford library in w' at t'. These are intuitively the correct meanings, and
they capture the obligatory de se interpretation of these sentences.
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Now let's turn to the internal structure of the infinitive complements. These are
standardly analyzed as containing the subject PRO, which is widely assumed to be a
pronoun and thus of type e. On this view, infinitive clauses denote properties, and so
something more needs to be said about how a sentence of the form [PRO VP] denotes a
property. Chierchia's (1989) widely adopted solution is to assume that PRO is a pronoun
that is obligatorily bound by an abstraction operator, meaning that the infinitive to be a
genius, e.g., has the structure in (31).
(31) Opi [PRO 1 [to be a genius] ]
Following widely accepted views of operator-binding (as in, e.g., Heim & Kratzer, 1998),
this will give the infinitive clause to be a genius the appropriate property meaning (the
same as that in (27)).
There are other obvious possibilities, of course. For example, PRO could be taken to
be semantically vacuous; or we could eliminate PRO from the theory altogether and treat
de se attitude predicates as combining directly with VPs rather than sentences. The choice
between these various options will not matter here (though see note 14.)
Given this view of de se attitudes, we now need to ask how non-de-se attitudes are
captured in this theory. For example, we need to be able to predict the meaning of (5),
repeated in (32), in the context where Lingens has read a bibliography of himself but does
not realize that it's about him.
(32) Lingens thinks that he's lost in the Stanford library.
[non-de-se interpretation]
In this case, we want this sentence to say that all of Lingens's doxastic alternatives
<w',t',x> are such that Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in w' at t'. (This says nothing
about "x.") There are two ways to achieve this. The first way is to say that think is
ambiguous between a meaning equivalent to (29) and a standard one where it takes a
proposition. (Chierchia, 1989 takes this approach.) The second way is to say that think
always takes properties, and to redefine the relevant embedded clauses as denoting
properties which are vacuous in a particular sense. (This more closely follows Lewis,
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1979.) For example, the embedded clause he's lost in the Stanford library in (32) would
denote the property in (33) (putting aside the issue of the interpretation of pronouns).
(33) [he's lost in the Stanford library]] w't = [Ly .Lingens is lost in the Stanford
library in w at t]
This property is vacuous in the sense that the lambda expression introduces a variable y
that does not appear in the description of the predicate.
There are trade-offs between the two options. On the first kind of view, there is some
redundancy in letting attitude predicates have both a property-taking and a proposition-
taking meaning. On the second kind of view, another decision has to be made about
whether matrix clauses should be treated the same way as embedded clauses. Even if all
sentences that serve as arguments of attitude predicates are treated as properties, matrix
clauses could still be treated as type t; in this case, there would be a fundamental
semantic distinction between two kinds of sentences. On the other hand, matrix clauses
could be treated as properties as well, in which case there would be an extra individual
argument that is systematically idle in matrix sentences.
Once again, this still leaves open the question of whether the optional de se
interpretation of (32) is a separate reading of the sentence.
3.2. A Judge-Dependent Proposal
Recall that the meaning I have given to think is in (34).
(34) [IthinkJ] w tJ = [Rp<s,<i,et>. [Xze . V<w',t',x>E Doxw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x) = 1] ]
Roughly speaking, this says that "z thinks that p" is true iff in all of z's doxastic
alternatives (which are world-time-individual triples), p is true at that triple. Crucially,
since I treat propositions as sets of world-time-individual triples (following Lasersohn,
2005), this means that they are already the right kind of thing to apply directly to doxastic
alternatives in this way. It also means that if the propositional argument of think is judge-
dependent, the judge is in effect shifted to the attitude holder, in a way that is de se and
satisfies the immediateness requirement, as discussed above.
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Notice that the lexical entry for think in (34) is exactly the same as the one for
credere, 'believe' given in (24) above. The clausal argument of the attitude predicate is
intended to be thought of as a property in (24) and as a proposition in (34), but since a
proposition on my view is of type <s,<i,et>>, this amounts to the same thing. An
analogous lexical entry for want is given in (35), using the same notion of want
alternatives defined in (26). Again, this is exactly the same as the property-taking version
in (25) except that the argument of type <s,<i,et>> is now thought of as a proposition.
(35) says that "z wants p" is true iff p is true at all of z's want alternatives.
(35) [Twant]jw' t = [RP<s,<i,et>>. [•z e. V<w',t',x>e Wantw,t,,: p(w')(t')(x)=l] ]
In my system, then, the most straightforward way to capture the obligatory de se
interpretation of infinitive clauses is not to have them denote properties, but rather judge-
dependent propositions. Specifically, the meanings for the infinitive clauses in (27)-(28)
should be replaced with those in (36)-(37).
(36) I[di essere un genio ('to be a genius')l]w't j = 1 iffj is a genius in w at t
(37) [[to get out of the Stanford libraryI] w tl" = 1 iffj gets out of the Stanford
library in w at t
According to these meanings, the infinitive phrase to be a genius (for example) is a
proposition that is true if the judge is a genius.9'10
The next question is how to derive the meanings in (36)-(37). If these infinitive
clauses have PRO as their subject, where PRO is taken to be an obligatorily bound
pronoun, they will denote one-place properties (on my view, type <s,<i,<e,et>>>) rather
than propositions. Treating PRO as an unbound pronoun will not help either, since then
the subject will not be linked to the judge parameter. What we need is for the subject of
9 This raises the question of why infinitive clauses cannot be asserted, since judge-dependent propositions
can of course be asserted. Thus I probably need to assume that an infinitive cannot head a matrix clause for
reasons relating to tense or to purely syntactic requirements.
10 By this point "judge" may seem to have become something of a misnomer, since there is no obvious
intuitive sense in which the subject of an infinitive sentence is the person "judging" it. However, the use of
the judge parameter in control constructions will generally be closely connected to an attitude of the
controller, as we will see, and so in that sense it makes just as much sense to use the term as it does for the
"knower" of epistemic modals. In any case I don't think the term "judge" should be taken too literally.
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these infinitives to be something that simply denotes the judge. Recall that I have argued
for just such an item, PROj, whose lexical entry is repeated in (38).
(38) [PROj]w,'t =j
I suggest, then, that the subject of the infinitive clauses in sentences like (6) and (8) is not
PRO, as standardly construed, but PROj. There are at least two ways to understand this
proposal. One possibility is that PRO should be reanalyzed as PROj, in all cases where it
is thought to occur." Another possibility is that PRO still exists, but does not appear in
these particular kinds of cases. I will discuss evidence that speaks to this question in
Section 4 below.
If we take the subject of these infinitives to be PROj, this will straightforwardly give
them the (judge-dependent) propositional meanings in (36)-(37). For example, (37) is
derived as shown in (39).
(39) I[PROj to get out of the Stanford library] w,' t = [Xy . y gets out of the
Stanford library in w at t] (j)
= 1 iffj gets out of the Stanford library in w at t
The resulting meaning of (8), Lingens wants to get out of the Stanford library, is shown
in (40).
(40) [(8)] w tJ = -[Lingens wants PROj to get out of the Stanford library]]w tJ
= [want]]w tJ ( [Lw" . [Xt" . [Xj". I[PROj to get out of the Stanford
library]w",t"J " ] ] ]) (Lingens)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x> E Wantw,t,Lingens: x gets out of the Stanford library in w' at
t'
This says that Lingens wants to get out of the Stanford library is true iff all of Lingens's
want alternatives <w',t',x> are such that x gets out of the Stanford library in w' at t',
which captures the obligatory de se interpretation of this sentence.
" This might loosely be seen as a variation on the view that PRO is a "logophor" in some sense (see, e.g.,
Williams, 1992; Landau, 2000), which is echoed by a suggestion by Anand that one instantiation of an
Amharic shifting indexical is "a local logophor (hence something of the equivalent of PRO)" (Anand,
2006: p. 102).
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The main motivation behind my analysis of these examples has been to derive their
obligatory de se interpretation in a way that fits naturally into the judge-dependent
system. In effect, though, I have also suggested that the control properties of want and
credere, 'think' follow from their lexical semantics, since the meanings I have given
them force the controller to be the attitude holder.' 2 (This happens to be the subject in
both of these cases, but in Section 4.1 I will discuss cases where it is the object.) The goal
of deriving control relations from the lexical semantics of control predicates has been the
impetus for a number of analyses of control, particularly around the 1980s. 13 One
particular approach within that tradition is to connect control relations to general
properties of the situation or event-types involved (as, e.g., in Jackendoff, 1974; Farkas,
1988; Sag & Pollard, 1991). My proposal is of this kind. For example, on Sag & Pollard's
(1991) view (also citing Comrie, 1984), the fact that want is a subject control verb comes
from it being of the "orientation" type, which means that the controller is the
"experiencer." (Italian credere, 'think' could also be placed in this category.) On my
view, this follows from the fact that want and credere express simple attitudes of the
subject towards some proposition, with no additional mediating attitudes involved.
3.3. Non-De-Se Cases and ECM
On this approach, nothing special needs to be said about cases of non-de-se attitudes,
such as the non-de-se interpretation of (5), repeated again in (41).
(41) Lingens thinks that he's lost in the Stanford library. [non-de-se
interpretation]
Again putting aside the details of the interpretation of pronouns, the that-clause in (41)
simply denotes the proposition in (42), which is non-judge-dependent.
(42) [[that he [Lingens] is lost in the Stanford library]wt j = 1 iff Lingens is lost
in the Stanford library in w at t
12 This fact about the meanings is independent of the judge-dependent semantics, since the same effect
could be achieved by giving them the property-based meanings from (24)-(25) (Section 3.1).
13 Some examples are Jackendoff (1974), Bach (1979), Bach & Partee (1980), Jacobson (1982), Klein &
Sag (1982), Chierchia (1983, 1984), Dowty (1985), Chierchia & Jacobson (1986), Farkas (1988), and Sag
& Pollard (1991).
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When this is taken as the argument of think in (41), the resulting meaning is given in
(43).
(43) [( 4 1)] w 't'  = [ithink]w' tJ ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xj". I[that he [Lingens] is lost in the
Stanford library]w",t' j"]]] (Lingens)
=1 iff V<w',t',x>EDOXw,t,Lingens: Lingens is lost in the Stanford library in
w' at t'
This says that Lingens thinks that he's lost in the Stanford library is true (on a non-de-se
interpretation) iff in all of Lingens's doxastic alternatives, the individual Lingens is lost
in the Stanford library. This can be true in the context where Lingens reads a biography
about himself but does not realize that he himself is the person the biography is about.
Formally, the non-de-se nature of this interpretation is captured by the fact that the "x" in
Lingens's doxastic alternatives <w',t',x> does not appear in the description "Lingens is
lost in the library in w' at t'." (As I discussed in Section 2.5, if there is a distinguished de
se reading of the sentence, it would not be derived using judge dependency.)
Similarly, the meaning I gave to want immediately carries over to the use of want in
ECM constructions, also known as object-raising, exemplified in (44).
(44) Sue wants Mary to be happy.
I assume that (44) has the structure in (45a), where the entire infinitive clause Mary to be
happy is a single syntactic and semantic argument of want (see, e.g., Haegeman, 1994:
pp. 169-171). Using the meaning for want from (35), this predicts that (44) has the
meaning in (45b). (I assume that Mary to be happy is true at a world-time-judge triple
<w,tj> iff Mary is happy in w at t.)
(45) (a) Sue [vp wants [s Mary to be happy] ]
(b) I[(a)]wt'j = -[wantw t'j ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [Xj". f[Mary to be happy1w"'' '" )
(Sue)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>EWantw,t,sue: Mary is happy in w' at t'
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This says that (44) is true if in all of Sue's want alternatives <w',t',x>, Mary is happy in
w' at t', which is the correct meaning. This attitude report is predicted not to have any de
se quality because the subject of the infinitive clause is Mary rather than PROj, and thus
the infinitive argument expresses a non-judge-dependent proposition.
In a sense, what I have done to derive cases of non-de-se attitudes and ECM
constructions is the same thing that would be accomplished by making all sentences
denote properties. Some of those properties are vacuous in the sense that their
formalizations involve vacuous binding of an individual variable, in the same way that
the formalizations of non-judge-dependent propositions involve vacuous binding of a
variable for the judge parameter. Either way there has to be an idle wheel somewhere in
these cases. The difference is that on my view, that wheel is independently needed (for
epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste), and it is not always idle in matrix
clauses.
4. More on Control Constructions
I have proposed that the infinitive clause in an example like Lingens wants to get out of
the Stanford library has PROj as its subject. The fact that the implicit subject is
"controlled" by the subject of the higher clause follows from the semantics of the attitude
predicates and general aspects of the judge-dependent system. This raises the question of
which, if any, other putative cases of controlled PRO (within the Government-
Binding/Minimalist approach to syntax'4) can be treated instead as PROJ. In this section I
will briefly discuss a few prominent cases, some of which are amenable to this analysis
and some of which are not. I will not attempt here to review the literature on control
14 There are, of course, syntactic views where PRO is not posited, and bare infinitivals and gerunds are
taken to have no subject at all, especially within approaches to syntax that are more lexicalist and surface-
based than the general Government-Binding/Minimalist approach. Such a view could still be combined
with my approach to de se attitudes with infinitivals, provided that the silent item PROJ were added (or
replaced with a category-changing rule with the same effect). In this case the question of which occurrences
of PRO can be reanalyzed as PROj becomes instead the question of which kinds of apparently subjectless
VPs actually contain PROj as a silent subject (or undergo some equivalent process). The issues that arise in
these kind of theories might well be different, but the basic phenomena are the same, and so the various
constructions I consider below would still have some impact on how to analyze VPs that lack overt
subjects. For a discussion of raising and control on one view of this kind, see Jacobson (1992).
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theory, which is full of intricacies and controversies, but will simply take as my starting
point what I consider to be a standard Government/Binding view of control. 15
4.1. Object Control
The view of PRO as PROJ can be fairly easily extended to the case of object control.
Object control occurs with verbs such as persuade, convince, ask, tell, order, warn, and
defy, as exemplified in (46).16
(46) (a) Sue persuaded Mary to take Sam to the movies.
(b) Sue told Mary to take Sam to the movies.
(c) Sue defied Mary to leave Sam behind.
I assume that both syntactically and semantically, object control verbs take two
arguments: a DP, and an infinitive clause with PROj as subject. For example, (46a) has
the structure in (47).
(47) Sue [vp persuaded [Mary] [s PROj to take Sam to the movies] ]
This is in line with standard views within the Government/Binding framework (see, e.g.,
Haegeman, 1994, Ch. 5) except, of course, for replacing PRO with PROj.
There are well known reasons why these verbs need to take the DP argument
separately rather than simply combining with an infinitive clause, as in (48).
(48) Sue [vp persuaded [s Mary to take Sam to the movies] ]
Essentially, it comes down to the fact that the DP argument makes a crucial contribution
to the meaning of the sentence - or, as it's usually stated, it gets a theta role from the
higher verb. We can see this in two ways: first, from the fact that expletive subjects are
impossible with object control verbs, as in (49); and, second, from the fact that (50a) does
15 My background assumptions owe something to the discussion in Haegeman's textbook (Haegeman,
1994, Ch. 5) and a literature review by Adler (2006, Ch. 2). Some other key sources for the syntax and
semantics of control include Chomsky (1981), Chierchia (1984), Williams (1992), and Landau (2000), to
name a few.
16 These are a representative sample of a list of more than 20 object control verbs given in Jacobson (1992:
pp. 162-163).
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not entail (50b), even though Mary takes Sam to the movies entails that Sam goes with
Mary to the movies.
(49) (a) * The bride persuaded it to be obvious that she was happy.
(b) * The director told there to be actors on the stage.
(50) (a) Sue persuaded Mary to take Sam to the movies.
(b) Sue persuaded Sam to go with Mary to the movies.
What object control verbs have in common is that they all in some way involve one
individual (e.g., Sue) getting another individual (e.g., Mary) to have particular intentions
towards some action. This generalization is discussed by Sag & Pollard (1991), citing
Comrie (1984); Sag & Pollard call these events of the "influence" type, where the
controller is the "influenced participant. For example, for x to persuade y to do P is for x
to cause y (through some kind of force of reasoning) to intend to do P; for x to tell y to do
P is for x to try (through an imperative speech act) to cause y to intend to do P; for x to
defy y to do P is for x to do something like try (through a particular kind of speech act) to
get y to intend not to do P (or else!). In order to give lexical meanings for these kind of
verbs, then, we first need to have an idea of what it means to intend something. As the
reader hopefully expects by now, I suggest that a notion of "intention alternatives" is in
order. This is defined in (51).
(51) Intention alternatives:
Intendw,t,z: {<w',t',x>: it fits with what z intends in w at t for z to be x in w'
at t'}
Using this notion, we can then give persuade (and convince, on the relevant use) a lexical
entry along the lines of (52).
(52) [[persuade]] w' tj = I[convince] w,' t = [y,e . [XP<s,<i,et>> . [Ze . z communicates
with y in a way that causes it to be the case that V<w',t',x> E Intendw,t,y:
p(w')(t')(x) = 1]]]
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This says, roughly speaking, that "z convinces y (to) p" means that z communicates with
y in a way that causes y to intend p. 17 Since p is evaluated with respect to the intention
alternatives of the direct object ("y"), the judge is in effect shifted to the direct object.
The meaning of (46a) (minus the past tense) is computed in (53), using the lexical
entry for persuade in (52) and the structure in (47).
(53) [(46a)] w' tJ = [Sue persuades Mary to take Sam to the movies]]w'tJ
= Ipersuade] w't' (Mary) ( [)w" . [Xt" . [Xj". I[PROj to take Sam to the
movies] w' t J ] ] ] ) (Sue)
= 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case
that V<w',t',x>eIntendw,t,May: x takes Sam to the movies in w' at t'
This says that Sue persuades Mary to take Sam to the movies is true iff Sue
communicates with Mary in a way that causes Mary to intend to take Sam to the movies,
which seems to be the correct meaning. 18
Similarly, tell (on the relevant use) can be given the lexical meaning in (54), which
predicts that the sentence in (46b) (again, minus the past tense) has the meaning in (55),
which is exactly analogous to the case of persuade in (53). Other object control verbs can
be treated similarly.
(54) [tell] w' tJ = [kye . [Rp<s,<i,et>> . [RZe. z performs an imperative speech act
addressed to y whose purpose is to make it the case that
V<w',t',x>eIntendw,t,y: p(w')(t')(x)= 1] ] ]
(55) J(46b)j]w t = ISue tells Mary to take Sam to the movies] w tdj
17 The notion of intention referred to in the lexical meaning for persuade does not behave exactly the same
as the English word intend. Both contain a requirement of some kind of agency towards a described action,
but an essentially non-agentive predicate can be more easily coerced into an agentive interpretation with
intend. For example, (i) is acceptable, but (ii) is not (Kai von Fintel, p.c.).
(i) John intends to be rich one day.
(ii) ?? Mary persuaded John to be rich one day.
18 There is a technical problem here in that according to (53), it must be the case that for every world-time-
individual triple compatible with Mary's intentions, she takes Sam to the movies in that world at that time,
which requires her to intend to take Sam to the movies constantly. I will make the optimistic assumption
that this problem can be overcome by a proper treatment of tense and of the future orientation of certain
infinitives (see, e.g., Stowell, 1982; Abusch, 1998, 2004; Wurmbrand, 2006); I will leave this to future
work.
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= [tell]w't' (Mary) ( [kw" . [ [t". j" . [PROj to take Sam to the
movies]w'tj ] ] ] ) (Sue)
= 1 iff Sue performs an imperative speech act addressed to Mary whose
purpose is to make it the case that V<w',t',x> Intendw,t,Mary: x takes Sam
to the movies in w' at t'.
Here, again, I have in effect proposed a view on which the control properties of verbs like
persuade and tell are derived from their lexical semantics. In this case, the reason the
controller must be the object is because the attitude that applies most directly to the
embedded proposition at the level of semantics is an attitude of the object - in all of these
cases, the attitude of intention. 19
It is worth noting that there is a second use of convince (and persuade for at least
some speakers), illustrated in (56).
(56) Sue convinced Mary that it was raining.
Instead of an infinitival clause, this use takes a regular finite clause with an overt subject,
in this case it was raining. On this use, what the subject (in this case Sue) seems to be
doing is causing the direct object (in this case Mary) to come to believe the embedded
clause, rather than to intend it in some sense. Thus this use needs a meaning different
from that in (52) - but only minimally so, as it turns out. We can give convince on this
use the lexical entry in (57).
(57) [convince2j]w'tj  = [Ye [RP<s,<i,et>> . [Ze . Z communicates with y in a way
that causes it to be the case that V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,y: p(w')(t')(x) = 1] ] ]
The only difference between (57) and (52) is that the attitude involved is belief, and so
the lexical entry makes reference to Doxw,t,y (the doxastic alternatives of y in w at t)
rather than Intendw,t,y. (Recall that Doxw,t,y, the doxastic alternatives of y in w at t, is the
set of triples <w',t',x> such that it is compatible with what y knows in w at t that he/she/it
19 Again, this is independent of the judge-dependent semantics, since persuade (for example) could be
given the property-based meaning in (i). (In fact, this is the same as (52) except that the argument of type
<s,<i,et>> is construed as a property rather than as a proposition.)
(i) [persuade]w 't = [Ry,. [P<s,<i,et,,. [,Ze. z communicates with y in a way that causes it to be the case
that V<w',t',x>eIntendw,t,y: P(w')(t')(x) = 1] ] ]
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is x in w' at t'.) This predicts that (56) has the meaning in (58) (again, putting aside the
past tense).
(58) 1[( 5 6)1]w tJ = [[convince 2] w'tjt (Mary) ( [Xw" . [Xt" . [j" .l[it's
raining] w t'' 'tj" ] ] ) (Sue)
= 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case
that V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,Mary: it's raining in w' at t'
This says that Sue convinces Mary that it's raining is true iff Sue communicates with
Mary in a way that causes Mary to believe that it's raining, which again is the correct
meaning.
This also predicts that when this second use of convince embeds a proposition
containing a judge-dependent item, the judge should be linked to the direct object. For
example, (59a) (minus the past tense) is predicted to have the meaning in (59b), where
might is linked to the mental state of the direct object, Mary.
(59) (a) Sue convinced Mary that it might be raining.
(b) [D(a)] w tj = 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be
the case that V<w',t',x>eDoxw,t,May: 3<w",t",y>eEpistw;,t',x: it's raining in
w" at t"
= 1 iff Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case
that <w',t',x> EDoxw,t,Mary: it's raining in w' at t'
This says that (59a) is true iff Sue communicated with Mary in a way that caused it to be
compatible with Mary's beliefs that it's raining (making the usual simplification from
belief of knowledge to simple belief), which seems to be correct.
4.2. Extensional Adjuncts
Another construction commonly thought to contain PRO is sentences with adverbial
gerunds such (60a-b) (see, e.g., Williams, 1992; Adler, 2006, Ch. 2).
(60) (a) Sam left without saying goodbye.
(b) Sue walked down the street (while) singing.
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If the gerunds are taken to have PRO subjects, the structures for (60a-b) should be
something like (61a-b), respectively.
(61) (a) Sam [left [AdvP without PRO saying goodbye] ]
(b) Sue [walked down the street [AdvP (while) PRO singing] ]
Since these are extensional contexts, we cannot treat the null subject of these gerunds as
PROj. If we did, (60a), for example, would have the bizarre meaning that Sam left
without the judge saying goodbye. A speaker could assert this proposition provided that
Sam left without them saying goodbye, and if it were added to the common ground, it
would have the same effect as adding the proposition that Sam left without the group of
conversational participants saying goodbye. Clearly the sentence does not have this
meaning, and so this seems to be a case where the silent subject of a non-finite clause
cannot be assimilated to PROj. This suggests that there do have to be two kinds of silent
subjects for infinitivals and gerunds, where perhaps examples like those in (60) involve
something like traditional PRO.
4.3. Partial Control
It has been observed that certain control verbs allow an interpretation where the silent
subject PRO seems to refer not to the subject of the higher clause, but rather to a larger
group that is contextually salient and includes that individual (see, e.g., Lawler, 1972;
Martin, 1996; Petter, 1998; Landau, 2000). These "partial control" verbs include want,
prefer, decide, and intend, as illustrated in (62).
(62) (a) John told Mary that he preferred to meet at 6:00.
(Adler, 2006, no. 15d)
(b) The chair decided to gather during the strike.
(based on Adler, 2006, no. 15e)
(c) John told Mary that he intended to separate before it was too late.
(Adler, 2006, no. 15f)
(d) Mary wants to meet at the movie theatre (but Sam wants her to take him
there).
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We can tell that the implicit subject of the lower clauses in these cases refers to a group
because the embedded predicates meet, gather, and separate are collective predicates,
hence the unacceptability of the corresponding sentences in (63).
(63) (a) */# John met at 6:00. [cf. (62a/d)]
(b) */# The chair gathered during the strike. [cf. (62b)]
(c) */# John separated before it was too late. [cf. (62c)]
As Landau (2000) and others observe, some control verbs do not allow partial control.
(Landau calls these "exhaustive control" verbs.) One example is manage, illustrated in
(64).
(64) */# The chair managed to gather during the strike.
(based on Landau, 2000, Ch. 2, no. 2a)
I will have little of significance to add to the discussion of the phenomenon of partial
control, and what determines whether a particular control verb allows it or not, but I
would at least like to show that it is not an insurmountable problem for the view of PRO
as PROj.
Note first that even cases of partial control are obligatorily interpreted de se in the
sense that the attitude holder must know that they themselves are part of the group
involved. For example, suppose the amnesiac Lingens reads a biography of himself (not
realizing that it's about him). Suppose further that he comes to believe that this man
Lingens has regular meetings with his biographer, and for some reason develops a desire
for the meetings to occur in the lobby of the Stanford library. This desire cannot be
reported with (65).
(65) Lingens wants to meet in the Stanford library lobby.
For (65) to be true, Lingens would have to realize that his desire is about a group that
includes himself.
To account for partial control, Landau (2000, Ch. 2) assumes, among other things,
that PRO can carry a feature for semantic plurality. Simplifying somewhat, this means
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that there is a "singular" PRO and a "plural" PRO. (It is crucial for him that these are
semantic features, not syntactic phi-features.) Essentially, partial control occurs when the
subject of the higher clause is singular but PRO is plural, which is allowed under certain
conditions because of the particular way that agreement relations work between the
higher and lower clause.20
Without going into the details of Landau's analysis, I will just show that there is a
coherent way to posit a plural version of PROj, which will yield the right interpretation
for partial control cases. Borrowing an idea of Kratzer (2006, to appear), I assume that
the plural version of PROj refers to the unique salient group containing the judge, rather
than the judge alone. A lexical entry for this plural version of PROj, which I'll call
PROJ-PLUR, is given in (66).
(66) 
-PROJ-PLURIC; w,tj = Gc(),
where Gc(x) = the salient group containing x in context c
For example, the partial control structure in (67a), which contains PROJ-PLUR, is predicted
to have the meaning in (67b).
(67) (a) Mary wants [PROJ-PLUR to meet]
(b) I[(a)]•c; w,t = [want]w,tj
( [lw" . [kt" . [kj" . [PROJ-PLUR to meet] c ; w",t "j" ] ] ]) (Mary)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eWantw,t,Mary: Gc(x) meets in w' at t'
This says that Mary wants to meet is true iff for all of Mary's want alternatives <w',t',x>,
the salient group containing x meets in w' at t', which captures the "partial" nature of the
control. It also correctly predicts that the attitude is still de se in the relevant sense, as
seen in example (65) above.
20 This has to do with whether the infinitive clause contains tense or not; thus Landau links the possibility
of partial control to the possibility of having a certain kind of temporal mismatch between the higher and
lower clauses. The relevant kind of mismatch is allowed with partial control verbs such as want (i), but not
with exhaustive control verbs such as manage (ii).
(i) Yesterday, John wanted to solve the problem tomorrow. (Landau, 2000, Ch. 1, no. 1 ib)
(ii) * Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem tomorrow. (Landau, 2000, Ch. 1, no. 11 a)
I leave it to future work to determine to what extent Landau's account of the distribution of partial control
could be adapted to fit the judge-dependent view I suggest, once my view is modified to correctly capture
the temporal interpretation of control clauses (see note 18).
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Another possibility is to modify the lexical meanings of the relevant verbs, again
using Kratzer's notion of the salient group containing an individual. There are two ways
to do this, which I will illustrate using want. The first way is to build the plurality into the
statement about the attitude holders want alternatives, as in (68).
(68) [[wantj]w 't ' = [p<s,<i,et>> . [hZ e. V<w',t',x>eWantw,t,z: p(w')(t')(G(x))=l] ]
where Wantw,t,z = {<w',t',x>: it fits with what z wants in w at t for z to be
x in w' at t'}, and G(x) is the contextually salient group containing x.
This says that "z wants p" is true iff in all of z's want alternatives <w',t',x>, p is true at
world w', time t', and the judge that is the contextually relevant group including x.
The second way of doing this is to keep the basic lexical meaning for want and build
the plurality into the notion of want alternatives, as in (69).
(69) [wantj]w 't j = [Xp<s,<i,et>>. [LZ e. V<w',t',X>eWantw,t,z: p(w')(t')(X)=l] ]
where Wantw,t,z = {<w',t',X>: it fits with what z wants in w at t for G(z) to
be X in w' at t'}, and G(x) is the contextually salient group containing x.
This says that "z wants p" is true iff for all the triples <w',t',X> such that it fits with what
z wants for G(z) to be the group X in w' at t', p is true at <w',t',X>.
4.4. Non-Obligatory Control
A significant amount of discussion in the literature has gone to analyzing so-called non-
obligatory control: cases where PRO does not seem to have an overt controller in the
same sentence or where its apparent controller is in a structural position that is not
expected to be able to enter into the right syntactic relation with PRO (see, e.g., Bresnan,
1982; Williams, 1992; Kawasaki, 1993; Landau, 2000, 2001). Some examples are given
in (70).21 (I have underlined the apparent controller and the relevant non-finite clause.)
(70) (a) Tom felt sheepish. Pinching those elephants was foolish.
(Adler, 2006, no. 24a; citing Bresnan, 1982)
21 TO simplify matters, I am focusing on cases where PRO has a referential interpretation rather than an
arbitrary interpretation. I leave it as an open question how much of what I say about the referential cases
could be extended to arbitrary or generic cases.
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(b) Frankly, I'm worried about Mary. ... Getting herself photographed with
those starving wolves was dangerous.
(Adler, 2006, no. 24b; citing Bresnan, 1982)
(c) John said to Mary that it would be easy to prepare herself for the exam.
(Adler, 2006, no. 26)
As with extensional adjuncts, it is generally not possible to treat these as containing
PROj. However, there is a sub-type of apparent non-obligatory control involving
predicates of personal taste that can be analyzed this way given certain assumptions.
Epstein (1984) observes that in examples like (71), the implicit subject of the infinitival
clause (to play baseball) is the same person whose experience is evaluated by the
predicatefun. He intended this example to be interpreted generically, but it also has an
interpretation where it says that it's fun, for the judge, for the judge to play baseball, and I
will focus on this interpretation. (On this interpretation, a speaker S can assert (71)
provided that S playing baseball is fun for S, and a hearer H will accept it if H playing
baseball is fun for H.)
(71) It is fun to play baseball.
(Epstein, 1984, no. 1)
Epstein observes further that if the implicit argument offun is made explicit, the required
link remains, as in (72), which seems to mean that it's fun, for Lucy, for Lucy herself to
play baseball.
(72) It is fun for Lucy to play baseball.
(Epstein, 1984, no. 3)
(Actually, (72) is ambiguous, but Epstein intends it on the reading equivalent to Playing
baseball is fun for Lucy; I will return to the second reading below.)
However,I if both of the implicit elements are made explicit, they do not have to
corefer, as shown in (73).
(73) It is fun for Lucy for Joe to play baseball.
(Epstein, 1984, no. 9)
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Note that the same pattern holds for gerunds, so (74)-(76) pattern with (71)-(73),
respectively.
(74) Playing baseball is fun.
(75) Playing baseball is fun for Lucy.
(76) Joe playing baseball is fun for Lucy.
I will put aside questions about the structure and interpretation of copular sentences, and
will simply assume that in these sentences fun takes two arguments in the semantics: the
gerund (or infinitival), and an expression giving the person whose experience is relevant
(either PROj or a referential argument).22 In my analysis of predicates of personal taste in
Chapter 2, I assumed that both arguments offun are individuals, but it is straightforward
to extend this so that one of the arguments can be a proposition. For simplicity, I will
assume a second lexical entry forfun along the lines of (77) (and similar meanings for
other predicates of personal taste).
(77) [fun 2  tj = [XP<s,<i,et>> . [ke . it is fun for y in w at t if p(w)(t)(y) = 1] ]
This says that "p is fun for y" is true iff y enjoys the fact (when it holds) that p is true as
judged by y. My claim is essentially that fun denotes a relation between individuals and
propositions that has to do with the proposition as judged by that individual.23
Now, consider the example from (74) (and similarly (71)). If both of the implicit
elements are PROj, as in (78a), then the meaning is (78b) (under the assumptions I
outlined above).
22 The approach I will take here is based closely on suggestions by Irene Heim (p.c.). It is also somewhat
reminiscent of Chierchia & Jacobson's (1986) analysis of verbs like bother, prove, and make in the so-
called Super Equi construction, except of course that I treat the non-finite clause as a judge-dependent
proposition rather than as a property.
The lexical entry in (77) has the stipulative quality of simply shifting the judge parameter to the "y"
argument without a mediating attitude, which I have avoided in other cases. It might be possible to get
around this by defining a notion of a person's "fun alternatives," which are triples <w',t',x> such that it's
compatible with the person's idea of what is fun for them to be x in w' at t'. Then "p is fun for y" would be
true iff all of the triples <w',t',x> where p is true are among y's fun alternatives. Note that the quantification
goes in the reverse direction compared to the meanings of want and think. (Thanks to Kai von Fintel, p.c.
for discussion of this point). It is not clear to me, though, that fun really has this kind of modal component
to its meaning, and so I leave this as an open question.
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(78) (a) [PROj Playing baseball] [is fun2 PROj]
(b) [(a)]]wtJ = [fun2lw'tJ ( [Xw' . [Xt'. [Xj'. [PROj playing baseball]1w' 't'J']] )
( [PROJi]w tj )
= 1 iff it is fun for j in w at t ifj plays baseball in w at t
This says that it is fun, for the judge, for the judge to play baseball, which seems to be
correct.
Now consider (75) (and similarly (72)), where the argument offun is made explicit.
Again assuming that the implicit subject is PROJ, as in (79a), the predicted meaning is
(79b).
(79) (a) [PROj Playing baseball] [is fun 2 for Lucy]
(b) [(a)l] w t = Ifun 2Jw 'tj ( [w' . [Xt' . [Xj' . [PROj playing baseball]Jw',t' i']] )
(Lucy)
= it is fun for Lucy in w at t if Lucy plays baseball in w at t
This says that it is fun, for Lucy, for Lucy herself to play baseball, which again seems to
be correct.
This also predicts that (71) and (74) should have a reading where fun is evaluated
with respect to a salient referent, in which case the implied subject of the infinitive or
gerund has to be the same individual. This kind of interpretation does indeed seem to be
possible in (80), which can mean that it's fun for the cat if the cat hunts mice.
(80) [Context: Sam is watching his cat hunt mice, and says:]
Look! I guess hunting mice is fun.
Now consider the case where both arguments are made explicit, as in (76) and (73). The
structure and predicted meaning for (76) is given in (8 l1a-b).
(81) (a) [Joe Playing baseball] [is fun2 for Lucy]
(b) I(a)]]w,' t = I[fun 2] ',t'j ( [Xw' . [t' . [Xj' . [Joe playing baseball]]w 't'J'] )
(Lucy)
= 1 iff it is fun for Lucy in w at t if Joe plays baseball in w at t
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This says that it is fun for Lucy if Joe plays baseball, which again seems to be correct.
Finally, to complete the paradigm, we need to look at cases where the subject of the
non-finite clause is made explicit and the argument of the predicate of personal taste is
left implicit, as in (83).
(82) ?? Joe playing baseball is fun.
The prediction is that (82) should be able to mean that it's fun for the judge when Joe
plays baseball. For some reason, (82) sounds a bit odd to me; however, to the extent that
it is acceptable it clearly has this meaning, rather than meaning that Joe enjoys playing
baseball. Some better examples are given in (83).
(83) (a) It's fun for the Yankees to get beaten so thoroughly.
(b) ? The Yankees getting beaten so thoroughly is fun.
(Kai von Fintel, p.c.)
Notice that (83a) is ambiguous (as was (72)), between a masochistic reading where the
Yankees enjoy being beaten (perhaps within the fantasy world of their rival Red Sox
fans) and a second one where seeing the Yankees lose is fun for the judge. The first
reading comes from a structure where the two arguments offun arefor the Yankees and to
get beaten so thoroughly, and the second reading comes from a structure where the two
arguments offun are PROj and the sentential expressionfor the Yankees to get beaten so
thoroughly. The second reading is the intended one, and is clearly the more plausible one
in this case. On this reading, the prediction is that a speaker could assert (83a) provided
that it's fun for them for the Yankees to get beaten, and a hearer could object if it isn't
fun for them. This is borne out, as seen in (84).
(84) Sam: It's fun for the Yankees to get beaten so thoroughly.
Sue: No, it's not. It's much more fun when there's a close game.
For some reason, the version with a to-infinitival still sounds better than the version with
a gerund in (83b), but again to the extent that (83b) is acceptable it clearly has the same
meaning.
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To sum up, then, while non-obligatory control cannot generally be reduced to cases of
PROj, Epstein's examples do seem to be amenable to this analysis. I leave it to future
work to investigate whether any other cases of non-obligatory control can be analyzed
along similar lines.
5. Multiple occurrences of PROJ
5.1. An Apparent Problem
In the preceding sections I have proposed that the same mechanism used for predicates of
personal taste -judge dependency, in the form of PROj - can also be used to explain the
obligatory de se interpretation in control structures. Specifically, for at least a subset of
control structures, I have proposed that what has been called PRO is actually the same as
the item PROj that I posited to be a possible implicit argument of predicates of personal
taste. If judge dependency in predicates of personal taste uses the same mechanism as
these cases of control, we might expect them to interact in a seamless way. For example,
we should expect to find sentences of the general form in (85), where the subject of the
infinitive clause and the implicit argument of the predicate of personal taste are both
PROj, and thus where it is intuitively clear that they corefer.
(85) X tried }PROj to be fun )PROi
wants tasty
It turns out to be difficult to construct such examples, because things that have the
potential to be tasty or fun - cakes, cat food, parties, roller coasters, games, and so on -
don't tend to be the kind of entities that have either attitudes (de se or otherwise) or
sensory and psychological experiences such as taste and enjoyment. For this reason, it is
not surprising that (86) is odd.
(86) # The cake wants to be tasty.
However, relevant examples can be constructed if we are creative enough with the
context. In some types of fiction and fairy tales all sorts of normally inanimate objects
can walk, talk, and have feelings. We might imagine something along the lines of the
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animated kitchen utensils in Disney's Beauty and the Beast, or one of the more obscure
"Oz" books by L. Frank Baum, where a magician creates a powder that will bring to life
any object it is sprinkled on (giving rise to, among other things, a talking, flying sofa). In
my experience of these stories, typically these sorts of odd creatures don't eat, but if they
can magically develop the kind of vocal apparatus needed to produce spoken human
language, presumably they could magically develop some kind of digestive system as
well. Given this creative license, then, we can construct appropriate examples.
First, imagine a magical living cake named Cakey. Cakey is able to walk, talk, think,
feel, and even eat; his diet consists mainly of flour, sugar, and eggs, as you might
imagine, or instant cake mix when he's on the run, plus regular leavening supplements.
Fortunately for Cakey, it doesn't hurt him at all if someone cuts a slice of him and eats it
- it causes more of a tickling sensation - and he can regenerate the missing piece
provided he eats an adequate diet. In fact, he needs to regularly have pieces eaten and
regenerated in order to stay fresh and moist and generally in good health. This means that
if no one is around to take a slice, he has to cut off pieces of himself, and either eat them
or throw them away. One might expect him to be squeamish about self-cannibalism, but
actually he objects much more strongly to having dried-up pieces of his own body lying
around, and thus usually goes for the option of eating pieces of himself even though,
oddly enough, they always taste terrible to him. Now consider the story in (87).24
(87) [Context: Cakey woke up one morning and realized that no one had taken a slice of him
in almost a week. He was starting to get stale and was feeling achy and lethargic. He
called his friends to see if they would come by and have a slice, but none of them were
home except Sam, who had just gone on a diet. Since he had no other choice, Cakey went
to the kitchen and cut off a few small pieces of himself, which he then ate. As usual, the
pieces tasted terrible to him. This was very frustrating because all of his friends who had
tasted slices of him had always enjoyed them.]
(a) # This was very frustrating. Cakey wanted to be tasty!
(b) This was very frustrating. Cakey wanted to taste good to himself!
24 For readers familiar with the work of Douglas Adams (of Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy fame), Kai
von Fintel (p.c.) pointed out that Adams's Restaurant at the End of the Universe contains a similar story of
a genetically engineered cow who offers itself eagerly to diners. However, from what I can gather from a
brief survey of secondary sources, there is no mention in this story of the cow eating itself, which is a
crucial part of the scenario here.
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Sentence (87a) sounds odd in this context. It seems to mean that Cakey wants to taste
good to someone else (or perhaps to other people in general), which is infelicitous given
the fact that he already knows he tastes good to everyone who has ever tried a slice of
him, besides himself. In this case, the problem is not that it's pragmatically implausible
for Cakey to taste himself, since, for one thing, we have set up a context where he
actually does so, and, for another, the sentence is perfectly acceptable with an explicit to
himself as in (87b).
A less exotic example can be constructed with the predicate fun, since people are
sometimes described as being fun in a way similar to games or parties. If other people
can find someone fun, then there seems to be no reason why they can't find themselves
fun. However, consider (88).
(88) [Context: Sue hates spending time alone. When she's with other people, they always
seem to enjoy her company, appreciating her stories and laughing at her jokes, but she
just can't ever seem to entertain herself, and wishes that she could.]
(a) # Sue wants to be fun.
(b) (?) Sue wants to be fun for herself.
Again, (88a) sounds odd in this context. It could mean that Sue wants other people to find
her fun, but in the context it's given that she already knows that they do. When an
explicitfor herself is added as in (88b), the sentence sounds much better.25
So far, nothing in my analysis would predict that (87a) and (88a) cannot have the
reading where tasty or fun takes PROj. My view predicts that one possible structure for
(88a), for example, is (89a), which would have the meaning in (89b).
(89) (a) Sue [wants [PROj to be fun PROj] ]
(b) [I(89a)i]w tJ = I[want]]w' tJ
( [Xw" . [Xt" . [fj" . [PROj to be fun PROj]w",t"j ] ] ) (Sue)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>eWantw,t,sue: x is fun for x in w' at t'
25 For some reason, (88b) doesn't sound perfect to me either, although it's better than (88a). This may be
because it is more difficult to add an explicit argument tofun on the meaning that applies to people than on
the meaning that applies to parties and roller coasters. For example, it seems easier to say The roller
coaster is fun for Sue than Sam is fun for Sue.
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It seems to be an unexplained generalization, then, that in control sentences of the form
"x wants to be tasty/fun," the predicate of personal taste cannot be interpreted in a judge-
dependent way, which is to say it cannot take PROj. For the moment, I will refer to this
as the "double-PROj restriction," given in (90).
(90) Double-PRO, Restriction: In a clause of the form [PROj be PRED X],
where PRED is a predicate of personal taste such as tasty or fun and X is
the (silent or overt) argument of PRED, X • PROJ.
Below I will develop an explanation of the double-PROj restriction.
5.2. Solution
On the face of it, the double-PROj restriction seems to be a problem for my proposal that
PRO in these examples is PROj. If the implicit subject of the control clause and the
implicit argument of the predicate of personal taste are the same expression (PROj), refer
to the same object, and use the same semantic mechanism, they ought to go together in a
straightforward dovetailing way. However, there is another way to look at it. Notice that
in a structure of the form in (89a), the two instances of PROj are co-arguments of tasty,
and accordingly the first PROj c-commands the second within the clause (assuming that
the presence of the copula be is irrelevant). This is just the kind of configuration that
gives rise to Principle B violations.26 Therefore we can explain the double-PROj
restriction as an instance of Principle B.2 7 For simplicity I will assume a version of
Principle B given in (91).
(91) Principle B: A non-reflexive nominal expression cannot be a co-argument
of the same predicate as a coreferential nominal expression.
Along with more well-known facts, Principle B predicts that (92) cannot have an
interpretation where him refers to Cakey; to get that interpretation the reflexive himself
26 Readers unfamiliar with Principles A, B, and C of the Binding Theory may refer to any syntax textbook
in the Government/Binding framework, such as Haegeman (1994, Ch. 4). Essentially, though, Principle B
is postulated to capture the fact that in a sentence like (i), he and him cannot refer to the same person, and
that for this interpretation, the reflexive himself must be used as in (ii).
(i) * Hei likes himi.
(ii) Hei likes himself.
27 This was suggested to me by Irene Heim (p.c.).
162
CHAPTER 4
must be used instead, as in (92b). The case of (93a-b) is exactly parallel (her cannot refer
to Sue).
(92) (a) * Cakeyi tastes terrible to himi.
(b) Cakeyi tastes terrible to himself1.
(93) (a) * Suei wants to be fun for heri.
(b) (?) Suei wants to be fun for herselfi.
The structure that would be needed to get the double-PROj interpretation in (87a) and
(88a) are given in (94) and (95), respectively.
(94) * Cakey wanted [PROj to be tasty PROj]
(95) * Sue wants [PROj to be fun PROJ]
The embedded clauses in (94)-(95) are exactly analogous to the sentences in (92a) and
(93a) in that the two instances of PROj are coreferential (for any world-time-judge triple
<w,tj>, they both refer to j) and are co-arguments of tasty or fun.
Note that two instances of PROj can occur in the same clause when they are not co-
arguments. Example (96a), of the type based on Epstein (1984) and discussed in Section
4.4 above, is a case in point. On the relevant interpretation, it has the structure given
schematically in (96b)
(96) (a) Playing baseball is fun. [=(74)]
(b) [PROj playing baseball] is [fun PROJ]
In (96b), the first PROj is an argument ofplay(ing), while the second is an argument of
fun, so they are not co-arguments.
Similarly, (97a) has an interpretation on which it has roughly the structure in (97b).
The first instance of PROj is an argument of eat whereas the second is part of an
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adjectival phrase modifying cake, and so is not itself an argument of eat. The situation is
similar for (98)-(99).28
(97) (a) Sam wants to eat a tasty cake.
(b) Sam [vP wants [s PROj to eat [DP a [tasty PROj] cake ] ] ]
(98) (a) Sam wants to eat a cake that's tasty.
(b) Sam [vP wants [s PROJ to eat [DP a cake [cP that t is tasty PROj ] ] ]
(99) (a) Sam wants to bring a tasty cake to the potluck.
(b) Sam [vp wants [s PROJ to bring [DP a [tasty PROJ] cake] [pp to the
potluck] ] ]
A possible interpretation of (97a) and (98a), indeed the most natural one, is that Sam
wants to eat a cake that tastes good to him (Sam himself). A more obvious interpretation
for (99a) might be that Sam wants to bring a cake to the potluck that will taste good to the
guests in general, thus showing off his baking skills; on this reading tasty would take a
silent argument referring to something like the group of guests at the party. However, we
could also imagine that Sam knows that he has unusual taste (or that the other guests do)
and thinks his cake might be the only thing at the potluck that he will like; in this context,
he might only care about the cake tasting good to him, and (99a) could still be used in
this context. Note that overt non-reflexive pronouns are also possible in these
configurations, as shown in (100)_-(101).29
(100) Sami wants to eat a cake that tastes good to himi.
(101) Sami wants to bring a cake that tastes good to himi to the potluck.
In the end, then, the restriction on having two occurrences of PROJ is not surprising. In
fact, if PRO in these constructions were not the same item as PROj, it is difficult to see
what would rule out the relevant readings. The only remaining thing to explain is why
28 The importance of these facts were pointed out to me by Irene Heim (p.c.).
29 (100) has to stand in as the analogue to both (97) and (98) because tasty does not allow explicit
arguments in prenominal position. (For example, *a tasty to me cake is ungrammatical.)
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PROJ does not have a reflexive form, at least in English. (It would be interesting to see if
there is evidence of such an item in any other languages.) I leave this question open.
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Chapter 5
Imagination and Moorean Paradoxes
1. Introduction
In this chapter I will discuss puzzles related to Moore's paradox which crucially involve
judge-dependent items and attitude reports using predicates like imagine. I will start by
looking at the semantics of imagine in Section 2, where it will be treated as an attitude
with some similarities to think or believe. Then in Section 3 I will introduce a puzzle
brought up by Yalcin (2005) for epistemic modals, discuss Yalcin's proposed solution,
and bring up a similar puzzle which is not helped by Yalcin's system. In Section 4, I
propose a solution to both puzzles, which involves some changes to the semantics of
imagine proposed in Section 2.
2. Imagine
I will start by looking at the meaning of imagine. I will focus on its use in things like
daydreaming and fantasy, where the attitude holder is doing something like building up a
fictional situation, perhaps thinking about the experiences they would have in that
situation. Examples of this are given in (1) and (2).
(1) [Context: A recording of a guided meditation.]
Close your eyes. Imagine that you're in an open field. The sun is
shining....
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(2) [Context: A teacher giving a lesson in living history.]
Imagine that you're the child of a peasant farmer. You live in a small
cottage with your mother, father, some aunts and uncles, grandparents, and
your brothers and sisters. ...
These use the imperative, so that the attitude holder is the addressee, and I will tend to
use the imperative to evoke this interpretation. I will also focus on examples where the
embedded clause is indicative rather than subjunctive (as in imagine that you were in an
open field), but this is less crucial.
There is a second use of imagine that seems to mean something very close to believe
or conclude. For example, if our friend Fred was scheduled to arrive at the airport three
hours ago and has a short drive home, I might utter (3).
(3) I imagine Fred is home by now.
Unlike in (1)-(2), the speaker in (3) is not thinking about an experience involving Fred
being home. Imagination seems to be involved instead in the process of coming to
believe that Fred is at home (for example, by imagining the length of time it would take
for Fred to get off the plane, collect his luggage, and drive home). I will put aside this
second use. For the moment, I will also put aside the use of imagine where it takes a
nominal argument, as in imagine a bear.
Going back to the use exemplified in (1)-(2), now let's look at what happens when a
sentence containing a judge-dependent item is embedded under imagine. I will start with
predicates of personal taste because their behavior is relatively clear, then look at
epistemic modals. First consider (4)-(5).
(4) Imagine that you're eating a cake for dessert, and it tastes good.
(5) Imagine that the cake sitting in front of you tastes good.
The attitude holder (in this case, the addressee) is the person whose taste experience is
relevant. That is, to imagine that a cake tastes good is to imagine that it tastes good to
oneself, just as to think a cake tastes good is (roughly) to think it tastes good to oneself.
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Note that, also as with think, the predicate of personal taste can be linked to a salient
referent, as in (6).
(6) Imagine that your cat is eating cat food, and it tastes good.
I assume, as before, that tastes good in (4)-(5) takes PROj as its argument, and tastes
good in (6) takes a silent argument referring to the cat.
It seems to be more difficult to embed epistemic modals. For example, the sentences
in (7) seem a bit odd out of the blue.
(7) (a) ?? Imagine that it might be raining.
(b) ?? Imagine that the butler must be the murderer.
My suspicion is that imagining something usually requires conjuring up a vivid image or
experience, and knowledge states are hard to have a vivid experience of. (Something
more may need to be said to capture this, but I'll put this aside.) If more material is added
that brings out the importance of the mental state, as in (8), the sentences become more
natural.
(8) (a) Imagine that it might be raining, but you're not sure.
(b) Imagine that the butler must be the murderer, but you have no way to
prove it.
In (8a-b), the epistemic modals might and must are clearly linked to the attitude holder.
For example, roughly speaking, (8b) tells the addressee to imagine knowing that the
butler is the murderer but not being able to prove it to others.
As expected, epistemic modals cannot be linked to a salient referent under imagine,
such as Mary in (9a) or Sherlock in (9b). For example, the addressee cannot comply with
(9a) while also imagining that he or she knows that it isn't raining.
(9) (a) Imagine that it might be raining, but Mary isn't sure.
[might # compatible with Mary's knowledge]
(b) Imagine that the butler must be the murderer, but Sherlock can't prove it.
[must # follows from Sherlock's knowledge]
169
CHAPTER 5
Thus imagine seems to manipulate the judge parameter in the same way that think does,
so it makes sense to treat them in similar ways. For think, I exploited the self-locating
nature of doxastic alternatives to manipulate the judge parameter. I would like to do the
same thing for imagine. I will define the "imagination alternatives" of a person x in a
world and time w and t as the set of world-time-individual triples <w',t',y> such that it is
compatible with what x is imagining in w at t that x is y in w' at t'. This is repeated in
(10), and a lexical meaning for imagine using this notion is given in (11).
(10) Imagination alternatives:
Imaginew,t,z = {<w',t',x>: it is compatible with what z is imagining in w at
t that he/she/it is x in w' at t' }
(11) [imagine]]w'tj = [RP<s,<i,et>> . [ze . V<w',t',x>eImaginew,t,z:
p(w')(t')(x) = 1]]
In a sense, of course, this doesn't tell us very much about what it means to imagine
something, except that it bears formal similarities to belief. But it does predict that judge-
dependent items embedded under imagine will be linked to the attitude holder. For
example, "Sam imagines that the cake is tasty" (where tasty combines with PROj) has the
meaning in (12).
(12) [Sam imagines that the cake is tasty PROi] w'Itd = [[imagine]]wtJ
( [the cake is tasty PROJi] w' tJ ) ( Sam)
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>lImaginew,t,sam: I[the cake is tasty PROJ]w'' t''x = 1
= 1 iff V<w',t',x>elmaginew,t,sam: the cake tastes good to x in w' at t'
This says that Sam imagines that the cake is tasty iff every triple <w',t',x> compatible
with what Sam is imagining (i.e., with the fictional situation he is building up) is such
that the cake tastes good to x in w' at t' - in other words, if Sam imagines that the cake
tastes good to him.
Let me finish by noting that I have focused on examples in the imperative in order to
bring out a particular interpretation of imagine, but this interpretation is also generally
available in declarative contexts, as illustrated in (13).
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(13) (a) Whenever Sam feels tense, he imagines that he's back in his home town.
(b) Mary was bored and tired of working, so she leaned back in her chair and
imagined that she was a world-famous gymnast.
3. The Puzzles
In this section I will introduce the two puzzles to be addressed. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I
discuss the puzzle brought up by Yalcin (2005) and his proposed solution. Then in
Section 3.3 I introduce a second puzzle that Yalcin's system does not solve.
3.1. Yalcin's Puzzle
The starting point for Yalcin's puzzle is Moore's paradox, exemplified by sentences like
(14).
(14) # It's raining but I don't know that it's raining.1
The notable fact about sentences like (14), known as Moore's paradox, is that they're not
logically contradictory (it's perfectly possible for it to be raining without the speaker
knowing it), and yet they sound contradictory. Moore's paradox is well known, and so is
its solution: although a sentence of the form "p but I don't know that p" is not logically
contradictory, it cannot be felicitously asserted in any context because it violates the
norm of assertion for a speaker to assert p while also asserting that they don't know that
p. This follows from any reasonable norm of assertion (including the one I have
proposed), along with the assumption that asserting a conjunction involves asserting its
conjuncts.
Yalcin (2005) discusses sentences like (15), which are also odd and contradictory-
sounding.2
(15) # It isn't raining but it might be raining.
1 I've changed and to but when this leads to a more natural sentence (or might be expected to do so). I
assume that the truth-conditional content of but is the same as and, or at least includes the meaning of and
(as well as possibly other content).
2 This is further evidence against a simple contextualist view of epistemic modals where the relevant
knowledge is simply that of some salient individual or group. As long as that individual or group does not
include the speaker, (15) ought to be perfectly acceptable on such a view.
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At first glance, (15) looks like another case of Moore's paradox: it is perfectly possible
that any particular person or group's epistemic state allows for the possibility that it's
raining even though in fact it isn't raining, but (15) cannot be asserted because the two
conjuncts put conflicting requirements on the speaker. That is, asserting it isn 't raining
requires that the speaker know (or believe) that it isn't raining, whereas asserting that it
might be raining requires that this not be the case. This follows from my view of
epistemic modals, as well as any view that requires the speaker to be part of the group
whose knowledge is relevant. However, as Yalcin points out, (15) is contradictory in a
more significant way: not only can it not be asserted in a matrix clause, as in (15), but it
cannot be embedded under imagine. Simple Moore-paradoxical sentences like (14), on
the other hand, become perfectly acceptable under imagine. To see the difference,
compare (16) to (17). 3
(16) Imagine that it's raining but you don't know that it's raining.
(based on Yalcin, 2005, no. 4)
(17) # Imagine that it isn't raining but it might be raining.
(based on Yalcin, 2005, no. 5)
While (16) sounds coherent and non-contradictory, (17) is just as bad as the
corresponding matrix case (15).
In summary, then, Yalcin's observation is that sentences of the form "not p but might
p" behave differently than traditional Moore-paradoxical sentences involving attitude
reports, as in "p but I don't know that p." Traditional Moore-paradoxical sentences
become acceptable when embedded under imagine, whereas Yalcin's sentences remain
unacceptable.
3 Yalcin's observation is actually the more general one that sentences like (15) cannot be "supposed,"
"conceived" of, "imagined," or "entertained" (Yalcin, 2005: p. 233). I will only be addressing the facts with
imagine, and leave it for future work to see whether the explanation I will offer can be extended to these
other attitudes.
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3.2. Yalcin's Account of Epistemic Modals
Yalcin (2005) proposes a theory of epistemic modals that is dynamic and probabilistic.4
It's dynamic in the sense that the meaning of sentences is given in terms of the effect they
have on the context set in a conversation, i.e., as context change potentials, but the
probabilistic nature of the account is more crucial. On Yalcin's view, the context set is a
set of "credence functions" rather than a set of worlds or of indices. A credence function
maps propositions (including worlds) to probability values, and the set of them in the
context set together determine the degree to which different propositions are accepted in
the context. For example, if it is completely open in a context whether a proposition p
holds, then for every value n between 0 and 1, there will be some credence function in the
context set that maps p to n. On the other hand, if p is completely accepted in a context,
then all of the credence functions in the context set will map p to the probability value 1.
(If a proposition p is completely ruled out, then all of the credence functions in the
context set will map p to 0, which is the same as "not p" being completely accepted.) The
content of an attitude such as imagine is treated similarly as a set of credence functions.
Yalcin treats epistemic modals essentially as modulators of force. On his view,
normal, non-modal assertions contain a silent assertion operator, and a successful
assertion of p restricts the context set to credence functions that map p to 1. In declarative
utterances with epistemic modals such as might, on the other hand, the modal takes the
place of the assertion operator. A successful declarative utterance of "might p" restricts
the context set to credence functions that map p to a probability value greater than 0.
Similarly, a successful declarative utterance of "probably p" restricts the context set to
credence functions that map p to a probability value greater than 0.5.
On Yalcin's view, then, the reason that it is impossible to make a declarative
utterance of the form "not p but might p" is not because it violates a conversational norm
but because it would lead to an empty context set. For example, in (15), repeated in (18),
the first part of the utterance has the form [assert [not [it be raining] ] ], which restricts
4 Yalcin cites views of epistemic modals as modulators of assertoric force (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953;
Toulmin, 1956), Bayesian models of belief (e.g., Jeffrey, 1987; Kaplan, 1996), and Veltman's (1996)
dynamic account of epistemic modals as precursors to his view.
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the context set to credence functions that map the proposition that it's raining to 0. The
second part has the form [might [it be raining]], which restricts the context set to
credence functions that map the proposition that it's raining to a value greater than 0.
These restrictions are contradictory - that is, they will always lead to the empty context
set - and so the utterance is impossible.
(18) # It isn't raining but it might be raining.
It is impossible to imagine something of the form "not p but might p" for a similar reason
since the content of a propositional attitude is also treated as a set of credence functions.
Imagining "not p" restricts this set to credence functions that map p to 0, and imagining
"might p" restricts this set to functions that map p to a value greater than 0, and so both
cannot be imagined together.5 This explains the impossibility of (17), for example,
repeated in (19).
(19) # Imagine that it isn't raining but it might be raining.
(based on Yalcin, 2005, no. 5)
For traditional Moore-paradoxical sentences such as (14), repeated in (20), Yalcin retains
a standard pragmatic explanation. In this case the two conjuncts do not put conflicting
requirements on the context set, but it would violate the norm of assertion to assert that
it's raining but that the speaker doesn't know it.
(20) # It's raining but I don't know that it's raining.
When a Moore-paradoxical sentence is embedded under imagine as in (16), repeated in
(21), there are no relevant norms of conversation to be violated, and so the sentences
become acceptable.
(21) Imagine that it's raining but you don't know that it's raining.
(based on Yalcin, 2005, no. 4)
5 There is a technical problem with Yalcin's system here. Propositions themselves do not put requirements
on credence functions - only the assertion operator and epistemic modals do that. Thus putting "not p"
under imagine should not by itself restrict the set of credence functions representing what is imagined.
Yalcin could get around this by assuming that the assertion operator is embedded under imagine, but it is
not clear if he makes that assumption.
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3.3. A New Moorean Puzzle
Given my semantic and pragmatic analysis of predicates of personal taste, we can also
construct apparently Moore-paradoxical cases like (22).
(22) # The cake tastes good but it doesn't taste good to me.
Provided tastes good is given the interpretation where it takes PROj, the sentence does
indeed sound contradictory when asserted. (This judgment is complicated somewhat by
the fact that tastes good could also potentially take a silent referential argument, but I
think it's clear that the judge-dependent reading also exists, and is contradictory.) This is
expected on my view of the norm of assertion, since in order for a speaker to assert (22),
they would have to believe that the cake tastes good to them and also believe that it
doesn't.
Like Yalcin's cases, though, (22) remains contradictory when it is embedded under
imagine (or, I should say, there remains a relevant reading that is contradictory). We can
see this in (2:3).
(23) # Imagine that the cake tastes good but it doesn't taste good to you.
As I discussed in Section 2, it seems that to imagine that a cake tastes good is to imagine
that it tastes good to oneself; thus (23) seems to be instructing the addressee to imagine
that the cake both tastes good to them and does not taste good to them, which is
impossible.
To summarize, then, we have considered three types of sentences that are potentially
examples of Moore's paradox, which I'll call types I-III. Type I is standard Moore-
paradoxical sentences such as It's raining but I don't know that it's raining or It's raining
but I think it isn 't raining. Type II is Yalcin's sentences, where p is replaced with its
negation and the attitude report is replaced with an epistemically modalized sentence.
Type III is like Yalcin's cases except that the epistemically modalized sentence is
replaced with one containing a predicate of personal taste (with PROj as its argument)
and the simple sentence is replaced with a sentence containing a predicate of personal
taste with an explicit argument. The three cases are rendered schematically in (24)-(26),
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respectively. ("PRED" stands for a predicate of personal taste and "&" indicates any
conjunction including but.)
(24) Type I: p & I don't know that p (Moore's paradox)
Example:
# It's raining but I don't know that it's raining.
(25) Type II: not p & might p (Yalcin's puzzle)
Example:
# It isn't raining but it might be raining.
(26) Type III: X PRED + X not PRED to me
Example:
# The cake tastes good but it doesn't taste good to me.
We have seen that the three cases show two different patterns: Type I sentences become
acceptable when embedded under imagine, while types II and III do not.
4. Proposal
In this section I will try to solve both puzzles together. I will start in Section 4.1 by giving
what I believe is the correct empirical generalization. In Sections 4.2-4.3, I discuss a
distinction that is often drawn between two ways of imagining which can be
characterized as objective (or "from the outside") and subjective (or "from the inside"). I
propose that imagine is ambiguous between a subjective and objective reading, and that
subjective and objective imagine take different kinds of propositions as arguments. In
Section 4.4, I add assumptions about pronouns that appear with imagine and dream with
a particular kind of de se interpretation. Then in Section 4.5 I show how my analysis and
assumptions help lead us towards a unified solution to the two puzzles. I close in Section
4.6 by connecting my discussion of Moorean puzzles with my judge-dependent approach
to control constructions from Chapter 4.
4.1. The Generalization
On a view like Yalcin's, there is no reason to expect a sentence like It isn 't raining but it
might be raining (Type II) to have the same behavior as one like The cake tastes good but
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it doesn 't taste good to me (Type III). The two have no obvious feature in common other
than their similar behavior. In the system that I have proposed, though, Type II and III
sentences do share a property that distinguishes them from Type I sentences, namely that
of expressing judge-dependent propositions. To see this, first recall that a non-judge-
dependent proposition is simply one that is a constant function with respect to the judge
parameter. For example, it's raining does not depend on the judge parameter, since it's
true at <w,t,j> iff it's raining in w at t. Second, note that if two independent, non-
tautologous, non-contradictory propositions are conjoined with truth-functional and, the
conjunction will be judge-dependent if even one of the conjuncts is judge-dependent, and
will be non-judge-dependent only if both of the conjuncts are non-judge-dependent.6
Now, in the examples of Type I that we have considered (and that Yalcin considers),
the first conjunct is always non-judge-dependent (for example, it's raining). All belief
and knowledge reports are non-judge-dependent as well, even if the embedded clause is
judge-dependent, because of the way the attitude predicates manipulate the judge
parameter of the embedded clause. This means that Type I sentences are conjunctions of
two non-judge-dependent propositions, and so they are non-judge-dependent. On the
other hand, any sentence with an unembedded judge-dependent item, such as an
epistemic modal or a predicate of personal taste taking PROS, is judge-dependent (for
example, it might be raining or the cake tastes good). This means that Type II and Type
III sentences have one judge-dependent conjunct, and so are themselves judge-dependent.
(In both cases the other conjunct is non-judge-dependent.)
As an empirical hypothesis, then, I suggest that given a sentence that is potentially
Moore-paradoxical, whether it will become acceptable when embedded under imagine
depends on whether it is judge-dependent. If it is non-judge-dependent, it will become
acceptable, and if it is judge-dependent it will not.
6 Proof: [Part I] Suppose p and q are non-judge-dependent propositions. Then for any world w, time t, and
individuals j and j 2, p(w)(t)(j 1) = p(w)(t)(j 2) and q(w)(t)(j 1) = q(w)(t)(j 2), from which it follows that
[p&q](w)(t)(j ) = [p&q](w)(t)(j 2). [Part II] Now suppose p and q are independent propositions, and p isjudge-dependent. Then there is some world w, time t, and individuals j and j 2 such that p(w)(t)(j 1)= 1 and
p(w)(t)(j 2) = 0. Since q is independent of p, there must be some such choice of w, t, and jl such that
q(w)(t)(j ) =1. It follows that [p&q](w)(t)(ji) = 1 and [p&q](w)(t)(j 2 ) = 0, therefore [p&q] is judge-
dependent.
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4.2. Two Ways of Imagining
It is common in philosophy to draw a distinction between imagining "from the inside"
and "from the outside."'7 The distinction is often illustrated using examples like (27)-(28).
(27) I imagined skiing down the hill.
(Ninan, 2007, no. 2a)
(28) I imagined that I was skiing down the hill.
(Ninan, 2007, no. 3a)
In the case of (27), what the speaker imagines is the experience of moving down the hill,
complete with sensory perceptions of the way the hill looks and feels as well as the
internal sense of fear or excitement. There is an interpretation of (28), on the other hand,
where the speaker might be imagining what it would look like, say, in a movie, if they
were skiing down the hill.
Here's another way to get at the distinction: in English, imagine can take DPs as
arguments, as in (29), as well as subjectless gerunds, as in (30a-b), in addition to
propositional CP arguments as in (31) and the cases we have looked at so far.
(29) Imagine a cat.
(30) (a) Imagine climbing up a tree.
(b) Imagine being a cat.
(31) Imagine that a cat is climbing up a tree.
When you imagine a thing, as in (29), you normally do something like build up a mental
image of that thing, looking at it from the outside. When you imagine doing something,
as in (30), you think of what the experience of doing that thing would feel like, from the
inside. When imagine takes a DP or subjectless gerund as an argument, the perspective
seems to be linked to the type of argument, with an external perspective going with DP
7 This has been discussed recently by, e.g., Ninan (2007) and Recanati (2007). (Also see, e.g., B. Williams,
1966; Nagel, 1974; Peacocke, 1985; Walton, 1990; Shoemaker, 1994; Velleman, 1996; Hill, 1997; M.
Martin, 2002; Higginbotham, 2003, all cited by Ninan.)
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arguments and an internal perspective going with gerund arguments. I suggest that with
CP (that-clause) arguments, either type of perspective is in principle available.
I assume that the two different kinds of perspectives reflect a real ambiguity in the
meaning of imagine. On one reading, which I will call the objective interpretation, a
person thinks about what a situation would look like from the outside. On the other
reading, which I will call subjective, they think about what it would be like to be a
particular individual in the situation. It's important here that the relevant difference is not
between imagining having an experience as yourself and imagining that you're somebody
else having the experience. If you imagine being a cat who is climbing up a tree, you are
still taking an internal perspective. The relevant difference is between imagining
experiencing a situation as an individual (yourself or someone else), and imagining a
situation completely from the outside. I assume further that the difference between the
subjective and objective interpretations of imagine has to do with the way they interact
with the judge parameter: subjective imagine is essentially the version of imagine defined
in Section 2, which crucially involves the judge; objective imagine, in contrast, crucially
does not involve the judge. (This is very similar in spirit to Ninan, 2007.)
4.3. Formalization of Objective and Subjective Imagine
Let me start with objective imagine, which I have suggested crucially does not involve
the judge parameter. To formalize this, I will start by defining an "objectivized" version
of a proposition, "pOBJ," in (32).
(32) Objectivized Propositions:
For a proposition p,
pOB = is defined iff Vw,t,j,j 2, p(w)(t)(j) = p(w)(t)(j 2)
If defined, pOBJ = [kw . [Xt . for all individuals j, p(w)(t)(j) = 1] ]
The objectivized version of a proposition p is only defined if p is non-judge-dependent; if
defined, it is simply the corresponding function from worlds and times - that is, what the
proposition would be on a standard view without the judge parameter. (In set terms, this
is a set of world-time pairs rather than world-time-individual triples.)
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I propose that objective imagine crucially involves the objectivized version of its
propositional argument. Since objectivized propositions are sets of world-time pairs,
then, we need to define a new notion of objective imagination alternatives. This is given
in (33). A lexical entry for objective imagine to go with this is given in (34).
(33) Objective imagination alternatives:
Imagine-OBJw,t,z = {<w',t'>: it is compatible with the situation that z is
imagining in w at t that it takes place in w' at t'}
(34) IimagineoJ]]w' t: = [Rp<s,<i,et>>: pOB' is defined. [,ze.
V<w',t'> Imagine-OBJw,t,z: pOBJ(w')(t') = 1]
In (33), I use "situation" to mean a situation or event in an intuitive sense. This could
perhaps be construed in Kratzer's (1989) sense as parts of worlds (with temporal
extensions), but I will not take a position on that. Taken together, what (33)-(34) say is
that "z imagines that p," on an objective interpretation, means that z is imagining a
situation or event, and all the world-time pairs compatible with that situation or event are
such that the objectivized version of p is true. It is a semantic presupposition of objective
imagine that the propositional argument must be non-judge-dependent.
Now I will turn to subjective imagine. The notion of imagination alternatives to be
used will be essentially the same as the one defined in (10) (Section 2), repeated in (35). I
will call these subjective imagination alternatives.
(35) Subjective imagination alternatives:
Imagine-SUBJw,t,z = {<w',t',x>: it is compatible with what z is imagining in
w at t that he/she/it is x in w' at t'}
The lexical entry for subjective imagine is given in (36). This is essentially the same
meaning from (11) in Section 2 except that it has a semantic presupposition that the
propositional argument cannot be objectivized - i.e., that it is judge-dependent.
(36) IimaginesuB>J] w't = [Xp<s,<i,et>>: POBJ iS NOT defined. [Xze .
V<w',t',x> Imagine-SUBJw,t,z: p(w')(t')(x) = 1] ]
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This says that "z imagines p" (on a subjective interpretation) means, roughly speaking,
that z imagines being a person x in a situation where p is true as judged by x, with the
extra requirement that it must potentially make a difference who the judge is.
I should mention that it may look like I have done the same work twice by defining
two kinds of imagination alternatives and then giving two lexical entries for imagine, but
this is only a matter of exposition. The definitions of imagination alternatives could be
built right into the lexical entries instead. (Similarly, the notion of doxastic alternatives
could be built into the meaning of think.) Of course, it is crucial that there are two
different lexical entries.
My view of subjective imagine immediately makes one prediction that seems far too
strong: it predicts that it is impossible to imagine any non-judge-dependent proposition
subjectively, or "from the inside." I propose, though, that non-judge-dependent
propositions can be taken as an argument of subjective imagine if they are converted into
judge-dependent propositions in a particular way. Specifically, I suggest that any typical,
non-judge-dependent proposition p can be systematically shifted to a proposition that is
true at a world-time-judge triple <w,tj> iffj knows that p is true. For example, the
proposition that it's raining, which is true at <w,tj> iff it's raining in w at t, would be
changed to a proposition that is true at <w,t,j> iffj knows that it's raining in w at t. I will
call the shifted version a "subjectivized" proposition, on analogy with the objectivized
propositions discussed above. The notion of a subjectivized proposition is defined in
(37); it involves epistemic alternatives, the definition of which is repeated in (38).
(37) Subjectivized Propositions:
For a proposition p,
p SUBJ,= [Xw. [Xt. [Xj . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: p(w')(t')(x) = 1] ] ]
(38) Epistemic alternatives:
Epistw,t,z = {<w',t',x>: it's compatible with what z knows in w at t that
he/she/it is x in w' at t'}
This means that it is possible to imagine subjectively that it's raining. In this case, the
argument of subjective imagine is not the regular proposition that it's raining, but the
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subjectivized proposition that it's raining; thus to imagine subjectively (or from the
inside) that it's raining is to imagine knowing that it's raining. Of course, it is also
possible to imagine objectively that it's raining, which is to imagine a situation or event
of rain. Note that on the formulation I have given, the notions of objectivized and
subjectivized propositions are not quite used in a parallel way (although this could
perhaps be changed). Objective imagine always takes a regular proposition (set of world-
time-individual triples), which must be non-judge-dependent, and then says something
about its objectivized version. On the other hand, subjective imagine can either take a
regular proposition that is judge-dependent or a proposition that has already been
subjectivized. In other words, on my view there needs to be something like an operator in
the grammar that applies to sentences to give them subjectivized meanings, whereas an
analogous operator for objectivized propositions is not needed.
4.4. Dream Pronouns and the Imagination-Self
I have just two more crucial assumptions to make, which have to do with the
interpretation of pronouns in sentences like Imagine that you don 't know thatp. To
motivate these assumptions, I need to start with a small digression on dream reports.
Examples like (39) were discussed by Lakoff (1972), and more recently by Percus &
Sauerland (2003b), Anand (2006), and others. (Lakoff's version involved Brigitte
Bardot.)
(39) I dreamt that I was James Dean and I kissed me.
Let's suppose that (39) is spoken by Sue. Then what it means is that Sue had a dream
where James Dean kissed Sue, but where the dream was from the perspective of James
Dean. In this kind of example, James Dean (the one doing the kissing) is sometimes
referred to as Sue's "dream self' and Sue (the one being kissed) as her "bodily
counterpart." Pronouns referring to the dream self can be called "dream pronouns." For
my purposes, the crucial observation about such examples is simply that in the clause I
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kissed me, first-person pronouns are used to refer both to the dream self (James Dean)
and to the bodily counterpart (Sue).8
Notice that similar examples can also be constructed with imagine. For example, (40)
can have an interpretation roughly equivalent to (41).9
(40) Imagine that you're James Dean and you're kissing you.
(41) Imagine being James Dean and kissing you.
In this case, 'we can say that the "imagination self' is again James Dean, and the bodily
counterpart of the imaginer is the addressee ("you"). Again, the crucial point for my
purposes is that you is used to refer to both the imagination self and the bodily
counterpart of the imaginer. I will call pronouns that refer to the imagination self
"imagination pronouns."
Now let's look again at an example of what I called Type III, from (26), repeated in
(42).
(42) # Imagine that the cake tastes good but it doesn't taste good to you.
The sentence becomes much more coherent in a context where the imagination self is not
the same as the bodily counterpart of the imaginer. For example, consider (43).
(43) Imagine that you're James Dean, and the cake tastes good but it doesn't
taste good to you.
(43) is acceptable provided that the underlined pronoun refers to the bodily counterpart of
the imaginer rather than the imagination self. For example, if (43) were addressed to Sue,
it would instruct her to conjure up a situation where the cake tastes good to James Dean
but doesn't taste good to Sue, and to imagine this from the perspective of James Dean.
s I will not be able to do justice here to the full range of phenomena and restrictions related to dream
pronouns. I refer the reader to Percus & Sauerland (2003a, 2003b) and Anand (2006, 2007), and leave it to
future work to see how their observations could be captured in a system like mine, and to what extent their
approaches to dream reports could be carried over to it.
9 Anand (2006) also suggests that imagine and dream may have similar behavior, though he focuses on the
case of dream, as much of the literature seems to do.
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The correct generalization about Type III sentences, then, is that they remain
unacceptable under imagine when they involve an imagination pronoun.
I will not give a formal account of imagination pronouns here, or dream pronouns for
that matter, and leave that to future work. All I will do here is make the following two
assumptions, with the hope that the foregoing discussion lends them some plausibility.
First, I assume that imagination pronouns only occur with subjective imagine. Second, I
assume that imagination pronouns satisfy the semantic principle in (44), where prOimag-self
stands for an imagination pronoun (one that refers to the imagination self). As before, I
am putting aside details of the interpretation of pronouns, and in particular I'm putting
aside how imagination pronouns come to refer to the imagination self.
(44) Imagination Self Principle:
For any world w' time t', and index k, 3x: <w',t',x>l Imagine-SUBJk <
<w',t',t[prOimag-selfk> E Imagine-SuBJk 10
This says that if it is compatible with what z is (subjectively) imagining in w at t that they
are in world w' at time t' (i.e., that they are some individual x in w' at t') then the triple
consisting of the world w', the time t', and the individual referred to by an imagination
pronoun must also be among their (subjective) imagination alternatives. (The converse
follows trivially, since the imagination self is an individual.) This is just another way of
saying that the imagination self is the individual that the imaginer is imagining
themselves to be. Again, I will not attempt to derive (44) from other principles, but
simply take it as a basic assumption.
One might think that I could achieve the same effect more straightforwardly by
simply assuming that imagination pronouns are morphological variants of PROj, that is,
that pronouns such as I, you, he, she, etc. are ambiguous between a regular version and
one that refers to the judge. The reason I have not suggested this is because imagination
pronouns do not have the same behavior as PROj and other judge-dependent items. In
particular, although they are obligatorily de se in an obvious sense, they are not subject to
the immediateness requirement that I discussed in Chapter 4. Recall, for example, that in
10 As in Chapter 3, Section 4, I use k as a variable for a world-time-individual triple.
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(45), the implicit subject of the lowest VP (to go to the party) is not only obligatorily de
se, but also must refer to Bill, not Sue. In other words, the subject of the lowest clause
(which I proposed is PROj), must be interpreted de se with respect to the most immediate
attitude holder.
(45) Sue wants Bill to want _ to go to the party.
Imagination pronouns do not have this property. Consider (46), for example.
(46) I imagined that I was George Lakoff and that I dreamt that I was Brigitte
Bardot and I kissed me.
Suppose that (46) is uttered by Sue. Then it can mean that Sue imagined a situation sl, in
which George Lakoff dreamt about a situation s2, in which what happened was that
Brigitte Bardot kissed George Lakoff, where Sue was imagining sl from the perspective
of George Lakoff and George Lakoff was dreaming about s2 from the perspective of
Brigitte Bardot. (This is admittedly confusing, but presumably we have to do something
like this in order to interpret a sentence like I imagined that I was Brigitte Bardot and I
kissed me.)
Now, on this interpretation of (46), the two underlined pronouns (I and me) are both
imagination pronouns; they refer to the person who the speaker is imagining themselves
to be, that is, George Lakoff. First look at the first one, I (in I dreamt that...). This
pronoun actually is in a position that is consistent with the immediateness requirement:
the most immediate attitude holder is the speaker, but the speaker is imagining
themselves to be George Lakoff, and so I refers de se to the most immediate attitude
holder. However, now consider the second underlined pronoun, me (in I kissed me). The
most immediate attitude holder is George Lakoff, but George Lakoff is dreaming from
the perspective of Brigitte Bardot, and thus me does not refer de se to the most immediate
attitude holder. Rather, it refers de se to the attitude holder one step higher - that is, the
speaker, imagining themselves to be George Lakoff.
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4.5. Explaining the Pattern
Given the analysis and assumptions from Sections 4.3-4.4 above, we can begin to make
sense of the contrast between Type I (Moore-paradoxical) cases on the one hand and
Type II (Yalcin's examples) and Type III cases on the other. (I won't call my explanation
a real solution because it has one significant problem related to compositionality, as I will
explain below.)
My basic claim is this: all three types of examples we have been discussing that
sound contradictory as assertions (including Moore-paradoxical sentences, Yalcin's
cases, and the rest) also create contradictions when imagined subjectively, i.e., when
embedded under subjective imagine. When imagined objectively, they do not necessarily
create contradictions; however, in all but the Moore-paradoxical cases, it is not possible
to use objective imagine in the first place because the embedded propositions are judge-
dependent. I will show this one case at a time.
Recall that Type III sentences are only contradictory under imagine if any relevant
pronouns are interpreted as imagination pronouns. Therefore, whenever I discuss
subjective imagine, I will assume that any such pronouns are imagination pronouns.
First consider a Moore-paradoxical case (Type I) such as (47).
(47) [Type I]
Imagine that it's raining but you don't know that it's raining.
(47) expresses a non-judge-dependent proposition, so in order for it to be embedded
under subjective imagine, it must be subjectivized. For this case, it won't matter whether
each conjunct is subjectivized separately or if the entire sentence is subjectivized as a
single unit, but in later cases it will be crucial that subjectivization always happen at the
lowest level. (This is where the compositionality problem will come in.) Thus I will do
the two conjuncts separately. Assuming you is an imagination pronoun, then according to
the definition from (37) above (Section 4.3), the subjectivized version of the two
conjuncts are the propositions given in (48). I use I[[]]4 sUBJ to stand for the subjectivized
version of the proposition expressed by sentence 4, and Selfimagine to stand for the
imagination self. As a reminder that you is to be interpreted as an imagination pronoun, I
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will again subscript it with "imag-self." Note also that I will be leaving out irrelevant
details of the internal composition of clauses.
(48) (a) [[it's rainingl]hsUBJ = [Xw . [Xt . [Xj . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: it's raining in w'
at t'] ] ]
(b) [[you don't know that it's raining1]€sUBJ
= [w . [,t . [Xj . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: Selfimagine doesn't know (in w' at t')
that it's raining in w' at t'] ] ]
When the conjunction of these is taken as the argument of subjective imagine, the
predicted meaning is given in (49).
(49) [[( 4 7 )]w*' t*j [when addressed to H and interpreted subjectively] =
[H is to make it so that]
V<w',t',x> e Imagine-SUBJw*,t*,H:
V<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: it's raining in w" at t" and
Selfimagine doesn't know (in w' at t') that it's raining
What this says is that (47) (on a subjective interpretation) instructs the hearer to make it
so that in all of their imagination alternatives <w',t',x>, x knows in w' at t' that it's
raining but the imagination self doesn't know in w' at t' that it's raining. But if <w',t',x>
is among the hearer's imagination alternatives, then <w',t',Selflmagine> is also among
them, and so the imagination self must also know in w' at t' that it's raining. This
contradicts the requirement of the second conjunct, and so the sentence yields a
contradiction.
However, (47) can also be interpreted with objective imagine, since the embedded
proposition is non-judge-dependent. In this case it will not create a contradiction. The
objectivized version of the embedded proposition is given in (50), using the definition
from (32) (Section 4.3). I use [[fq]O° BJ to stand for the objectivized version of the
proposition expressed by sentence 4.
(50) [[It's raining but you don't know that it's rainingo]IOBJ = [Xw . [Xt . it's
raining in w at t but you don't know that it's raining in w at t] ]
When this is taken as the argument of objective imagine, the resulting meaning is (51).
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(51) 0[(4 7 )]jw*, t*J [when addressed to H and interpreted objectively] =
[H is to make it so that]
V<w',t'>rImagine-OBJw*,t*,H: it's raining in w' at t' but H doesn't know
(in w' at t') that it's raining
On the objective interpretation, (47) instructs the hearer to make it so that in all of their
objective imagination alternatives <w',t'>, it's raining in w' at t' but they don't know that
it's raining. In other words, the hearer is to conjure up a situation or event where it's
raining but their bodily counterpart doesn't know this. Such a situation is perfectly
imaginable, and so this is not a contradiction and the sentence is acceptable.
Now let's turn to Type II cases (Yalcin's examples). Consider the sentence in (52).
(52) [Type II]
# Imagine that it isn't raining but it might be raining.
First, note that the embedded proposition is judge-dependent (since the second conjunct
is), and thus (52) cannot be embedded under objective imagine. That means that imagine
must be interpreted subjectively. Note that the first conjunct of the embedded sentence is
non-judge-dependent. I will assume that this means that this conjunct must be
subjectivized before it is conjoined with the second conjunct. This gives the proposition
in (53).
(53) [[it isn't raining]]SUBJ = [kw . [Xt . [Xj . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: it isn't
raining in w' at t'] ] ]
Recall that the proposition expressed by it might be raining is that in (54). (I will use a
D[AI]] to indicate the proposition expressed by the sentence 4.)
(54) l[it might be raining]]¢ = [kw . [Xt . [Lj . 3<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: it's raining
in w' at t'] ] ]
When the propositions in (53) and (54) are conjoined and embedded under subjective
imagine, the resulting meaning is given in (55).
(55) [( 5 2)]]w *t *j [when addressed to H and interpreted subjectively] =
[H is to make it so that]
V<w',t',x> e Imagine-SUBJw*,t*,H:
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V<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: it isn't raining in w" at t" and
3<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: it's raining in w" at t"
This says that (52) instructs the hearer to make it the case that in all of their imagination
alternatives -w',t',x>, x knows that it isn't raining and at the same time it's compatible
with x's knowledge that it's raining. This is a straightforward contradiction, and so this
interpretation is not possible. Since it is not possible in this case to use objective imagine
instead, the sentence is simply deviant.
My assumption that the first conjunct, it isn 't raining, is subjectivized separately
before being conjoined with the second conjunct is crucial, and rather troubling. The
assumption is crucial because the entire conjunction expresses a judge-dependent
proposition, and so (without the additional assumption) it ought to be possible to embed
it, as is, under subjective imagine. If this happened, then the requirement of knowing that
it isn't raining would not be introduced, and the sentence would not be contradictory. The
assumption is troubling because it seems to require that imagine "know" what kind of
proposition is denoted by each conjunct, rather than by its sentential argument as a whole.
This is a blatantly non-compositional requirement, equivalent to the generalization in
(56).
(56) Local Subjectivization Requirement: If z imagines subjectively that p & q,
then z must imagine subjectively that p and imagine subjectively that q.
I certainly hope that we can explain these phenomena related to Moorean paradoxes
without resorting to a non-compositional principle of this kind, but I leave it to future
work to see if it is possible to derive the generalization (56) from principles or
assumptions of a more compositional nature.
Finally, consider the Type III case in (57).
(57) [Type III]
# Imagine that the cake tastes good but it doesn't taste good to you.
As with the Type I case, I assume that you is an imagination pronoun. I also assume that
the argument of tastes good in the first conjunct is PROj. (If either of these did not hold,
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then the sentence would actually be acceptable, as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.4, and
thus would not pose a puzzle in the first place.) Now, note that, as with Type II cases, the
embedded proposition is judge-dependent, in this case because of the first conjunct.
Therefore the only possible interpretation of (57) is one using subjective imagine. As
with the Type II cases, I assume that the non-judge-dependent conjunct must be
subjectivized. The subjectivized version of this proposition is given in (58).
(58) [[the cake doesn't taste good to you]j]sUBJ
= [w . [Xt . [Xj . V<w',t',x>eEpistw,tj: the cake doesn't taste good to
SelfImagine in w' at t'] ] ]
When this is conjoined with the first conjunct and embedded under subjective imagine,
the resulting meaning is in (59).
(59) [(5 7)]]w*' t*j [when addressed to H and interpreted subjectively] =
[H is to make it so that]
V<w',t',x>l Imagine-SUBJw*,t*,H: the cake tastes good to x in w' at t' and
V<w",t",y>eEpistw,,t,,x: the cake doesn't taste good to SelfImagine in w" at t"
This means that (57) instructs the hearer to make it so that all of their imagination
alternatives <w',t',x> are such that the cake tastes good to x in w' at t' but at the same
time x knows (in w' at t') that the cake doesn't taste good to the imagination self. By the
Imagination Self Principle (44), this means that all of their imagination alternatives
<w',t',x> must be such that the cake tastes good to x but x knows that the cake doesn't
taste good to x, which is a contradiction.'1
In summary, then, all three types of sentences lead to contradictions when embedded
under subjective imagine. Type II and III examples are judge-dependent, and thus are
1 A difficulty arises with sentences like (i), which contains two epistemic modals, one of which is
embedded in an attitude report.
(i) # Imagine that it might be raining but you think it must not be raining.
This seems to behave like a Type III example, which is expected given that it contains one judge-dependent
conjunct and one non-judge-dependent conjunct. However, my proposal would predict that on a subjective
interpretation, (i) instructs the hearer to conjure up a situation where it is compatible with their knowledge
that it's raining but where they (know that) they believe that this is not compatible with their knowledge.
This is not actually a contradiction; rather, it should simply be asking the hearer to imagine being wrong
about their own knowledge, which is a perfectly coherent thing to imagine. Thus I do not have an
explanation for the behavior of (i), and leave it as an open puzzle.
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impossible with objective imagine as well. Type I examples, on the other hand, are non-
judge-dependent, and so they are possible with objective imagine, and in fact they do not
lead to contradictions when embedded under objective imagine.
4.6. Imagine with Non-Finite Complements
I will close with a prediction that my proposal makes when combined with the judge-
dependent view of control from Chapter 4. Consider example (60), alongside the regular
Moore-paradoxical case in (61).
(60) Imagine being surrounded by rain but not knowing that it's raining.
(Irene Heim, p.c.)
(61) Imagine that it's raining but you don't know that it's raining.
Note that (60) closely resembles (61): in both cases, the first conjunct of the embedded
sentence says something about the fact that it's raining, and the second conjunct says that
the imaginer doesn't know this fact. Note also that (60) is perfectly acceptable. What it
seems to do is ask the addressee to imagine being a person x such that x is surrounded by
rain and x doesn't know it.
Recall from Section 4.5 that (61) created a contradiction if imagine was interpreted
subjectively, but could be rescued by interpreting imagine objectively instead. It's
possible to use objective imagine in this case because the embedded proposition is non-
judge-dependent. Now, on my view from Chapter 4, the clauses being surrounded by rain
and not knowing that it's raining have PROj as their subject; thus the propositions
expressed by the two conjuncts are those in (62).
(62) (a) I[PROj being surrounded by rain]] = [Xw. [,t . [kj . j is surrounded by
rain in w at t] ] ]
(b) I[PROj not knowing that it's rainingl]] = [Xw. [Xt. [?j . j does not know
(in w at t) that it's raining] ] ]
These are judge-dependent propositions, and so of course the conjunction is as well. This
means that in (60), unlike (61), imagine can only be interpreted subjectively. At first
glance this seems to pose a problem: since Moore-paradoxical sentences create
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contradictions under subjective imagine, we might expect (60) to create a contradiction as
well, contrary to fact. (This would also follow the generalization in Section 4. 1.)
However, there is an important difference between the embedded clauses in (60) and
(61). In (61), the two conjuncts in the embedded clause expressed non-judge-dependent
propositions, and so they had to be subjectivized before they could be embedded under
subjective imagine. This added a layer of knowledge to the propositions, so that it's
raining became something like "you know that it's raining," which is what led to the
contradiction. In (60), in contrast, the two conjuncts express judge-dependent
propositions on their own, and thus do not need to be subjectivized. The proposition
taken as the argument of subjective imagine, then, is just the simple conjunction of (62a-
b), which is shown in (63).
(63) I[PROj being surrounded by rain and PROj not knowing that it's rainingl]]
= [kw . [,t . [Xj . j is surrounded by rain in w at t and j does not know (in
w at t) that it's raining] ] ]
When this is taken as the argument of subjective imagine, the resulting meaning is given
in (64).
(64) 0[( 6 0 )1]w*,t*j [when addressed to H and interpreted subjectively] =
[H is to make it so that]
V<w',t',x>lImagine-SUBJw*,t*,H: x is surrounded by rain in w' at t' and x
does not know (in w' at t') that it's raining
This says that (60) instructs the addressee to make it so that, roughly speaking, all of their
imagination alternatives are surrounded by rain but don't know that it's raining, which is
not a contradiction.
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Conclusions
1. Recap
In this dissertation I have developed a semantic and pragmatic theory based on the
premise that propositions are sets of world-time-individual triples, in contrast to standard
views that talke them to be sets of worlds or world-time pairs. Building on ideas of
Lasersohn (2005, 2006), I motivated this view in Chapter 2 with a puzzle that has been
observed separately for two classes of expressions: predicates of personal taste
(Lasersohn, 2005; also to some extent Mitchell, 1986) and epistemic modals (DeRose,
1991; Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson, 2005; MacFarlane, 2006; Egan, 2007). I then
extended the approach to indicative conditionals in Chapter 3 and de se control
constructions in Chapter 4. I also discussed how the judge-dependent system could be
used to help solve puzzles related to Moore's paradox in Chapter 5.
There are: two essential parts to my proposal, which are both introduced in Chapter 2.
The first part is semantic: a sentence is evaluated for truth or falsity not just at a world
and time but at a world, time, and individual, meaning that certain propositions are
subjective in a way that is reflected in the formal semantics. (This individual parameter is
mnemonically called the "judge," following Lasersohn's terminology.) For example, the
sentence the cake is tasty (on one possible reading) is true at a world-time-individual
triple <w,t,j> iff the cake tastes good to j in w at t. Informally, we can say that the cake is
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tasty iff it tastes good to "the judge." This much comes from Lasersohn (though I make a
few modifications to his view). As part of Chapter 2 I extend this approach to epistemic
modals; for example, I propose that the sentence it might be raining is true at a world-
time-individual triple <w,t,j> iff it is compatible with j's knowledge in w at t that it's
raining. If we take the view that indicative conditionals involve covert epistemic modals,
this gives a natural way to extend the view to conditionals as well, as I do in Chapter 3.
This turns out to provide solutions to a number of longstanding puzzles about
conditionals, in particular involving the purported inference from "not j or Y" to "if 4
then y" (which I claim is an illusion caused by the way epistemic modals interact with
predicates of belief).
The second part of the proposal is pragmatic, and this part is essential for most of the
explanatory force of the proposal. I propose a theory of conversation (adapted from
Stalnaker, 1978, 2002) where the context set is a set of world-time-individual triples. The
pragmatic proposal has two crucial pieces. First, in every world-time-individual triple
<w,t,x> that is a member of the context set of a conversation, x is the plurality of the
group of participants in the conversation. This means that we can talk about a "judge of
the conversation," which is always the entire group of conversational participants. The
second crucial piece is the norm of assertion: in essence, a speaker is allowed to assert a
proposition provided that it is true at the triple <world of utterance, time of utterance,
speaker> - in other words, if the sentence is true as judged by the speaker themselves.
(This follows in a straightforward way from the interaction of the semantics of belief with
the view of propositions as sets of world-time-individual triples.) However, because the
context set consists of triples whose individual parameter is the plurality of the group of
conversational participants, if the speaker's assertion is accepted by their interlocutors,
what becomes common ground, roughly speaking, is that the proposition is true as judged
by the whole group. Therefore a hearer will only be willing to accept an assertion if the
proposition asserted is true as judged by them.
This pragmatic view accounts for conversational stand-offs of the kind that occur in
(1)-(2).
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(1) Sam: This cake is tasty.
Sue: No it isn't, it tastes terrible!
(2) Sam: If the butler isn't the murderer, the cook is.
Sue: (No! / Nuh-uh!) If the butler isn't the murderer, the maid is.
In each case, both Sam and Sue are justified in making their assertions (since each
assertion is true as judged by the speaker), but their interlocutor is not willing to accept
their assertion, and so neither one can be added to the common ground. Since both are
allowed to make their assertions anyway, the argument could continue in the same vein
until the participants see its futility.
An additional theme that runs through this work has to do with the semantics of
attitude predicates. I pay special attention to think in Chapters 2 and 3; find and believe
(to a lesser extent) in Chapter 2; want in Chapter 4; persuade, convince, and tell (to a
lesser extent) also in Chapter 4; and imagine in Chapter 5. I put a particular emphasis on
accounting for the way attitude predicates interact with the expressions I look at such as
epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. I assume (following Lewis, 1979;
Chierchia, 1989, and others) that the meaning of think or believe, for example, involves
the notion of doxastic alternatives. An individual z's doxastic alternatives in world w at
time t are the set of triples <w',t',y> such that it's compatible with what z believes in w at
t that z (him-/herself) is y in w' at t'. I also suggest analogous notions for other attitude
predicates such as want and imagine.
Doxastic alternatives and analogous notions are independently needed to capture de
se attitudes, which are attitudes that crucially involve the attitude holder's "self." For
example, in (3) (based on an example by Chierchia, 1989), the desire expressed is not
simply a desire for Pavarotti to be a genius, but a desire of Pavarotti to himself be a
genius. In other words, for all the triples <w,t,x> such that it's compatible with what
Pavarotti wants for him to be x in w at t, x is a genius.
(3) Pavarotti wants to be a genius.
On my semantic view, sets of doxastic alternatives (and related notions) are the same
kind of formal object as propositions, which allows them to dovetail naturally. In Chapter
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4, I observe that this correctly predicts a de se property of embedded epistemic modals,
and show that another class of de se constructions including (3) can be straightforwardly
captured in the same way. In particular, I propose that in (3), for example, the infinitive
complement (PRO) to be a genius has a meaning that crucially depends on the individual
"judge" parameter: that is, (PRO) to be a genius is true at a world-time-individual triple
<w,t,j> iffj is a genius in w at t.
This means, then, that in certain cases, the implicit item that has traditionally been
called PRO can be reclassified as an item that simply refers to the judge. I call this item
PROj, and argue for it on independent grounds in Chapter 2 (to serve as an implicit
argument of predicates of personal taste). At the end of Chapter 4, I discuss some of the
implications of this approach for a traditional view of control.
In Chapter 5, I use the interaction of attitude predicates with the judge parameter to
develop a particular way of looking at the distinction between imagining something
"from the inside" and "from the outside." I discuss ways that this can help to solve some
puzzling facts that are broadly related to Moore's paradox.
In extending the reach of judge dependency to epistemic modals, conditionals, and
subjects of nonfinite clauses, my proposal goes well beyond any intuitive notion of a
"judge." While predicates of personal taste such as tasty andfun might seem intuitively to
involve the judgment of an individual, it's not at all obvious that this is true for these
other expressions. They do all have another property in common, though: in every
construction I have discussed that crucially involves the judge parameter, the judge
always represents the locus of an internal mental or psychological state that is important
for the interpretation of the construction in some way. Notice that I say every
construction, not every expression. For example, in the de se control constructions
discussed in Chapter 4, the judge-dependent lexical item involved is PROj, which simply
refers to the judge and does not by itself have anything to do with mental or
psychological states. Even the entire embedded infinitive clause need not say anything
about a mental or psychological state. However, the kinds of expressions that take these
infinitival sentences as arguments and operate on them in a way that crucially
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manipulates the judge parameter - i.e., control verbs - always involve mental or
psychological states held by the judge. My claim, then, is that in any place where the
judge parameter is crucial for interpretation at the level of an entire utterance, the judge
must represent the individual or group that has a particular mental or psychological state.
However, this is not a requirement of a local or compositional kind, but something like a
constraint that the grammatical system as a whole must conspire to satisfy. I leave it to
future work to investigate whether this characterization of the judge parameter is the right
one, and, if so, how to properly formulate this requirement.
2. Issues for Further Study
There are a number of questions and open problems which ought to be investigated in
future research, so I will introduce a few of them.
2.1. Broadening the Domain
I have extended the reach of Lasersohn's judge parameter beyond predicates of personal
taste likefun and tasty to epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, and certain infinitive
complements, but there are a number of other types of expressions that might be fruitfully
analyzed in similar terms. One example is vague scalar predicates; it seems plausible that
the location of the cutoff point for a term like red is somehow linked to the judge. We
would need to look at exactly how the cutoff point relates to the judge, and whether to
treat these items as inherently judge dependent (like epistemic modals) or optionally so
(as with predicates of personal taste, which are two-place predicates with the option of
taking PROj). Also, since predicates of personal taste such as fun and tasty are probably
also vague and scalar, in addition to being judge-dependent, we would need to see how
the judge dependency of the cutoff point interacts with the basic judge dependency of the
predicate.
Another example is raising predicates such as seem, appear, sound, and look. I
suspect that these are exactly parallel to predicates of personal taste: they take an
argument which can be made explicit (as in seem to x) or left implicit, and can either be
referential or be filled by PROj. However, I leave it to future research to see if this makes
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all the right predictions, and to see what other implications this might have either for
raising constructions or for the semantics of perception.
To give just one more example, I also think it's possible that other kinds of modality
besides epistemic modality also have a component of judge dependency, particularly
those that involve internal psychological states. This does not include purely deontic
modals such as can and may (on their meanings denoting permission), be allowed to, and
related expressions such as allowed, permissible, etc. These are generally understood
with respect to a salient set of rules, and it is likely that the particular set of rules involved
is determined purely according to context, as originally proposed by Kratzer (1977, 1981,
1991 a). However, such items as should and ought to may involve reference to the value
system or priorities of the judge. This judge-dependent component could potentially
either take the place of or come in addition to a component of meaning giving it less than
universal strength (as proposed, e.g., by von Fintel & Iatridou, 2006).
One class of expressions that I suspect are not amenable to an analysis using the
judge parameter includes items with a spatial or temporal orientation such as in front of,
behind, local, prior, and so on. These include many of the "perspectival" expressions
discussed by Mitchell (1986) (though he places predicates of personal taste in the same
class). This is consistent with my claim that crucial uses of the judge parameter always
involve internal mental or psychological states. The empirical reason behind my
suspicion, though, is that it is particularly difficult to imagine a coherent dialogue along
the lines of (4).
(4) [Context: Sam and Sue are standing on opposite sides of a room facing each other. There
is a table between them in the middle of the room, and a lamp on the side of the table
closer to Sue.]
Sam: The lamp is behind the table.
Sue: # No, it isn't, it's in front of the table!
Sue's response seems odd in this context, unless perhaps she is deliberately
misunderstanding Sam to make a joke. This contrasts with similar dialogues using
predicates of personal taste such as (1), but it would be worth investigating to what extent
the two classes are sharply distinct and to what extent this is a matter of degree.
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2.2. Compositional Matters
I have assumed, for example, that taste good means the same thing as tasty, but have not
said anything about how appropriate meanings for taste and good would combine
compositionally to derive this meaning (and similarly for taste great, taste terrible, smell
good, and so on). This is not trivial, since things can be said to taste good, sound good,
smell good, etc. and also to be good. Good is a highly vague expression (in the everyday
sense of "vague") and also highly context-dependent, but its meaning seems to become
much more specific when combined with something like taste or smell. It is not clear to
start with, then, whether taste should take good as an argument (so that "good" is a way
of tasting) or if good should take taste as an argument (so that tasting good is a way of
being good). In addition, since most predicates of personal taste are scalar, a fuller view
of their semantics should be put together with an appropriate semantics of degree-
denoting expressions.
2.3. Factivity and Double-Access Sentences
Lasersohn (2006) observes that when a predicate of personal taste is embedded under a
factive verb such as recognize, as in (5), the factive presupposition comes out as a
requirement on the taste of the speaker. (This is so even though the assertion involves the
taste of the subject.)
(5) Sam recognizes that licorice is tasty.
(Lasersohn, 2006)
For (5) to be true and felicitous, licorice must taste good both to Sam and to the speaker,
and Sam must be aware that it tastes good to him. According to Lasersohn, this is
predicted by his system. It is also predicted by my pragmatic view under obvious
assumptions. Assuming that "x recognizes that p" presupposes that p, and that
presupposing: p involves treating it as already being in the common ground, then a
speaker who utters (5) must agree that licorice is tasty. In fact, my view predicts that the
speaker must be assuming that the other participants in the conversation also think that
licorice is tasty, which seems to be correct.
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On the other hand, there are similar cases involving attitude predicates commonly
thought to be factive where there is no such requirement on the speaker. One example is
(6), which uses discover.
(6) Last summer Sam discovered that rollerblading was fun.
It seems to me (and other English speakers I have consulted) that (6) does not commit the
speaker to thinking that rollerblading is fun (or even that it used to be fun last summer).
Here we can only infer that rollerblading was fun for Sam - that is, for (6) to be true and
felicitous, it only needs to be the case that (last summer, at least) rollerblading was fun
for Sam, and Sam discovered this. For the moment, I will refer to the kind of factivity
that applies to (5) as "full factivity" and the kind that applies to (6) as "partial factivity."
(This does not necessarily have any connection to notions of "strong" and "weak"
factivity that have sometimes been proposed, which is why I have avoided using these
terms.)
I should note that the "partial" factivity that shows up in (6) does not itself pose a
problem for my view, in fact quite the contrary. We could simply analyze discover in
terms of epistemic alternatives, so that "x discovers p" is true iff p is true at all of x's
epistemic alternatives (as a result, perhaps, of some kind of event of observation).
Epistemic alternatives have a built-in notion of factivity that is only partial in the sense
above: the epistemic alternatives of an individual z in world w at time t must always
include the triple <w,t,z> itself (I referred to this as the "factivity principle" in Chapter
3), but they need not include any other triples of the form <w,t,y> for any y not identical
to z. In other words, we could treat the full factivity of recognize in (5) as a true
pragmatic presupposition, which treats the content of the complement clause as already
being in the common ground; and at the same time we could treat the partial factivity of
discover in (6) as arising purely from the lexical semantics of the predicate. (This should
probably not be conflated with notions of"pragmatic presupposition" and "semantic
presupposition" that are sometimes used.) In fact, then, my view predicts that we should
find these two different types of factivity.
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However, there is a twist. Consider what happens if the embedded past tense in (6) is
changed to present tense, as in (7), making a so-called "double-access" construction (see
Abusch, 1988, 1991; Ogihara, 1995).
(7) Last summer Sam discovered that rollerblading is fun.
To assert (7), the speaker must again share the opinion that rollerblading is fun. Compare
this to a run-of-the-mill double-access sentence such as (8a). (I am using an example with
a factive predicate to make things simpler.)
(8) (a) Sam found out that Mary is pregnant.
(Ogihara, 1995, no. 27)
(b) Sam found out that Mary was pregnant.
(Ogihara, 1995, no. 28)
The sentence in (8a) carries the additional requirement that Mary's pregnancy be ongoing
at the time of utterance; this requirement does not hold for (8b).
It seems intuitively plausible that the extra level of factivity that arises in (7) is
somehow related to the extra temporal requirement that arises in (8a), but it is not
immediately obvious how to make the connection formally. It would be interesting to
investigate further exactly what the relationship is between judge dependency, factivity,
and the temporal and aspectual properties of embedded clauses in attitude reports.
2.4. Final Remarks
I will close by drawing attention to what I see as the two crucial ways that my proposal
alters basic standard assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of natural language.
First, sentences no longer have truth conditions as normally construed: knowing what a
sentence means is not just a matter of knowing what the world has to be like for it to be
true, but may also require knowing what one's own internal mental or psychological state
must be like. Similarly a group of people engaging in a conversation of the typical,
information-exchanging sort can no longer be seen as simply narrowing down what world
they're in and what time it is; they must also, in a sense, be narrowing down who they
are, as a group, and what sorts of internal mental or psychological states they have in
201
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common. On one way of thinking, these changes constitute a trivial formal extension of
existing systems; on another way of thinking, they represent a fundamentally different
way of looking at meaning and conversation. My thoughts are still mixed about which
way to look at it.
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